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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis concerns fallacies in judicial interpretation. The central contention of this thesis is that 
judges commit certain fallacies when interpreting language and that it is possible to detect such 
fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when they occur.  
 
An instance of judicial interpretation is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant 
consideration and it is most likely that a different result would have been reached if that 
consideration had been omitted, or when it omits a relevant consideration and it is most likely that a 
different result would have been reached if that relevant consideration had been taken into account.  
 
The thesis identifies two specific fallacies which involve judges introducing an irrelevant 
consideration and usually involve judges omitting relevant considerations. These two fallacies are 
errors of categorisation, and occur when judges make an interpretive decision on the basis of the 
irrelevant consideration of the verbal category to which an item can be assigned rather than the 
relevant considerations which determine the legal category to which it should be assigned.  
 
These two fallacies are detected by assessing whether an instance of interpretation is merely based 
on the verbal category to which an item can be assigned or whether it is justified by relevant 
considerations. Alternative, non-fallacious interpretations are arrived at by introducing any relevant 
considerations and omitting any irrelevant considerations.  
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The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1  Mark 2:28 The Holy Bible (King James Version). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis2 investigates fallacies in judicial interpretation. Fallacies in judicial interpretation are 
instances of the judicial interpretation of language that are not legally justified and reach the wrong3 
result. The primary aim of this thesis is to provide a way to critique instances of judicial 
interpretation and determine whether certain fallacies have been committed.4 It also provides a way 
for judges to avoid these fallacies.  
 
The central contention of this thesis is that judges commit certain fallacies when interpreting 
language and that it is possible to detect such fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-fallacious 
interpretations when they occur.  
 
To prove this contention, there are three things this thesis does: first, it provides a general definition 
of when an instance of judicial interpretation is fallacious; second, it identifies specific fallacies that 
have been committed by judges, and provides a method by which such fallacies can be detected; 
and third, it provides a method by which alternative, non-fallacious interpretations can be reached 
for the specific fallacies identified. 
 
This thesis has six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two introduces the topic 
of judicial interpretation by briefly discussing some basic issues related to language, law and 
judicial interpretation. Chapter Two concludes with two groups of questions which are addressed in 
the remainder of this thesis: first, general questions regarding the relationship between law and 
language, and second, specific questions regarding fallacies in judicial interpretation. 
 
Chapter Three analyses the ordinary interpretation of language5 and discusses some fallacies in such 
interpretation to provide a foundation from which to analyse judicial interpretation.  
                                               
2  The word ‘thesis’ is ambiguous, and can be used to refer to both a complete research dissertation and to the specific 
proposition that is proven in such a dissertation. In this paper, the word ‘thesis’ will be used to refer to this entire 
dissertation and the word ‘contention’ will be used to refer to the proposition that is proven in this thesis.  
3  What it means for a result to be ‘wrong’ will be discussed at Chapter Four C.1. 
4  The word ‘commit’ will be used in relation to fallacies because this is the common word used with reference to 
fallacies. This word should not be taken to have any legal connotation. 
5 The ordinary interpretation of language means the interpretation of language outside the law. It is in contrast to the 
interpretation of language by the judiciary. 
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Chapter Four analyses judicial interpretation. It provides a general definition of fallacious 
interpretation and identifies two specific fallacies. Following this, it analyses some instances of 
judicial interpretation, detects these two fallacies, and provides alternative, non-fallacious 
interpretations. It concludes by addressing the specific questions raised in Chapter Two regarding 
fallacies in judicial interpretation.  
 
Chapter Five addresses the general questions raised in Chapter Two regarding the relationship 
between law and language.  
 
Chapter Six provides a conclusion to the thesis showing how the central contention has been 
proven. 
 
This thesis deals with the judicial interpretation of legal documents such as statutes, regulations, 
contracts, and wills, and focuses on instances of judicial interpretation that involve categorisation.6 
Two specific fallacies are identified which occur when judges make interpretive decisions on the 
basis of the verbal category to which an item can be assigned rather than the relevant legal 
considerations which determine the legal category to which it should be assigned.  
 
The analysis in this thesis applies to judicial interpretation under the Common Law legal system, 
but is not limited to any specific jurisdiction7 or to any particular area of the law. This analysis, 
therefore, applies very broadly. This means that detailed considerations concerning interpretation in 
particular areas of the law are not introduced unless they are relevant to the specific cases being 
discussed. Therefore, this thesis does not provide a descriptive analysis of the current process of 
interpretation in any specific area of the law, but rather provides an analysis of judicial 
interpretation in the abstract. 
 
References to places within this thesis are given by the heading level (for instance, Chapter Three 
B.2.(a).) if an entire section is being referred to. More specific references are given by referring to 
                                               
6 For a detailed discussion of the instances of judicial interpretation on which this thesis focuses, see Chapter Four 
B.1.(a). 
7  Legal terminology sometimes differs between jurisdictions, with either the same words being used with different 
meanings or different words being used with similar meanings. In the general discussion in the thesis, the 
terminology that applies all jurisdictions has been adopted, for instance, the phrase ‘the legislature’ has been used 
rather than ‘Parliament’ or ‘Congress’. When discussing specific judicial decisions, however, the terminology from 
the jurisdiction under discussion has been adopted. 
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the footnote number, or the text or paragraph accompanying a certain footnote.8 
 
                                               
8  When referring to a specific sentence or quotation, there is a reference the text accompanying a footnote. When 
referring to a specific paragraph, there is a reference to the paragraph accompanying a footnote. This is not to 
highlight that particular footnote, but is just a convenient way to refer to that specific paragraph.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LANGUAGE, LAW AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
 
A Introduction 
 
Much has been written on the topic of judicial interpretation from many different points of view and 
many issues have been raised regarding the relationship between law and language and the nature of 
judicial interpretation. In order to provide an introduction to this topic, this chapter briefly sets out 
some basic issues and viewpoints related to language, law and judicial interpretation. Specifically, it 
looks at the importance of language to the law, the relationship between law and language, and the 
role of judicial interpretation in the law. The chapter concludes with two groups of questions which 
will be addressed in the remainder of this thesis.   
 
B Language 
 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of human beings is the ability to use language.9 At first 
blush, it may seem that language is primarily used to communicate thoughts and feelings.10 Even 
more basic than this, however, is the constitutive role of language in relation to thought itself. In 
many cases, it is language that enables abstract or complex thought. Language is also the primary 
means people use to conceptually categorise the various items in the world.11 Language, therefore, 
on the one hand, is an internal medium12 of thoughts and feelings and, on the other hand, enables 
people to conceptualise the external world. Language plays a crucial role both in comprehending 
                                               
9 This has been frequently noted by theorists. Possessing languages and dialects has been described as “a uniquely 
human characteristic.” Laurie Bauer & Peter Trudgill Language Myths (Penguin Books Limited, London, 1998) at 
xviii; S Morris Engel claimed that “[h]uman beings can be defined as talking animals.” Fallacies and Pitfalls of 
Language (Dover Publications, Inc, New York, 1994) at 1; Steven Pinker noted that “[i]n any natural history of the 
human species, language would stand out as the preeminent trait.” The Language Instinct (Penguin Books Limited, 
London, 1994) at 16. Various definitions that have been given to ‘language’ are discussed at Chapter Three (B).  
10  A C Gimson starts an article by stating: “We use language primarily as a means of communication with other human 
beings.” “The Transmission of Language” in Randolph Quirk The Use of English (Longmans, Green and Company 
Limited, 1962) 259 at 259. 
11 See John M Ellis Language, Thought, and Logic (Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL), 1993) at ch 3. 
12 See Lera Boroditsky and Jesse Prinz “What Thoughts Are Made Of” in Gün R Semin and Eliot R Smith (eds) 
Embodied Grounding (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) 98. The authors argue that “the acquisition of 
knowledge … is simultaneously grounded in perceptual experience and enmeshed within a linguistic system.” (at 
112).  
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things in the world and in engaging in thought. As will be seen, it is important to clearly grasp the 
relationship between words, thoughts and things. 
 
Having said this, communication is also a crucial function of language. Language helps people to 
understand each other and cooperate with each other. Furthermore, language enables people to pass 
information on to subsequent generations.13 For these reasons, societies are able to advance by 
means of language.  
 
Language, however, can be dangerous. Language not only creates the possibility for understanding, 
but also for misunderstanding. Francis Bacon noted: “Men imagine that their minds have command 
of language, but it often happens that language bears rule over their minds.”14 Similar sentiments 
have frequently been expressed. S Morris Engel remarked: “Although language seems the oldest, 
the easiest, and the most natural of our gifts, it is in reality one of the most difficult, subtle, and 
treacherous of them.”15 Anatol Rapoport claimed that:16 
 
[I]t is symbolic language that generates the tremendous excess baggage of false knowledge cluttering up 
our existence … It is symbolic language that makes possible the manipulation of the many by the few. 
 
Such scepticism17 concerning language may be justified. On the one hand, language can be used by 
speakers to deliberately misinform and manipulate hearers. On the other hand, and perhaps more 
dangerously, language can unconsciously mislead both speakers and hearers.18  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13  This function of language was an important part of what Alfred Korzybski called ‘time-binding’, which he defined 
as “a capacity to collect all known experiences of different individuals.” Alfred Korzybski Science and Sanity (5th 
ed, Institute of General Semantics, New Jersey, 1994) at 376.  
14 Quoted by Simeon Potter in Language in the Modern World (Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, 1960) at 19.  
15  Engel, above n 9, at 1. 
16  Anatol Rapoport Semantics (Thomas Y Crowell Company, New York, 1975) at 16. 
17  A fear of language has been given the name ‘logophobia’ (Peter Farb Word Play (Coronet Books, London, 1973) at 
158). Compare n 20. 
18  There have been a number of books written on the dangers of language. These include: Stuart Chase The Tyranny of 
Words (6th ed, Methuen & Company Limited, Great Britain, 1947); Engel, above n 9; and CK Ogden and IA 
Richards The Meaning of Meaning (10 ed, Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London, 1949). 
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C Law and Language 
 
It is possible to draw various parallels between law19 and language. Just as having a language is a 
distinctive human characteristic, having a system of laws or rules may be a universal characteristic 
of human societies. Just as language is necessary to communicate thoughts and feelings, law is 
necessary to communicate the legislature’s intention. Just as language is essential for the advance of 
society, law is also an important factor in such advancement. Just as people can be fearful of being 
misled by language, people are often sceptical about law.20 Theorists have also noted other parallels 
between law and language.21  
 
Furthermore, language is essential to the operation of the law. Statutes, regulations and other legal 
documents are drafted in language. Judicial decisions are given in language and often involve the 
interpretation of language. Lawyers advise clients, prepare briefs, and plead cases using language. 
Words have often been considered the tools of the lawyer’s and judge’s trade.22 To be a successful 
lawyer or judge, therefore, requires the skilful use of language.23  
 
A number of theorists have gone further to claim that law is language24 or have made related 
                                               
19  The meaning of ‘law’ in this context refers to a legal system generally, and includes both oral and written law.  
20  Interestingly, Christopher Hutton noted: “Fear and mistrust of language frequently go together with fear and mistrust 
of law (‘jurisphobia’)” Christopher Hutton Language, Meaning and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2009) at 4. Just as there have been books written on the dangers of language, there have been sceptical 
books written about the law. For instance, two sceptical books written by American legal realists are Fred Rodell 
Woe Unto You, Lawyers (Pageant Press, New York, 1957) and Jerome Frank Courts on Trial (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1950) [Courts]. 
21 “Language, like law, is a living thing. It grows and changes. It both reflects and shapes the communities that use it.” 
Terrill Pollman and Judith M Stinson “IRLAFARC! Surveying the Language of Legal Writing” (2004) 56 Me L Rev 
239 at 240; “Law and language are structurally similar. They are generated through social practices, resulting in 
organized and more or less formalized communication systems, in the sense that they are both governed by their 
own rules of creation and reproduction.” Edgardo Rotman “The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical 
Aspects” (1995) 6 Ind Int’l & Comp L Rev 187 at 188; “With both language and law, theorists have … tried to 
locate a single source of order, regularity, coherence, authority or sovereignty.” Hutton, above n 20, at 5. 
22 See Zechariah Chafee “The Disorderly Conduct of Words” (1941) 41 Colum L Rev 381 at 382; Glanville Williams 
“Language and the Law” (1945) 61 Law Q Rev 71 at 71; JJ Spigelman “Words, Words, Words” (2007) 81 Australian 
Law Journal 601 at 601; and Richard V Barndt “Language and Logic in the Law” (1964) 43 Tex L Rev 86 at 86. 
23 “A facility with words is a desirable attribute for a good lawyer.” Gerard McMeel “Language and the Law Revisited: 
An Intellectual History of Contractual Interpretation” (2005) 34 Comm L World Rev 256 at 256.  
24 “The relation between language and the law is so intimate that it is not far-fetched to say that law is essentially 
language.” Rotman, above n 21, at 187; “The specific purpose of this study has been to develop the theoretical basis 
for an interdisciplinary approach to law and legal texts as language or as linguistic practice.” Peter Goodrich Legal 
Discourse (St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987) at ix. See also the slightly different claims: “Law is in a full sense a 
language” James Boyd White “Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature” (1982) 60 Tex L Rev 415 at 
415, and “Our law is a law of words.” Peter M Tiersma “The Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing 
Interpretation from Construction” (1995) 73 Wash U L Q 1095 at 1095 [“Ambiguity”].  
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claims.25 It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions from such claims, and they need to be 
assessed on their own merits. Such claims, however, do show that a close relationship has been 
recognised between law and language. 
 
Rather than considering whether law should be regarded as language, it is more useful at this stage 
to consider some specific claims that have been made concerning the relationship between law and 
language. First, it has been said that laws are expressed in language.26 The term ‘laws’ in such a 
claim refers to specific legal rules. Such rules are expressed in language, for instance, in the text of 
statutes. Second, statutes, judicial decisions and various other items (most of which consist of 
language) have been described as sources of law.27 This means that such items function as the 
origins of law. The term ‘law’ in such a claim is more general than the term ‘laws’, and is an 
abstraction referring to the whole system of rules, conventions, and principles that are recognised as 
law.28 Third, language has been described as the medium of the law.29 The phrase ‘the law’ in this 
claim is also an abstraction and probably refers to an entire legal system. The practical operation of 
such a system is conducted in language, for instance, the language of statutes, private legal 
documents and judicial decisions. Thus, language functions as the medium of the law.30  
 
Therefore, at an abstract level, language functions as the medium within which a legal system 
operates. More concretely, the language of certain documents functions as the source of law. 
Furthermore, specific legal rules are expressed in language. Thus, language functions as the 
medium of the law, the source of law, and the means for laws to be expressed. These three aspects 
                                               
25 It has also been claimed that law is communication (Mark Van Hoecke Law as Communication (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2002)), law is rhetoric (James Boyd White “Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and 
Communal Life” (1985) 52 U Chi L Rev 684), and that law is a code (Goodrich, above n 24, at 65).  
26 “Laws are expressed in language.” Lawrence M Solan “Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and 
Rules in Legal Interpretation” (2001) 26 Law & Soc Inquiry 243 at 267.  
27  “[M]ost of what we call law consists of words, whether in the form of statutes, judicial opinions, or the myriad other 
sources of law.” Tiersma “Ambiguity”, above n 24, at 1095.  
28  J C Gray’s notes that statutes are “to be dealt with as sources of Law, and not as part of the Law itself” The Nature 
and Sources of the Law (The Columbia University Press, New York, 1909) at s 276. Other sources of law that Gray 
gives include: “judicial precedents, opinions of experts, customs, and principles of morality (using morality as 
including public policy).” (at s 274). Regardless of whether such sources are viewed as part of the law or merely as 
sources of law, it can be said that they are origins of law. Most of these sources consist of language, and even though 
customs and principles may not initially be expressed in language, for them to function as sources of law they need 
to be recognised and this recognition requires their expression in language. 
29 “Language is the medium through which law acts.” Brian Bix Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1993) at 1.  
30  This distinction between ‘laws’, ‘law’ and ‘the law’ is useful for making sense of these claims regarding the 
relationship between law and language, but should not be applied to every use of these words. It is worth noting that 
not only is the meaning of ‘law’ slightly different in each of these uses, but the language referred to may also be 
different. Thus, it can be misleading to compare statements about the relationship between law and language, since 
the meanings of both ‘law’ and ‘language’ may be different in each statement. 
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of the relationship between law and language can be summarised by saying that law is embodied in 
language.  
 
D Judicial Interpretation  
 
For the successful operation of a legal system, however, the law does not merely need to be 
embodied, but needs to be applied to concrete situations. The law is applied to situations by judicial 
decisions, which often involve the interpretation of the language in which the law is embodied.  
 
Judicial interpretation has, on the one hand, been viewed as being limited to ascertaining the 
meaning of the law by interpretation rather than creating the law.31 Proponents of this view may 
hold a declaratory view of law: that “judges find (or declare) law rather than make law.”32 This is 
the view that the judges’ task is “not … to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the 
old one.”33 On the other hand, judicial interpretation has been viewed as a form of legislating.34 On 
this view, judicial interpretation involves creating the law, not merely expounding it. Judicial 
interpretation itself has even been viewed as ‘the law’.35 Conversely, law has been viewed as 
interpretation.36  
 
Before comparing such claims it is important to ascertain whether they are referring to the same 
kind of interpretation. In relation to the interpretation of statutes, one theorist may argue that a 
court’s job is limited to interpreting the law (that is, the rules embodied in the text of statutes). In 
                                               
31 “A court does not legislate and it does not enforce the law, it can only interpret and apply the law.” Margaret 
O’Toole “Lawyer’s response to language constructing law” in John Gibbons (ed) Language and the Law (Longman 
Group UK Limited, Harlow, 1994) 188 at 189.  
32 William S Brewbaker III “Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory” 
(2006-2007) 22 J L & Religion 255 at 256. 
33 William Blackstone The Commentaries on the Laws of England (Robert Malcolm Kerr (ed)) (4th ed, John Murray, 
London, 1876) vol 1 at 47, quoted in Brewbaker, above n 32, at 256. Compare Matthew Krygier’s remark that “even 
in hard cases the law governs judicial decisions.” “Julius Stone: Leeways of Choice, Legal Tradition and the 
Declaratory Theory of Law” (1986) 9 UNSWLJ 26 at 26. 
34 For example, Jerome Frank stated: “Legislative legislation … often calls for interpretation which compels judicial 
legislation necessary to carry out the legislature’s purpose.” Frank Courts, above n 20, at 294. 
35 J C Gray stated: “It has sometimes been said that the Law is composed of two parts, – legislative law and judge-
made law, but in truth all the Law is judge-made law. The shape in which a statute is imposed on the community as a 
guide for conduct is that statute as interpreted by the courts. The courts put life into the dead words of the statute.” 
Gray, above n 28, at s 276. A similar point was made by Karl N Llewellyn when he referred to “judges or sheriffs or 
clerks or jailers or lawyers” as “officials of the law” and stated: “What these officials do about disputes is, to my 
mind, the law itself.” The Bramble Bush (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 5 (italics in original). 
Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes’ remark: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” “The Path of the Law” (1897) 1 Boston L School Mag 1 at 4. 
36 Ronald Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Tex L Rev 527. 
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relation to the common law, another theorist may claim that a judge’s role is to create the law, rather 
than interpret it.37 It is misleading to contrast such claims and suggest that they show different ways 
of viewing judicial interpretation when they are really describing different kinds of judicial 
interpretation. Furthermore, it is important to draw a distinction between judicial interpretation of 
language and judicial interpretation of the law.38 Although the judicial interpretation of language 
involves the interpretation of the law embodied in that language, statements solely related to the 
judicial interpretation of law should not be applied to the judicial interpretation of language.39  
 
Having said this, it is still possible to discern two basic views regarding the judicial interpretation of 
language. On the one hand, the judicial interpretation of language can be viewed as ascertaining the 
meaning of the law, and, on the other hand, such interpretation can be viewed as creating the law.40 
There is much involved in this dispute about the role of the judicial interpretation of language in the 
law, but, on any view, it is clear that the law is applied to concrete situations by such 
interpretation.41 This includes not merely statutory interpretation, but judicial interpretation 
generally. For instance, a judicial decision regarding the interpretation of a will or a contract is the 
application of the law to the situation at issue in the sense that it is a legally recognised binding 
interpretation.42  
 
The relationship between law and language, therefore, involves both embodiment and application. 
The law needs to be embodied in language, and this embodied law needs to be applied by the 
interpretation of the language in which it is embodied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
37  For instance, Glanville Williams defined the common law as “the power of judges to create new law under the guise 
of interpreting it.” Learning the Law (10th ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1978) at 26.  
38  This thesis is looking at the judicial interpretation of language rather than merely judicial interpretation of the law, 
which may not involve any explicit interpretation of language.  
39  For instance, see Glanville Williams’ statement regarding the common law, quoted in n 37. 
40  On both views, judicial interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of language.  
41 This does not, however, mean that the law is only applied to situations by the interpretation of language. Even 
judicial decisions that do not explicitly involve interpretation involve the application of the law.  
42  For a further discussion of this, see the paragraph accompanying n 238. 
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This relationship between law and language is depicted by Diagram 2.1, below. 
 
 
 
This diagram43 depicts the relationship between law and language in a simple way. It also shows the 
role of judicial interpretation in the law. Although useful as a starting point, this diagram has its 
shortcomings. First, the ‘legal drafting’ referred to is limited to statutory drafting, since it is not 
usually claimed that the drafting of contracts or other legal documents involves the embodiment of 
law.44 Thus, this diagram omits some legally significant uses of language. Second, the concept of 
‘abstract law’ is questionable, and this concept may create confusion.45 Third, this diagram does not 
show what the processes of legal drafting or judicial interpretation involve, or how they are related 
to one another.46 Diagram 2.1, therefore, is not sufficient to adequately explain the relationship 
between law and language and the role of judicial interpretation in the law. There is the need to 
examine the use of language in the law in more detail to understand the relationship between law 
and language and the role of judicial interpretation clearly. 
 
The next section of this chapter will raise some questions to be addressed in this thesis regarding the 
relationship between language and the law and fallacies in judicial interpretation. Before doing this, 
however, it is important to address the issue of whether an instance of judicial interpretation can 
ever be fallacious.  
 
At the beginning of Chapter One, fallacies in judicial interpretation were defined as instances of 
                                               
43  The processes depicted here – the embodiment of law and the application of law – are returned to in more detail in 
Chapter Four. That chapter discusses ‘legal speaking’ and ‘legal interpretation’, which are similar to these two 
processes.  
44  Although such documents are legally significant, they are not usually viewed as involving the embodiment of law. 
For instance, a contract can be seen as the embodiment of a legally enforceable promise. The law recognises such a 
promise, but the promise is not generally viewed as part of the law itself.  
45  Oliver Wendell Holmes belittled the view of the law as an abstraction by stating: “The common law is not a 
brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be 
identified” Southern Pacific Co v Jensen (1917) 244 US 205 (SC) at 222. 
46  A more detailed depiction of two similar processes is given in Diagram 4.6. A different view of the relationship 
between law and language is depicted in Diagram 5.1 (which depicts the relationship between the law and 
language). 
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judicial interpretation that are not legally justified and reach the wrong result. There are difficulties, 
however, with claiming that an instance of judicial interpretation is wrong. In most situations, 
judges have the discretion to make whatever decision they want to make.47 Furthermore, once 
language has been judicially interpreted, it means what the judge says it means.48 In this sense, it is 
not a question of a right or wrong interpretation, but a question of who has the authority to make the 
decision on meaning. Apart from a decision being reversed on appeal or overturned by legislative 
action,49 an instance of interpretation cannot be legally challenged. Thus, it cannot be said that the 
decisions are legally wrong merely because they appear to be unjustified.  
 
Having said this, although an interpretive decision may be legally valid in that it is a legally 
authoritative interpretation, it may still be unjustified in that the reasons given for the decision do 
not support the decision reached. This thesis will use the word ‘fallacy’ to describe an instance of 
interpretation that reaches a result that is not legally justified because the reasons given for the 
decision do not support the decision reached. Such fallacious decisions will also sometimes be 
referred to as ‘wrong’ decisions. This does not mean that are not legally valid, but it means that they 
have not been legally justified.50 
 
There are also difficulties with describing an instance of fallacious interpretation as a mistaken 
interpretation. It is not possible to claim definitively that a judge has made a mistake in 
interpretation. Because of the subjective nature of interpretation, it may be impossible to know 
whether an unjustifiable interpretive decision was deliberate, or whether it was caused by an 
oversight on the part of the judge. A judge may deliberately interpret a provision in an unjustifiable 
way. In such a situation, although the judge may not have been mistaken, the interpretation is still 
fallacious. Therefore, this thesis will refer to ‘fallacies’, rather than ‘mistakes’.  
 
 
                                               
47  In practice, judicial decisions may be constrained in certain ways, for instance, by binding precedent. The point 
being made here is that within the limits of their authority, judges are not constrained to interpret a provision in a 
specific way.  
48  “Once a decision has been made, the meaning of the words of the statute is what the judge says it is.” Yon Mayley 
“The language of the law” in John Gibbons (ed) Language and the Law (Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow, 
1994) 11 at 31.  
49  The legal principle established in a case can also be overruled by a subsequent decision of a higher court, but this 
does not mean that this specific instance of interpretation is changed for the parties involved. It does mean, however, 
that it is no longer good law.  
50  This point about wrong decisions is discussed in more detail at Chapter Four C.1. 
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E Questions for this Thesis 
 
This chapter has briefly discussed various views regarding law, language and judicial interpretation. 
Based on this discussion some general questions can be raised: 
 
1. What is a useful way to describe the nature of the relationship between law and language?  
2. Why is language important to the law?  
3. To what extent does the nature of language determine the nature of the law? 
4. Is the law merely contained in language, or is this language itself the law?  
5. If a distinction is drawn between the words of the law and the law, what is the law as 
opposed to the words of the law?  
6. Does changing the words of statutes or other legal documents change the law?  
7. When judges determine the meaning of language, do they create the law or do they merely 
interpret the meaning of the law?  
 
Questions raised at this level of generality can be answered in many ways. Furthermore, such 
questions may rely on unsubstantiated assumptions. It is clearer if more specific questions about the 
nature of judicial interpretation are addressed before an attempt is made to address these general 
questions.  
 
A more specific question that this thesis needs to address is: ‘What causes an instance of judicial 
interpretation to be legally justified?’ Once this question has been addressed, a more detailed 
definition of judicial fallacies can be given.51 The method of addressing this question in this thesis 
is to compare judicial interpretation with ordinary interpretation. This thesis will investigate specific 
fallacies in judicial interpretation similar to certain fallacies committed in ordinary interpretation. 
This question can therefore be expanded into a group of questions related to the comparison 
between legal interpretation52 and ordinary interpretation and to fallacies in judicial interpretation: 
 
 
 
                                               
51  This question is addressed at Chapter Four B.3 and a definition of judicial fallacies is given at Chapter Four C.1. 
52  The phrases ‘legal interpretation’ and ‘judicial interpretation’ are used interchangeably in this thesis, both referring 
to interpretation by the judiciary, with the choice of phrase depending on what is being emphasised in the specific 
context. ‘Judicial interpretation’ emphasises the role of the judiciary in interpretation and ‘legal interpretation’ is in 
contrast to ordinary interpretation and emphasises the difference between these kinds of interpretation. 
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1. What are the differences between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation? 
2. Should legal interpretation be approached differently from ordinary interpretation? If so, in 
what way?  
3. Are fallacies committed in the interpretation of language ordinarily relevant to legal 
interpretation?  
4. What is the goal of judicial interpretation? 
5. What makes an instance of judicial interpretation fallacious? 
6. What kinds of fallacies are committed in judicial interpretation? 
7. Why are these fallacies committed in judicial interpretation? 
8. What is the consequence of these fallacies? 
9. How should an instance of interpretation be analysed to see whether it is fallacious? 
10. How can judges avoid fallacies? 
11. What is the way to arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when judicial fallacies 
have been committed? 
 
The central contention of this thesis is that judges commit certain fallacies and that it is possible to 
detect such fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when they occur. The 
answers to these questions will show in detail how this contention has been proven. 
 
These questions, although more specific than the general questions which have been raised, can also 
be answered in many ways. Without an understanding of the way language functions ordinarily, 
however, it is difficult to address such questions adequately. This thesis, therefore, will address 
these questions by comparing legal interpretation with ordinary interpretation and determining 
whether there are fallacies that can be committed in legal interpretation which correspond to 
fallacies which can be committed in ordinary interpretation. For this reason, Chapter Three will 
analyse the interpretation of language ordinarily and identify some fallacies in such interpretation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION FALLACIES 
A Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the use of language ordinarily and fallacies that can be committed in the 
ordinary interpretation of language.53 The ordinary interpretation of language refers to the 
interpretation of language outside the law. At the beginning of this analysis, it is helpful to raise 
some questions regarding interpretation in ordinary language and fallacies in such interpretation 
which will be addressed in this chapter. These questions correspond to some of the questions raised 
regarding judicial interpretation at the end of Chapter Two: 
 
1. What is the goal of interpretation? 
2. Is it always unjustifiable for an interpreter to arrive at a different meaning from a speaker? 
3. What makes an instance of interpretation fallacious?  
4. What kinds of fallacies are possible with interpretation?  
5. Why are these fallacies committed? 
6. What is the consequence of these fallacies? 
7. How should an instance of interpretation be analysed to see whether it is fallacious? 
8. How can interpreters avoid fallacies? 
9. What is the way to arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when fallacies have 
been committed? 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general sketch of ordinary interpretation with which legal 
interpretation can be compared. Therefore, these questions will not be answered exhaustively, but 
will be addressed in sufficient detail to provide a foundation from which legal interpretation can be 
analysed. Furthermore, this chapter will not discuss every kind of fallacy possible in ordinary 
language, but only certain fallacies which correspond to fallacies that can be committed in legal 
interpretation.  
 
                                               
53 The focus of this chapter is on the ordinary interpretation of language, not the interpretation of ordinary language. It 
is a focus on a kind of interpretation, not a kind of language that is being interpreted. 
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This chapter will look at the principles that generally govern ordinary interpretation. Distinctive 
aspects of specialist kinds of interpretation (for instance, literary criticism and biblical 
hermeneutics) will not be covered in detail since these kinds of interpretation are not representative 
of the way language is ordinarily interpreted. Because this thesis investigates the judicial 
interpretation of written language,54 this chapter will not focus on aspects of interpretation relevant 
only to spoken language. Furthermore, other aspects of ordinary interpretation that are not relevant 
to legal interpretation will not be covered. 
 
There are various academic disciplines55 that deal with language and interpretation, including 
linguistics, the philosophy of language, semiotics, and literary criticism.56 This chapter draws 
insights from a number of these disciplines.57 There are also various conflicts between these 
disciplines. This chapter does not enter into a detailed investigation of any of these conflicts.58  
 
This chapter has three main parts. The first part of this chapter (Chapter Three B, Language) 
analyses the processes of speaking and interpretation. The second part (Chapter Three C, 
Interpretation Fallacies) identifies fallacies in interpretation. The third part (Chapter Three D, 
Language and Thought) briefly discusses the relationship between language and thought. 
 
                                               
54 This thesis focuses on the judicial interpretation of legal documents such as statutes, regulations, contracts and wills. 
55 In this chapter certain words have been given definitions to distinguish them from the technical way they have been 
used by writers in these various disciplines or to clarify their meaning for the purpose of this thesis. Important words 
that are defined in this chapter include: ‘arbitrary’, ‘convention’, ‘referent’, ‘meaning’, ‘speaking’, ‘ineffable’, 
‘interpretation’, ‘meaningless’, and ‘fallacy’. The definitions are given when these words are first used and are 
collected in Appendix One, Glossary.  
56 The topics of language and interpretation are also dealt with in a number of other areas. These topics are dealt with 
in the discipline of general semantics developed by Alfred Korzybski, which is outside mainline academia (see 
Korzybski, above n 13). Much attention was also paid to language in the twentieth century by two (now defunct) 
schools of philosophy – logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy – both influenced by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Furthermore, there are many popular books dealing with language and communication, for instance, 
John Gray Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus (Thorsons, New York, 1993). Such sources occasionally 
contain useful insights and have also been consulted in the writing of this chapter.  
57 This thesis, however, is not interdisciplinary, in that it does not adopt a methodology from a specific discipline and 
apply it to the interpretation of language in the law. Rather, it draws relevant insights from various disciplines to 
provide a general description of the process of ordinary interpretation. This chapter does not presume any 
background knowledge of any of these language disciplines. 
58 Most of the points of conflict between these disciplines are not relevant to this thesis either because it is not 
concerned with the matters in dispute or because it does not need to investigate the disputed topic at the level of 
depth at which the conflicts appear. Controversial points include the origin of language, whether humans think in 
words or images (or in some other medium), and whether the ability to use language is innate or acquired. These 
issues do not need to be addressed. The only controversial point that needs to be addressed is the nature of meaning. 
Even in relation to meaning, however, the different views held by various theorists are not discussed in detail. 
Rather, a definition of meaning is adopted that works for the purposes of this thesis.  
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B Language 
 
Language has been defined in various ways. It is often defined by comparing it to something else.59 
An outdated view is to compare language to human inventions by calling it an invention.60 This 
view is not currently popular.61 Language has also been compared to an instrument62 and words 
have been compared to tools.63 Under this view, language is something that is used to achieve a 
certain purpose.64 Another view of language is that it is an aspect of human behaviour, comparable 
to other kinds of human behaviour.65 A popular current view is that language is an innate biological 
capacity. Steven Pinker views language as an instinct, comparing the ability to talk to a spider’s 
ability to spin webs.66 In a similar vein, Noam Chomsky compares the “growth of language” in 
humans to “the development of a bodily organ.”67 Finally, semioticians view language as a system 
of signs,68 similar to other sign systems.69 
 
Each one of these views can be problematic if it is pressed too far. It may be better just to look at 
language directly, rather than comparing it to something else. There are, however, some useful 
insights to be gained from these various ways of looking at language. The following section of this 
chapter will therefore begin by looking at words as signs.  
 
                                               
59 Most theorists, however, do not present their definitions of language as comparisons, but as comprehensive 
descriptions of what language is. The danger with presenting such definitions in this way is that they usually only 
highlight one aspect of language. 
60 “[S]ymbolic language, like all human inventions, is a mixed blessing.” Rapoport, above n 16, at 16.  
61 This view has fallen out of fashion because it conflicts with the currently popular view of language as an innate 
biological capacity. The view of language as an invention did influence the law. Glanville Williams began an 
influential legal article with the sentence: “Language is perhaps the greatest of all human inventions.” “Language 
and the Law” (1945) 61 Law Q Rev 71 at 71. In a legal article in 2005, Gerard McMeel quoted this sentence and 
remarked: “Nowadays the cognitive scientists and evolutionary biologists would immediately quarrel with that. 
Human language is now understood as a species attribute or a genetically determined innate metal ability.” McMeel, 
above n 23, at 257.  
62 L Susan Stebbing Thinking to Some Purpose (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1939) at 57. 
63 Ludwig Wittgenstein (GEM Anscombe trans) Philosophical Investigations (2nd ed, Blackwell Publishers Limited, 
Oxford, 1958) at [11] [Investigations]; William Empson Seven Types of Ambiguity (2 ed, Chatto and Windus, 
London, 1949) at 5-6. 
64 Stebbing, above n 62, at 57-58. 
65 BF Skinner Verbal Behavior (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, New York, 1957). 
66 Pinker, above n 9, at 18. Although currently popular, this view of language is not new. For instance, in a book first 
published in 1851, Richard Trench expressed a similar view: “Man makes his own language, but he makes it as the 
bee makes its cells, as the bird its nest” On the Study of Words & English, Past and Present (JM Dent & Sons 
Limited, London, 1927) at 18. This view is not without opposition (see Geoffrey Sampson The ‘Language Instinct’ 
Debate (Continuum, London, 2005)). 
67 Noam Chomsky Reflections on Language (Fontana Books, Glasgow, 1976) at 11. 
68 Jonathan Bignell Media Semiotics (2ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002) at 6.  
69 These different views concerning language determine the way language is studied, and these ways may conflict. For 
instance, the view of language as an innate capacity directly conflicts with the view of language as an acquired 
behaviour (see Noam Chomsky “Review of BF Skinner Verbal Behavior” (1959) 35 Language 26).  
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1 Words, thoughts and referents 
 
This section will introduce some important ideas about language. It will discuss the relationship 
between words, thoughts and referents, the arbitrariness and conventionality of language, and the 
notion of meaning. This section will also define some important words that will be used in this 
analysis of language in this chapter.  
 
It is useful to begin this analysis of language by viewing words as signs. There is no argument with 
the fact that words are signs,70 but the semiotic view of language can be taken too far. It can lead to 
the extreme view that:71  
 
Rather than thinking of signs and media as channels which translate pre-existing thought and reality into 
communicable form, signs and media are the only means of access to thought or reality which we have. 
 
Such a statement, taken at face value, is easily disproved by looking at children who have not yet 
learned to speak, but who have access to thought and reality without signs.72 Having heeded this 
warning against taking the semiotic approach to language too far or drawing unwarranted 
conclusions from it, it is still useful to view words as signs. Once words are defined as signs, it is 
necessary to consider what they signify. On the one hand, words seem to signify ideas,73 thoughts.74 
On the other hand, words also seem to signify things.75 The relationship between words, thoughts 
and things needs to be seen clearly.  
                                               
70 It is more accurate to say that words are symbols, and to define symbols as signs which are deliberately used for 
communication: Stephen Ullmann Words and their Use (Frederick Muller Limited, London, 1951) at 13. This 
distinction between signs and symbols, however, is not needed for this thesis as it is only looking at signs which are 
symbols (specifically, words).  
71 Bignell, above n 68, at 7.  
72 Perhaps Bignell would argue that children still use signs to access thought and reality, but not words. Since such 
signs cannot be equated directly with thought (they are, in his words, the “means of access to thought”), it is difficult 
to see what such signs could be. Alternatively, viewing this statement charitably it could be taken to mean that once 
a person has learned the name of something, this person no longer has direct, unmediated knowledge of it, and now 
the name provides the “means of access to reality”.  
73  John Locke states that “words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas 
that are in the mind of the speaker” John Locke (John W Yolton (ed)) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(JM Dent, London, 1993) at 229 (italics in original). 
74 It is more accurate to say that the spoken word is a sign of the thought and the written word is a sign of the spoken 
word (Potter, above n 14, at 48). Because this thesis is dealing with the interpretation of written language, the step of 
spoken language will be omitted, and written words will be treated as signs of thoughts directly.  
75  In a famous book on linguistics, Leonard Bloomfield stated: “We can define the names of minerals … in terms of 
chemistry and mineralogy, as when we say that the ordinary meaning of the English word salt is ‘sodium chloride 
(NaCl)’” Leonard Bloomfield Language (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1933) at 139. If meaning can be 
equated with signifying, this claim that ‘salt’ means NaCl suggests that a word signifies the object to which it 
relates. Modern theorists do not generally agree with Bloomfield’s view (see David Bellos Is That a Fish in Your 
Ear? (Penguin Books Limited, London, 2011) at 83-84).  
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Words are associated with things, but it is the idea of the thing, the thought about the thing, that 
establishes this connection. Words directly signify thoughts that refer to things. This makes it 
possible for words to stand for things. A convenient label for the thing for which a word stands is 
‘referent’.76 The relationship between words, thoughts and referents was illustrated helpfully in an 
early book on semantics by C K Ogden and I A Richards, The Meaning of Meaning,77 by a diagram 
commonly referred to as the semantic triangle. Diagram 3.1, below, is a simplified and slightly 
modified version of this semantic triangle. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3.178 depicts the relationship between a word, the thought it signifies, and that to which 
                                               
76 The word ‘referent’ was popularised by Ogden and Richards who introduced this word by stating: “The word ‘thing’ 
is unsuitable … because in popular usage it is restricted to material substances … It has seemed desirable, therefore, 
to introduce a technical term to stand for whatever we may be thinking of or referring to.” Ogden and Richards, 
above n 18, at 9 footnote 1. This is a very broad definition of the word ‘referent’. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
not necessary to posit referents for every word. Rather, referents will only be posited when they can be readily 
identified.  
77 Ibid, at 11. Ogden and Richards were not the first to use this type of diagram, but they made it famous. See Rita 
Temmerman Towards New Ways of Terminological Description (John Benjamins Publishing Co, Amsterdam, 2000) 
at 58 for a discussion of earlier uses of this diagram. This diagram has subsequently been used in a number of books 
on semantics, for instance: Chase, above n 18, at 66; Ullmann, above n 70, at 32; and FR Palmer Semantics (2ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) at 24. Variations on this diagram are used in Simon Blackburn 
Spreading the Word (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984) at 3, and in John Lyons Language, Meaning & Context 
(Fontana Paperbacks, Bungay, 1981) at 19. It has also been used in a number of legal articles, for instance: Reed 
Dickerson “Referential Meaning: The Static Aspects” (1969) 10 Jurimetrics J 58 at 58, and Barbara Bintliff 
“Context and Legal Research” (2007) 99 Law Libr J 249 at 252. 
78 For convenience, all the diagrams in this chapter and Chapter Four are collected in Appendix Two, Diagrams. 
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the thought refers, its referent. A word signifies a thought.79 This thought refers to a referent. The 
dotted line connecting the word to the referent indicates that the connection between them is 
indirect. Therefore, words stand for80 referents because of connecting thoughts.  
 
For simplicity, Diagram 3.1 uses the term ‘word’, rather than the term ‘words’. This diagram, 
however, can also apply to the use of more than one word to stand for a referent. The other 
diagrams in this chapter will also use the singular term ‘word’, but these diagrams should also be 
understood to apply to the use of more than one word.  
 
It is helpful to give a simple example to illustrate the elements in Diagram 3.1. If someone says, ‘I 
saw a dog’, the word ‘dog’ in this statement can be viewed in relation to this diagram. The word 
‘dog’ is the word on the left-hand side of the triangle. The idea of the animal that was seen is the 
thought at the apex of the triangle. The animal itself is the referent on the right-hand side of the 
triangle. The word signifies a thought which refers to a referent. In this way, the word stands for the 
referent. This diagram thus illustrates clearly the indirect connection between words and referents 
and the importance of the connecting thought. It is commonly said that words refer to things. This 
view of language, however, omits this connecting thought. When analysing meaning, it is important 
to be aware that the relationship between words and their referents is indirect. Words are associated 
with referents, but this association is indirect and is through thoughts.  
 
The left-hand side of the triangle in Diagram 3.1 depicts the relationship between words and 
thoughts. As mentioned, words are signs of thoughts. Signs can be divided into two categories: 
natural signs and conventional signs. Natural signs have meaning because of a natural connection 
between the signs and what they signify.81 For example, smoke naturally signifies fire.82 With 
conventional signs, however, there is no natural link but the signs are conventionally connected to 
what they signify.83 Words are conventional signs. This means that the connection between words 
and the thoughts that they signify is established by an agreement to use words to signify these 
thoughts. For example, the word ‘smoke’ conventionally signifies the idea of smoke.  
                                               
79 For the purpose of this thesis, it is unnecessary to discuss the nature of thoughts in detail, or to address whether they 
involve words or images or some other form of representation, or even whether they involve representation at all. 
The thought in this diagram can be loosely defined as the idea associated with a word. 
80 Even though on this diagram words stand for referents and thoughts refer to referents, it will not be necessary to 
maintain this distinction sharply, and this thesis will sometimes speak of words ‘referring to’ referents. This should 
not create any difficulty as long as it is borne in mind that the relationship between words and referents is indirect. 
81 Ullmann, above n 70, at 13. 
82  Lyons, above n 77, at 13. 
83  Ibid. 
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The right-hand side of the triangle in Diagram 3.1 depicts the relationship between thoughts and 
referents, that is, it depicts the relationship between thoughts and the things that the thoughts are 
about. For instance, the idea of smoke refers to smoke itself. It is not necessary to discuss the nature 
of this relationship in detail. It is useful, however, to distinguish between a thought and the thing to 
which the thought refers, so it is important to be aware of this relationship. 
 
The base of the triangle in Diagram 3.1 depicts the relationship between words and referents. This 
relationship is indirect, and is through thoughts. Therefore, this relationship is established by 
speakers.84 Speakers can choose any word to stand for a referent. Ogden and Richards stated: 
“Between the [word] and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which 
consists in its being used by someone to stand for a referent.”85 For this reason, the meaning of a 
word is determined by what it is used to mean, and meaning is sometimes equated with use.86  
 
There is no natural connection between words and thoughts. Therefore, this connection is 
arbitrary.87 This means that the connection between words and referents is also arbitrary. The fact 
that there is only an arbitrary connection between words and referents can be easily proven by the 
fact that different languages use different words to stand for the same things.  
 
If the connection between words and thoughts were merely arbitrary, however, communication 
would be impossible. Although this connection is arbitrary, it is nevertheless conventional. This 
conventionality is what makes communication possible. Richard Mitchell put this point well: 88 
 
Language is arbitrary, but it’s not anarchic. Although there’s no reason why this or that in a language 
should be ‘right’ and something else ‘wrong,’ it does not follow that you can do whatever you please in it. 
At some point, of course, when you wander too far from what is ‘right’ you’ll cease to be intelligible.  
                                               
84 In this chapter, the two parties in communication are referred to as the speaker and the interpreter and the actions 
they perform as speaking and interpretation. The speaker should be understood to include any producer of language 
being interpreted, including a writer. The interpreter is not limited to the direct audience of spoken language or the 
intended audience of written language, but can include any person interpreting language. This chapter will also 
sometimes use the word ‘utterance’ to refer to a portion of language, and this should be understood to include both 
spoken and written language. 
85 Ogden and Richards, above n 18, at 11. 
86 This view of meaning was stressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “For a large class of cases … in which we employ the 
word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Wittgenstein 
Investigations, above n 63, at [43]. 
87 To say that the connection is ‘arbitrary’ means that it is not a natural or necessary connection. It should not be taken 
to mean that the connection is random, unpredictable or unreasonable.  
88 Richard Mitchell quoted in Engel, above n 9, at 18. 
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Language has been defined as “a shared system of rules and conventions mutually intelligible to all 
members of a particular community”.89 Intelligible communication, therefore, depends on the 
existence of shared conventions.90  
 
Words are therefore arbitrary signs conventionally associated with certain thoughts of certain 
referents. In a book first published in 1763, Isaac Watts stated:91 
 
Though names are in their original merely arbitrary, yet we should always keep to the established 
meaning of them, unless great necessity require the alteration; for when any word has been used to 
signify an idea, that old idea will recur in the mind, when the word is heard or read, rather than any new 
idea which we may fasten to it. 
 
This statement highlights the fact that the words a speaker chooses are important because words 
have thoughts conventionally associated with them. For speakers to use words to signify different 
thoughts from the thoughts with which they are conventionally associated can mislead interpreters.  
 
It is helpful to define language conventions in more detail. Words are conventional signs. The use of 
a word to signify a certain thought (and thus to stand for a certain referent) establishes a language 
convention. This language convention involves an association of the word with a thought. Since this 
thought is of a referent, this convention is also the association of this word with a referent. For 
instance, if a speaker uses the word ‘dog’ to refer to a dog, the speaker is employing the language 
convention that associates the word ‘dog’ with dogs.  
 
The primary source of language conventions are agreed usages within speech communities. 
Dictionaries may record92 such conventions.93 Conventions, however, can also be created by 
                                               
89 Farb, above n 17, at 20.  
90 This sharing can either be between a few individuals or within a whole community. When these conventions are 
shared by a particular community, this is sometimes called a ‘speech community’. For an influential investigation of 
the role of speech communities in the interpretation of literature, see Stanley Fish Is There a Text in This Class? 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1980). 
91 Isaac Watts Logic (Thomas Tegg, London, 1811) at 77. 
92 By recording such conventions, dictionaries give them an authoritative status, and often these conventions are 
treated as binding rules. Thus, dictionaries which intend to be descriptive become prescriptive because of the way 
they are treated. The term ‘convention’ can mean an accepted usage (the way things are done) or a strict rule (the 
way things should be done). For the purpose of this thesis, conventions should be understood as agreed associations 
between words and thoughts, which may become general usages. Conventions should not be understood as binding 
rules. 
93 The conventions of specialised speech communities are recorded in technical dictionaries, for example, in 
dictionaries of medical terms.  
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speakers. Such ad hoc conventions can be made known to interpreters by explicit definitions or may 
be clear from the context of an utterance. Therefore, language conventions include established 
usages of words within a society generally, technical meanings of words within specialised groups, 
and new meanings of words specified by explicit definitions or made clear from the context of 
speaking. Put simply, a convention can be defined as an agreed association of a word with a 
thought.94  
 
Having discussed the relationship between words, thoughts and referents, it is now useful to define 
the word ‘meaning’. In one sense, this word needs no definition. A competent user of language 
knows what it is for a word to have meaning. Moreover, it has been very difficult for theorists to 
agree on a definition of ‘meaning’,95 and one way to get around these difficulties is to avoid 
discussing meaning altogether.96 Indeed, certain linguists have come close to claiming that words 
do not have meanings.97 If, however, the word ‘meaning’ is left undefined or vague, the task of 
interpretation becomes vague, and it becomes difficult to determine whether an instance of 
interpretation is correct.  
 
The meaning of a word cannot simply be equated with the referent of the word. Two or more words 
can refer to the same referent, but have different meanings. For instance, the words ‘my father’ and 
the words ‘my mother’s husband’ may refer to the same person, but are not equivalent in meaning 
                                               
94 Although the word ‘convention’ should be understood to mean the association of a word with a thought, in some 
contexts it will be convenient to use it to also mean the thoughts that are associated with words. For instance, in the 
sentence, ‘Interpreters need to learn the conventions associated with words’, the term ‘conventions’ could be 
understood to mean the thoughts conventionally associated with words, and not merely the association itself.  
95 This is especially so in the philosophy of language, where there have been a number of influential approaches to 
meaning. A P Martinich discusses a number of these approaches in “Philosophy of Language” in John V Vanfield 
(ed) Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, London, 1997) 11, 
including, the naming theory of meaning (at 12), the verification theory of meaning (at 18), utterer’s meaning (at 
21), speech acts and conversation (at 22), and the causal theory of naming (at 26). 
96 Some linguists, and even some approaches to linguistics, avoid discussing meaning altogether. Commenting on this, 
Mario Pei noted: “It is … strange to encounter a school of linguistics that eschews meaning in its analysis of 
language” Voices of Man (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1962) at 110. 
97 For instance, the linguist Georgia Green stated: “I don’t want to talk about the meaning of words. The notion doesn’t 
make sense to me. … I don’t think the meaning is something that is a property of the word.” Judith N Levi and 
others “Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference—Proceedings” (1995) 73 
Wash U L Q 800 at 828. Such a statement, if taken at face value, is quite misleading. Green later clarifies her 
statement by stating that meaning (or rather, the way people expect a word to be understood) is “an indirect property 
of the word. It’s a property of the word by virtue of properties of people.” (at 829). Therefore, even on Green’s 
analysis it is still possible to speak of words having meaning. She is highlighting, however, that words have 
meanings indirectly. 
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in that they do not describe that person in the same way.98  
 
In this thesis, the meaning of a word will be defined as the thought99 associated with this word.100 It 
may be claimed that since it is impossible to directly discover the thoughts of another person, to 
define meaning in terms of a thought is to commit a fallacy.101 This argument is unconvincing. It is 
true that it is impossible to directly discover the thoughts of another person. It is also true that this 
means that it is impossible to directly discover the meaning another person is giving a word. This 
discovery, therefore, must be indirect. This discovery is possible through the correct use of language 
conventions.  
 
The definition of the meaning of a word as the thought with which it is associated is a common 
understanding of word meaning and a useful first step in understanding meaning. This 
understanding by itself, however, does not give much insight into the nature of meaning, but may 
just shift the difficulties with the term ‘meaning’ to the term ‘thought’.102 An adequate description 
of meaning needs to explain how meaning is associated with words, when words are meaningless, 
and how meaning is communicated.  
 
Once meanings are identified with thoughts, however, an important basic conclusion can be drawn. 
Because words are arbitrarily connected to thoughts, words are arbitrarily connected to meanings. 
                                               
98 This point was clearly made by the German philosopher Gottlob Frege who drew an important distinction between 
sense and reference (“Sense and Reference” (1948) 57 Philosophical Review 209). Frege gave the example of the 
phrases ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ as words with the same referent but different senses (210). Although there 
has been considerable debate about what Frege meant by ‘sense’, for the purpose of this discussion the word ‘sense’ 
can be viewed as equivalent to ‘meaning’. This distinction thus makes it clear that it is misleading to directly equate 
the meaning of a word with its referent. 
99 Meaning is sometimes discussed in terms of ‘intention’ rather than ‘thought’ (see, for instance, HP Grice “Utterer's 
Meaning and Intention” (1969) 78 Philosophical Review 147 at 153). Because of the associations related to the word 
‘intention’, in this thesis the more general term ‘thought’ will be used. 
100 A definition of meaning as the thought associated with a word was often taken for granted by earlier writers. For 
example, Karl Britton states: “Words are used to communicate thoughts; words mean thoughts or successions of 
thoughts” Communication (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Limited, London, 1939) at 18. Since the latter part of 
the twentieth century, there have been various objections to identifying the meaning of a word as the thought with 
which it is associated, especially in the philosophy of language, the most famous of which is Hilary Putnam’s twin 
earth argument (Hilary Putnam “Meaning and Reference” (1973) 70 Journal of Philosophy 699 at 700-703). The 
details of these objections are beyond the scope of this thesis, and do not arise in relation to interpretation at the 
level at which it is investigated in this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, it is convenient to give a definition of 
the meaning of a word as the thought associated with this word.  
101 Compare William K Wimsatt and Monroe C Beardsley’s influential article on literary criticism “The Intentional 
Fallacy” (1946) 54 Sewanee Review 468. In this article the authors claim that “the design or intention of the author 
is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art” (at 468). 
102 Ruth Kempson states that viewing meanings as concepts “does no more than substitute for the problem term 
meaning the equally opaque term concept.” Semantic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977) at 17. 
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This insight is so obvious that it is easy to regard it as trivial.103 If, however, the arbitrariness of the 
connection between words and meanings is not seen clearly, certain mistakes regarding meaning 
can be made. First, interpreters may assume that each word has a single, correct meaning. Second, 
they may assume that the oldest meaning of a word is the correct meaning or that the etymology of 
a word gives a clue to its true meaning.104 Third, they may uncritically use dictionaries to ascertain 
the meaning of words regardless of their context. Fourth, they may focus on the supposed ordinary 
meaning of a word, rather than the specific meaning a speaker has given to a word.  
 
Furthermore, once the meaning of a word has been defined as the thought associated with the word, 
the basic difficulty with communication becomes apparent: speakers and interpreters105 may 
associate different thoughts with a word, and thus attribute different meanings to this word. In order 
for an interpreter to discover the thought of a speaker, that is, the meaning of the speaker, it is 
necessary that this thought be indicated in some way. This is done by the use of language 
conventions. These conventions, because they are objective in that they are a public or 
communicated agreement to use a word, make communication possible.  
 
Successful communication, therefore, depends on speakers employing language conventions 
correctly, which includes either adhering to established conventions or notifying potential 
interpreters of changes to these conventions if these changes are not clear from the context of the 
utterance. Speakers make changes to conventions explicit by providing definitions. It is important to 
distinguish between two kinds of definition: stipulative definitions and reportive definitions. A 
stipulative definition stipulates the specific meaning that is being given to a word. A reportive 
definition reports what people commonly use a word to mean.106 Stipulative definitions assign new 
meanings, whereas reportive definitions describe existing meanings. For instance, dictionary 
definitions are reportive, and statutory interpretation sections are stipulative. If stipulative 
definitions are not explicitly given when meanings are changed, there is a risk that interpreters will 
assume that words are being used with their existing meanings.  
 
This section has introduced a number of basic ideas about language that will be important in this 
chapter. It is useful to summarise these ideas. When considering language and meaning, it is firstly 
                                               
103 Wolfgang B Sperlich Noam Chomsky (Reaktion Books Limited, London, 2006) at 29. 
104 This has been referred to as the “etymological fallacy” (David Crystal Linguistics (Penguin Books Limited, 
Harmondsworth, 1971) at 63). 
105 See n 84. 
106 John Hospers An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (4th ed, Routledge, London, 1997) at 15-16. 
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important to distinguish three elements: words, thoughts and referents. Words signify thoughts 
which refer to referents. Thus, the connection between words and referents is indirect, and attention 
should be paid to the intervening thought. Words are arbitrary signs of thoughts. Therefore, speakers 
can choose any word to signify any thought. This choice, however, needs to be communicated to 
potential interpreters for intelligible communication of this thought. This is done by speakers 
employing language conventions which are agreed associations of words with thoughts. The 
thought that is associated with a word can be viewed as the meaning of that word. Interpreters can 
ascertain speakers’ meanings when speakers employ language conventions correctly. 
 
(a) Approach to language and interpretation 
 
Having discussed some important concepts in relation to language, it is useful to define the 
approach to language and interpretation in this chapter in more detail. This chapter focuses on the 
use of language to signify thoughts and to stand for referents. Language, however, has a variety of 
functions. First, the use of language is not limited to description. There are many other uses of 
language. For instance, language is used to promise, to issue commands, and to ask questions.107 
Since all of these uses of language involve the signification of thoughts and the designation of 
referents, they may be within the scope of this chapter, but the distinction between such functions 
will not be emphasised. Second, a distinction is sometimes drawn between the descriptive and 
emotive aspects of language.108 Speakers do not use language merely to describe, but also use 
language emotively to convey an attitude towards that which is being described. This chapter will 
not focus on the emotive aspect of language. Third, language is important for social cohesion.109 
This function of language will not be covered in this chapter.  
 
                                               
107 These various functions of language are emphasised by the speech act theorists, most notably John L Austin in How 
to Do Things with Words (2 ed, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1975) and John R Searle in Speech 
Acts (Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, London, 1969) and numerous other books. This approach to 
language has influenced some legal theorists. For examples of the use of speech act theory in analysing language in 
the law, see Peter M Tiersma “The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent” 
(1986) 74 Cal L Rev 189, and Pintip Hompluem Dunn “How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the Doctrine 
of Stare Decisis” (2003) 113 Yale LJ 493. 
108 This is especially important in literary criticism. For instance, I A Richards distinguished four kinds of meaning: 
sense, feeling, tone and intention. Sense refers to what the speaker is saying, feeling refers to the speaker’s “attitude 
to what he is talking about”, tone refers to “his attitude to his listener”, and intention to “the speaker’s intention, his 
aim … the effect he is endeavouring to promote” Practical Criticism (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company 
Limited, London, 1935) at 182. The first of these meanings is the descriptive meaning. The second and third are 
emotive meanings. The fourth is similar to the force of an utterance, discussed in the paragraph accompanying n 
118. 
109 This aspect of language is dealt with in the discipline of sociolinguistics. See Janet Holmes An Introduction to 
Sociolinguistics (2 ed, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2001). 
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In this chapter interpretation will be viewed as the discovery of the meaning that speakers have 
given to the words being interpreted. Diagram 3.1 depicts the use of a word to signify a specific 
thought and to stand for a specific referent. That is, it is depicting the unambiguous use of 
language.110 It is common for emphasis to be placed on the fact that words have many meanings. 
Although this is true of words in the abstract, in use they generally have a single intended meaning, 
and it is the task of interpreters to correctly ascertain this single meaning.111  
 
This chapter will also focus on the identification of referents. Diagram 3.1, however, should not be 
taken to imply that all words have identifiable referents. Such a view of language can lead to the 
view that the meaningfulness of a word depends on the existence of an identifiable referent to which 
it relates, and consequently the use of “the absence of a referent as a criterion of the absence of 
meaning.”112 It can also lead to an extreme scepticism about abstract words.113 It is true that it is 
easy to get into arguments about the meaning of words which have no identifiable referent. The fact 
that a referent cannot be identified for a certain word, however, does not mean that this word is 
necessarily meaningless. It is not necessary or possible to identify referents in every instance of 
interpretation. For instance, it is often difficult to posit referents for abstract words such as ‘love’. 
Therefore, referents are a useful element to consider in some instances of interpretation, and 
unhelpful in others. 
 
This chapter, therefore, investigates the use of language to signify thoughts and to stand for 
referents. In this chapter, interpretation is viewed as the identification of the meanings that speakers 
have given to words by identifying the thoughts they have associated with these words and, where 
possible, the referents to which these thoughts refer. 
 
The next section of this chapter will discuss the process of speaking. In light of this, it is necessary 
                                               
110 There may be more than one word used to signify a single thought, but if a single word signifies more than one 
thought, it is ambiguous. 
111 This has been recognised in relation to legal interpretation: James Farr “Francis Lieber and the Interpretation of 
American Political Science” (1990) 52 Journal of Politics 1027 at 1039. 
112 JC Cooley “Review of Lionel Ruby Logic” (1953) 50 Journal of Philosophy 619 at 620. 
113 George Orwell notes: “Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless 
… Since you don’t know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such 
absurdities as this”” “Politics and the English Language” in The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George 
Orwell (Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, 1970) Vol 4 156 at 169. Orwell is probably referring to Chase, 
above n 18, where Chase makes such claims as: “The point of every discussion is to find the referent.” (68), and: 
“We cannot escape from concrete referents by using abstract language. If we try to dodge the difficulty, our words 
become meaningless. We frequently use the abstraction ‘mankind’. What is the referent?” (at 69). In these 
statements, Chase seems to imply that abstract words may become meaningless if a referent cannot be identified for 
them.  
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to point out a shortcoming of Diagram 3.1: this diagram does not distinguish between the processes 
of speaking and interpretation. Many important details concerning communication are obscured 
when these two processes are conflated, and it is much clearer if they are separated. Diagram 3.1 
distinguishes between the relationship between a word and the thought it signifies and the 
relationship between that thought and the referent to which it refers, but it does so in a confusing 
way. This diagram states that the word signifies a thought. Although loosely true, this conflates two 
distinct processes. In speaking, words encapsulate thoughts, whereas in interpretation, words 
generate thoughts. The word ‘signifies’ obscures the distinction between these two processes. 
Furthermore, Diagram 3.1 states that the thought refers to a referent. This also conflates two distinct 
processes. In interpretation, although this thought does refer to a referent, it is generated by a word, 
whereas in speaking the thought may be generated by the referent itself. Again, the words ‘refers 
to’, although loosely true, obscure these two processes. Finally, the single thought at the apex of the 
triangle represents two thoughts: the thought in a speaker’s mind and the thought in an interpreter’s 
mind. Therefore, to provide an accurate description of language, it is necessary to discuss the 
processes of speaking and interpretation separately.  
2 Speaking 
 
Diagram 3.2, below, depicts the relationship between a referent, a thought and a word in the process 
of speaking.  
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Diagram 3.2114 depicts the process of speaking, which should be understood to include writing. In 
this diagram, the semantic triangle is reversed with the word on the right-hand side and the referent 
on the left-hand side. Going from left to right, a referent generates a thought which is encapsulated 
by a word. Speaking, therefore, involves a thought in a speaker, which may have been generated by 
a referent, and which is encapsulated in language.  
 
A referent generates a thought spontaneously. There is considerable debate about the extent to 
which this generation is dependent on language and influenced by language.115 Regardless of 
whether certain thoughts can exist without language, however, it is clear that for complex or 
detailed thoughts to be accurately communicated they need to be encapsulated in language. The act 
of speaking is this encapsulation of a thought in language. 
 
If someone sees a tree and says, ‘I can see a tree’, the act of speaking, in relation to the word ‘tree’, 
can be viewed as beginning at the left-hand side of the triangle with the tree as a referent and 
proceeding through the connecting thought to the word on the right-hand side. If someone says, ‘I 
saw a tree, yesterday’, the act of speaking begins at the apex of the triangle with the thought of the 
referent, the tree. This thought is still directly based on an experience with this referent. Speakers do 
not, however, always have direct experience with the referents they speak about. If someone says, 
‘My sister saw a tree’, in relation to the word ‘tree’, the thought is not directly based on experience. 
The referent of the word ‘tree’ is still the actual tree seen, but the speaker has not had direct 
experience with this referent.  
 
It is therefore useful to view the act of speaking as beginning at the apex of the triangle with a 
thought. This thought is often of a certain referent, and may have been generated by experience with 
                                               
114 Although the word still stands for the referent, the words ‘stands for’ have been omitted from the base of the triangle 
as they could be taken to suggest the referent stands for the word when the diagram is read from left to right. 
115 The details of this debate are beyond the scope of this thesis, but the two basic views regarding the relationship 
between language and reality can be briefly described. In the book The Linguistic Construction of Reality (Croom 
Helm Publishers Limited, Beckenham, 1987) George W Grace discusses two “conceptions of the way language 
represents reality” (at 5): the ‘mapping view’ according to which “there is a common world out there and our 
languages are analogous to maps of this world” (at 6) and the ‘reality-construction view’, according to which “it is 
impossible to draw a clear line between thinking, i.e. bringing a thought into being, and encoding the thought, i.e. 
putting it into words” (at 10). Lera Boroditsky presents a balanced view on this issue, by stating: “Whether people’s 
native language is covertly involved in all manner of seemingly nonlinguistic tasks … or whether aspects of 
grammar are able to influence nonlinguistic representations directly, it appears that thinking involves a collaboration 
between many different linguistic and nonlinguistic representations and processes.” Lera Boroditsky, Lauren A 
Schmidt, and Webb Phillips “Sex, Syntax, and Semantics” in Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow (eds) 
Language in Mind (The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2003) 61 at 76-77. The relationship between language and 
thought is briefly discussed at Chapter Three D. 
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this referent. This thought is then encapsulated in words. The key point is that for speakers the 
thought is first and the choice of language follows.  
 
This thesis has defined the meaning of a word as the thought associated with the word. In Diagram 
3.2, the speaker’s thought may be viewed as the meaning the speaker is giving to the word. When 
this is a thought of a definite referent, the meaning of the word can also be loosely equated with this 
referent. This can be called the speaker’s meaning. The speaker’s task is to make this thought, this 
meaning, clear to interpreters. 
 
This chapter has emphasised the role of conventions in associating words with thoughts. A speaker 
encapsulates thoughts in language by using language conventions. The words speakers choose are 
often constrained by existing language conventions, for instance, the convention associating the 
word ‘tree’ with trees. If a speaker is using a word with a new meaning, that is, to signify a different 
thought from the thoughts conventionally associated with this word, this new convention should be 
made clear. Unless this new convention is clear from the context of the utterance, the word should 
be defined.  
 
The following conversation from the short story Jeeves in the Springtime usefully illustrates the 
choice of language available to speakers. Bertie Wooster is asking his butler, Jeeves, about Mr 
Little, the uncle of Bertie’s friend Bingo Little:116 
 
“Tell me about old Mr. Little. What sort of chap is he?” 
 “A somewhat curious character, sir. Since retiring from business he has become a great recluse, and 
now devotes himself almost entirely to the pleasures of the table.” 
“Greedy hog, you mean?” 
“I would not, perhaps, take the liberty of describing him in precisely those terms, sir. He is what is 
usually called a gourmet.” 
 
In this extract, three choices of language are used by the speakers to describe Mr Little. Jeeves’ 
initial polite description, that Mr Little “devotes himself almost entirely to the pleasures of the 
table” is his idiosyncratic way of describing Mr Little. Bertie’s response, “Greedy hog”, is his way 
of describing the same sort of person. Jeeves then gives a more general term, “gourmet”. This 
extract clarifies the speaker’s main task. In choosing a word, a speaker needs to make his or her 
                                               
116  PG Wodehouse “Jeeves in the Springtime” in The World of Jeeves (Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1967, London) 19 at 
24. 
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thoughts clear to an interpreter. To do this, the speaker needs employ language conventions. Jeeves’ 
initial description was somewhat unclear to Bertie. When his meaning was questioned, he resorted 
to a more common language convention: “what is usually called a gourmet”. 
 
In some situations, speakers need to explicitly clarify the conventions they are employing. This can 
been illustrated by Evelyn Waugh’s description of a cosmetician at a funeral home asking a client 
about the usual appearance of a recently deceased man: 117 
 
Did the Loved One wear his own hair? And the normal complexion? We usually classify them as rural, 
athletic, and scholarly – that is to say red, brown, or white. 
 
The phrase “we usually classify them as” is an indication of the particular conventions employed in 
this industry. Because the cosmetician is talking to an outsider, these conventions are clarified by 
explicit definition.  
 
A further aspect of a speaker’s meaning is the speaker’s intention in saying something, which has 
been called the ‘force’ of an utterance.118 The speaker’s meaning is the speaker’s thought, and this 
thought includes the intention of the speaker. For instance, if someone is loitering in a shop, the 
shopkeeper may ask, ‘Can I help you?’ The literal meaning of this utterance is an offer of help, but 
to interpret the utterance correctly it is necessary for interpreters to pay attention to the 
shopkeeper’s intention in asking this question.119 The shopkeeper may intend to make the loiterer 
leave the shop. Thus, such a statement needs to be interpreted on two levels: the level of the literal 
meaning and the level of the intention behind the utterance.120 The force of an utterance is often 
indicated by the factual context of the utterance.121 
 
This section has briefly discussed speaking.122 The speaker’s task is to make his or her thoughts 
clear to an interpreter. Speaking involves the encapsulation of a speaker’s thoughts in language. 
                                               
117  Evelyn Waugh The Loved One (Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, 1948) at 47. 
118  Jenny Thomas Meaning in Interaction (Longman, London, 1995) at 18. 
119  It is possible to discuss the ‘force’ of a single word if that word is being interpreted, but is it often clearer to view 
entire sentences as having a certain force. 
120  This is another reason why the meaning of a word cannot merely be equated with a referent. It is not merely that the 
speaker may be viewing the referent in a certain way, but also that the speaker may have a certain intention in 
referring to the referent. This intention is part of the meaning of the word. 
121  Another important indication is the fact that, interpreted literally, the utterance seems to lack relevance (see HP 
Grice “Logic and Conversation” in Peter Cole and Jerry L Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics (Academic Press, 
New York, 1975) 41). 
122  This discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of speaking, but is just bringing out some salient 
points about the process of ordinary speaking so that this process can be compared to speaking in a legal context. 
39 
 
This is the encapsulation of a speaker’s meaning. This encapsulation involves the use of language 
conventions. For successful communication, speakers need to employ language conventions 
correctly by either adhering to existing conventions or making new conventions clear to 
interpreters.  
 
(a) Ineffability 
 
For intelligible communication, a speaker needs to be aware of language conventions and employ 
them correctly. A person’s experience with things,123 however, generates thoughts even when the 
person does not have words to describe these things. In this situation, Diagram 3.3, below, would 
apply. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3.3 depicts ineffability. In this diagram a thing has generated a thought, but the thought has 
not been encapsulated in language. Therefore, this thought is ineffable for a speaker. Because this 
thought is of a certain thing, this thing is also ineffable for the speaker. Words are associated 
directly with thoughts and indirectly with things. Therefore, ineffability can either be described as a 
situation in which a speaker does not know which word to use to encapsulate a certain thought or as 
                                               
123  The word ‘thing’ rather than the word ‘referent’ is used in this section because it is discussing things that have not 
been referred to by words. 
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a situation in which a speaker does not know which word to use to describe a certain thing.  
 
Although a word may have been conventionally associated with a certain thing, a particular 
speaker’s use of this word depends not only on having a thought regarding this thing, but also on 
knowledge of this word, that is, knowledge of the conventional association of the word with this 
thing. Therefore, a thing may be ineffable for a speaker because the speaker does not know the 
language conventions associated with that thing.124 
 
‘Ineffable’ is not used here to refer to things that are intrinsically incapable of being described by 
language. Rather, it is being used in a new sense to describe a situation in which someone does not 
know which word to use to encapsulate a certain thought, and thus to stand for a certain thing.125  
 
Often ineffability can be caused by a speaker temporarily forgetting a word. Another example of a 
conversation between Jeeves and Bertie can illustrate this. Bertie asked Jeeves: 126 
 
“I’m on the horns of … what are those things you get on the horns of?” 
“Dilemmas, sir.” 
“That’s right. I’m on the horns of a dilemma.” 
 
In such a situation, ineffability often creates no problem because the speaker is well aware of the 
need to find the correct word.  
 
If the word that is usually used to name something is not known, it may still be possible for this 
thing to be described and this description may be intelligible to others. This description would then 
comprise the ‘word’ in Diagram 3.2 and the triangle would be complete. Diagram 3.3, therefore, is 
depicting the point in time at which a word has not yet been used by a speaker. Since any object can 
be given any name, and names are not intrinsically correct, the absence of the knowledge of an 
existing name may not always be a barrier to communication, but it often creates certain 
problems.127  
                                               
124  Language conventions are associations of words with thoughts. This means that they are also associations of words 
with the things to which these thoughts refer. 
125 Therefore, this is a stipulative definition giving a new meaning to this word. ‘Ineffable’ will be used with this 
meaning throughout this thesis. 
126  PG Wodehouse Stiff Upper Lip, Jeeves (Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, 1966) at 31 (ellipsis in original). 
127 This should not be taken to suggest that the term ‘word’ in Diagrams 3.1 and 3.2 refers to the correct word, that is, 
the word associated via correct language conventions. Rather, the term ‘word’ in these diagrams is being used to 
refer to any word that is used to encapsulate a thought.  
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Difficulties with interpretation do not occur when something is merely ineffable because ineffability 
means that no word has been used by a speaker. Difficulties occur when a speaker does not know 
which word to use to describe a certain thing, but still attempts to describe the thing. In his 
autobiography Far Away and Long Ago, W H Hudson gives a short description of a tree for which 
he does not know the name.128 Unless readers can recognise the tree from this description, they 
have to rely on this description for information about the tree. If the name had been given, readers 
who knew this name would know what tree was being referred to. Even if they did not know this 
name, they could find out about the tree because the name had been given. Although the semantic 
triangle may be complete because of Hudson’s description of the tree, this description is not as 
useful as the name of the tree.  
 
Problems also occur when speakers use the wrong word because they do not know the correct 
language conventions. In this situation, the thought is no longer ineffable because it has been 
expressed, but there may be difficulties with communication. There is a clear example of this in the 
novel Pnin.129 Pnin is a Russian man in America who struggles with English. He wants to catch a 
bus, and is talking to a man at an information booth. Pnin asks the man:130 
 
“And where possible to leave baggage?” 
“That bag? I’ll take care of it.” 
… 
“Quittance?” queried Pnin, Englishing the Russian word for “receipt” (kvitantsiya). 
“What’s that?” 
“Number?” tried Pnin. 
“You don’t need a number,” said the fellow, and resumed his writing. 
 
Pnin wanted to ask for a receipt. He knew the thing he wanted to refer to, but not the word 
conventionally associated with it in English. Thus, it can be said that this thing was ineffable for 
Pnin in English. Nevertheless, he attempted to refer to this thing by using the word ‘quittance’, 
which is not the common word for a receipt. When the man did not understand him, he was able to 
make himself clear by using the word ‘number’. This shows how the wrong word may be used 
when speakers do not know the correct language conventions. This can be considered as a result of 
ineffability. 
                                               
128 WH Hudson Far Away and Long Ago (JM Dent & Sons Limited, London, 1951) at 6. 
129  Vladimir Nabokov Pnin (William Heinemann Limited, London, 1957). 
130  Ibid, at 18. 
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If speakers are aware that they do not know the word that is conventionally associated with 
something, they are usually careful in what they say and can indicate to interpreters that they do not 
know the right word. It is more dangerous, however, when speakers are not aware that they do not 
know the word that is conventionally associated with a certain thing and mistakenly believe a 
different word is associated with that thing. This is not ineffability as defined in this thesis because 
the speaker has associated a word with a thing, but the speaker has used the wrong word.  
 
Because words are arbitrary labels, it may be thought that it is impossible for speakers to use the 
wrong word. Speakers, however, can use the wrong word in the sense that they do not employ 
existing conventions or clarify the new conventions they are employing. Such a use of language is 
wrong because it is misleading to interpreters. Similarly, it is wrong for a speaker to deliberately use 
new conventions without notification.131 In such a situation, interpreters will probably assume that 
the word is being used to describe the thing with which it is conventionally associated, not the new 
thing with which the speaker has associated it.  
3 Interpretation 
 
Diagram 3.4, below, depicts the relationship between a word, a thought and a referent in the process 
of interpretation. 
 
                                               
131  See Chapter Three C.1. 
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Diagram 3.4 depicts the process of interpretation.132 It should be read from left to right. The first 
thing is the word heard or read. This word generates a thought. This thought may refer to a certain 
referent. The thought is usually generated by language conventions, rather than by experience of a 
referent directly.133 In such a situation, the referent is not directly perceived by the interpreter but is 
imagined.134 A thought refers to a referent spontaneously. Difficulties occur, however, with the 
generation of this thought from a word. The act of interpretation is this generation of a thought by 
language. 
 
This diagram appears similar to Diagram 3.1 (Word, Thought and Referent), but is useful because it 
specifically depicts the process of interpretation. Diagram 3.1 appears to show speaking when read 
from right to left and interpretation when read from left to right. Diagram 3.4, however, illustrates 
interpretation unambiguously.  
 
Diagram 3.4 shows that the relationship between a word and its corresponding thought are different 
for a speaker and an interpreter. Whereas a speaker deliberately chooses a certain word to 
encapsulate a thought, for an interpreter the word generates the thought. For speakers, the thought is 
first and the word follows; for interpreters, the word is first and the thought follows. To say that the 
word ‘signifies’ a thought, as in Diagram 3.1, obscures these two distinct processes.  
 
In Diagram 3.4, the meaning of the word is the interpreter’s thought. This can be called the 
interpreter’s meaning. Earlier in this thesis, the meaning of a word was defined as the thought with 
which it is associated. Based on this definition, there are three basic ways to view meaning: as the 
thought of a speaker, as the thought of an interpreter, or as the thought generally associated with a 
                                               
132 ‘Interpretation’ here, and throughout this thesis, means comprehending the meaning of language, and not the 
translation of foreign languages. 
133 This would not be the case in an instance of shared experience of the same referent, for examples, if a speaker points 
to a table and says, ‘See that table’, in relation to the word ‘table’, the thought is generated by the object, not merely 
by language. Although the language is calling attention to the object, the thought regarding the object is not based 
merely on language. This chapter, however, will not consider such situations, because they are not present in the 
interpretation of written language.  
134  In older philosophy books this was called a conception as opposed to a perception. In Alexander Jamieson’s 
Grammar of Logic ‘perception’ is defined as “the faculty by which we are informed of the properties of external 
objects, in consequence of the impressions which they make on the organs of sense” ((AH Maltby and Co, New-
Haven, 1822) at 50) and ‘conception’ is defined as “that faculty of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an 
absent object of perception” (at 61). 
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word.135 For communication to be effective, ideally speakers and interpreters need to assign the 
same meaning to a word, that is, ideally the thought of the speaker and the thought of the interpreter 
need to be the same.  
 
Interpretation has been defined as “that faculty, which enables us to attach to another’s language, 
the same meaning as the author himself attached to it.”136 Thus, the task of interpretation is one of 
discovering the speaker’s meaning, that is, ascertaining the speaker’s thought, and, if possible, 
ascertaining the referent to which this thought refers. The subjective thoughts of speakers, however, 
are inaccessible to interpreters. Furthermore, speakers are often unavailable to clarify their 
meanings,137 and even if they could do this, this clarification is still open to interpretation and may 
be no more authoritative than any other opinion on their meaning. For these reasons, this view of 
interpretation has come under considerable challenge, especially from post-modern literary 
critics.138 Still, this does not negate the fact that interpreters usually have the goal of ascertaining 
speakers’ meanings, and that communication based on this view of interpretation works well for 
many purposes.139 Moreover, even if the discovery of a speaker’s exact thoughts is unattainable, it 
                                               
135 In relation to communication theory, three similar aspects of meaning have been distinguished. These are: “sender’s 
meaning: sender’s intended message … receiver’s meaning: receiver’s inferred message … sign meaning: the sum 
of the properties of the signal which make it ... apt … for conveying sender’s intended message” Alan Cruse 
Meaning in Language (2ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 6. Interestingly, this means that there are 
three tasks in which an interpreter can engage. For instance, in relation to ascertaining the meaning of a poem, an 
interpreter can ask three questions: “what did the author intend? … what is the poem saying? … [and] what do I 
make of it?” Kerry S Robichaux “A Prolegomenon to a Hermeneutic of the Bible According to the Intrinsic Being of 
God” (1999) 4(3) Affirmation & Critique 3 at 4. This chapter will focus on interpreters answering the first of these 
questions. 
136 JA Ernesti Elements of Interpretation (trans Moses Stuart) (Flagg and Gould, Printers, Andover (Mass) 1822) at 2. In 
a similar vein, E D Hirsch notes: “The reader should try to reconstruct authorial meaning” The Aims of 
Interpretation (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976) at 8. 
137 This applies especially to the interpretation of written texts. 
138 For a detailed discussion of the postmodernists’ approach to interpretation and meaning, see Kevin J Vanhoozer Is 
There a Meaning in This Text? (Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1998). Both Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida 
emphasised the indeterminateness of meanings: “For Nietzsche … all philosophies, whatever their claim to logic or 
reason, rested on a shifting texture of figurative language … The bottomless relativity of meaning, and the ways in 
which philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of departure for Derrida’s 
writing like Nietzsche’s before him.” Christopher Norris Deconstruction (Methuen, London, 1982) at 58. 
139  In contrast to Derrida’s emphasis on the indeterminateness of meaning (see n 138), M H Abrams notes that “the 
philosophy of language offers an alternative to the supposition that language requires an absolute foundation in 
order to be determinately meaningful. This alternative sets out from the observation that in practice language often 
works, that is gets its job done. … This alternative stance takes as its task not to explain away these workings of 
language, but to explain how it is that they happen, and in instances of failure, to inquire what it is that has gone 
wrong.” “How to do things with texts” (1979) 46 Partisan Review 566 at 570. 
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is still useful for interpreters to have this as an aim.140  
 
A speaker’s subjective meaning is communicated by the use of language conventions. Therefore, 
speakers need to ensure that they make the language conventions they are using clear and 
interpreters need to ensure that they correctly discover such conventions. This means that the 
governing factor for intelligible communication is the correct use of language conventions.141 The 
interpreter’s task is to ascertain the thoughts that the speaker is encapsulating in language by paying 
attention to the language conventions that the speaker is employing. This is to ascertain a speaker’s 
meaning objectively. Put simply, interpretation involves the interpreter objectively ascertaining the 
speaker’s meaning.142 
 
It is useful to consider a few examples of interpretation. In the conversation between Jeeves and 
Bertie quoted earlier, Bertie correctly interpreted Jeeves’ somewhat cryptic statement that Mr Little 
“devotes himself almost entirely to the pleasures of the table”.143 Bertie’s response (“Greedy hog, 
you mean?”) shows that he interpreted Jeeves’ statement correctly.  
 
Bill Bryson recounts calling the United States Social Security Administration when his wife had lost 
her social security card and asking a government official what his wife’s social security number 
was:144  
 
“We are only permitted to divulge that information to the designated individual,” he replied. 
“The person named on the card you mean?” 
“Correct.” 
 
The phrase ‘the designated individual’ may seem obscure, but, again, in the context it was 
                                               
140  E D Hirsch made this point clearly: “I can never know another person’s intended meaning with certainty because I 
cannot get inside his head to compare the meaning he intends with the meaning I understand … But this obvious fact 
should not be allowed to sanction the overly hasty conclusion that the author’s intended meaning is inaccessible and 
is therefore a useless object of interpretation. It is a logical mistake to confuse the impossibility of certainty in 
understanding with the impossibility of understanding.” Validity in Interpretation (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1967) at 17. 
141 This is true by definition. Any situation where communication is not governed by established conventions is an 
instance of the creation of new conventions, since what makes communication by language possible at all is the use 
of language to signify thoughts, and this use involves the establishing of conventions, even if only for one specific 
instance of communication.  
142  There are certain words with which it may seem difficult to associate any meaning. For instance, the word ‘well’ in 
the sentence, ‘Well, I’m going now.’ This thesis will not focus on the interpretation of such words, but they should 
not be considered meaningless. 
143  See text accompanying n 116. 
144  Bill Bryson Notes from a Big Country (Black Swan Books, London, 1999) at 202. 
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interpreted correctly.  
 
Another illustration of interpretation can be seen in a fictional conversation between Stephen Potter 
and a doctor:145 
 
Doctor: Men who come within the ambience of a woman, are more likely to be attracted by, to feel the 
attraction of, that woman, if she is beautiful. 
… 
Potter: You mean they are more likely to fall in love with them if they are pretty? 
Doctor: Yes 
  
Although the word “ambience” in this context is unusual and the phrase “to feel the attraction of” 
makes this statement a somewhat obscure, the meaning was clear from the context.146  
 
In each of these examples of interpretation, the interpreters simplified the speakers’ statements by 
translating them into their own words. The correctness of their understanding was then confirmed 
by the speakers. This shows the basic goal of interpretation. It is not that an interpreter needs to 
have exactly the same thoughts as a speaker, but that the interpreter arrives at a meaning that is 
sufficiently similar to that of the speaker.147 These examples involve the interpretation of spoken 
language, but, in principle, the goal of the interpretation of written language is the same. When 
interpreting written texts, there is no opportunity for interpreters to confirm their understanding with 
writers. Interpreters, however, still need to arrive at a meaning that is sufficiently similar to the 
writer’s meaning. 
 
These examples also show how language conventions are clarified by the context of an utterance. 
Words are often conventionally associated with a number of thoughts. The context in which a word 
is spoken or written can show which conventions apply. For example, the word ‘table’ in the phrase 
“pleasures of the table” does not refer to the table itself, but to the food placed on the table. In the 
                                               
145  Stephen Potter Anti-Woo (William Heinemann Limited, London, 1965) at 15 (italics in original). 
146  This example of interpretation shows the danger of limiting interpretation to the identification of referents. In the 
context of the doctor’s utterance the meaning of the word “attraction” is clear, but it would be very difficult to try to 
posit a referent for this use of the word, especially because it is referring to attraction in the abstract, and not to a 
specific instance of attraction. 
147  These examples also all illustrate an important principle about the interpretation of spoken language: the speaker and 
the hearer interact to arrive at meaning. This aspect of meaning is emphasised in Thomas, above n 118, which 
“accords a central place to the roles of both speaker and hearer in the construction of meaning” (preface). This 
aspect of meaning will not be emphasised in this chapter because this chapter is highlighting aspects of 
communication relevant to the interpretation of written language. 
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abstract the word ‘table’ can refer to an item of furniture or to the food which is placed on it. Which 
convention applies in a specific situation is made clear by the context.  
 
It is important also to distinguish two types of context: verbal and factual. The verbal context is the 
language surrounding the words being interpreted. In relation to written language, this can include a 
sentence, a chapter, an entire text, and other related texts. It would also include any definitions 
given. The factual context is the factual background of the language being interpreted. This can 
include the situation in which the utterance was made, the time the utterance was made,148 and the 
person to whom the utterance was directed. This factual context can also show which conventions 
apply. For instance, Bill Bryson needed to take into account the fact that he was talking to a 
government official who might use official language like “divulge” and “designated individual”.  
 
In Diagram 3.4, a word generates a thought and this thought refers to a referent. As mentioned, 
difficulties mainly occur with the first step: generating a thought from a word. In order to arrive at 
the correct thoughts, interpreters need to take into account a number of considerations. These can 
either be viewed as considerations that show the speaker’s meaning or considerations that indicate 
the conventions that the speaker is employing.  
 
It is useful to list some of the considerations which interpreters need to take into account. First, 
there is the general conventional meaning of the words being interpreted.149 Second, there are the 
specific conventions that apply in certain areas. Third, there is the verbal context of the utterance, 
including any definitions given. Fourth, there is the factual context of the utterance, including who 
the speaker is, who the intended interpreter is, and the situation in which the utterance is made.150 
These four considerations show which specific conventions apply and whether a new convention 
has been established. These considerations need to be taken into account by interpreters because 
they are indicators of the speaker’s meaning.  
 
                                               
148  This time element is especially relevant in relation to the interpretation of written texts. For instance, Martin 
Gardner explained the usefulness of an annotated edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland by stating: “In the 
case of Alice we are dealing with a very curious, complicated kind of nonsense, written for British readers of another 
century, and we need to know a great many things that are not part of the text if we wish to capture its full wit and 
flavour.” Lewis Carroll (Martin Gardner (ed)) The Annotated Alice (Penguin Books Limited, London, 2001) at xiii 
(italics in original).  
149  There may, of course, be more than one general conventional meaning of these words.  
150  Meanings can also be made known by other means, for instance, body language and facial expressions. Such matters 
could also be viewed as part of the factual context of an utterance. Because this thesis is focusing on the 
interpretation of written language, such considerations will not be discussed. 
48 
 
The considerations relevant to interpretation are given in Chart 3.1, below. 
 
Chart 3.1   Relevant Considerations for Interpreters 
1.1 General conventional meaning of words. 
1.2 Specific conventions applying in certain areas. 
1.3 Verbal context of utterance. 
1.4 Factual context of utterance. 
 
The considerations in Chart 3.1 are all relevant to interpretation because they all are indicators of 
the speaker’s meaning. This is not an exhaustive list of the kinds of considerations that interpreters 
need to take into account. Any further considerations, however, would only be relevant if they were 
also indicators of the specific meaning that a speaker is using a word to express.  
 
This section has briefly discussed interpretation. The interpreter’s task is to objectively ascertain the 
speaker’s thoughts. Interpretation involves a word generating a thought in the mind of an 
interpreter. This thought is the interpreter’s meaning. Although it is impossible for the interpreter’s 
meaning to be exactly the same as the speaker’s meaning, language conventions make it possible 
for the interpreter’s meaning to be sufficiently similar to the speaker’s meaning for there to be 
successful communication. Therefore, interpreters need to take into account various considerations 
which indicate the conventions that speakers are employing.  
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(a) Meaninglessness 
 
Interpretation always begins with a word. This word then generates a thought. If the interpreter has 
never encountered the word before, the word may not generate any thought. In this case, Diagram 
3.5, below, would apply. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3.5151 depicts a situation in which an interpreter does not know the meaning of a word. 
‘Meaningless’ here means a lack of the knowledge of the language conventions connecting a word 
to a thought. Unlike the use of the word ‘ineffable’ in this thesis, this is a common meaning of the 
word ‘meaningless’. When a word is meaningless to an interpreter, it does not generate any thought 
in the interpreter’s mind, and, therefore, it does not refer to any referent.  
 
Whereas a thing may be ineffable for a speaker if the language conventions connecting it to a word 
are not known by the speaker, a word is meaningless to an interpreter if the conventions connecting 
it to a thought are not known by the interpreter. Language conventions connect words to thoughts 
regarding things. Without such conventions, things may be ineffable for speakers and words are 
meaningless to interpreters. With ineffability, the speaker’s thought was based on the speaker’s 
experience with a thing. With meaninglessness, the interpreter has no thought since the interpreter’s 
                                               
151 The word ‘generates’ in this diagram may be a little misleading since no thought is generated. The point of this 
diagram is that the word does not generate a thought. In order to depict this diagrammatically, it is necessary to view 
the word as generating no thought. 
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thought is dependent on language conventions and the interpreter has no knowledge of the relevant 
conventions. 
 
If a speaker refers to an ‘ombú’, a tree described by W H Hudson in Far Away and Long Ago,152 
and an interpreter has never heard this word before, this word will be meaningless to the interpreter. 
The context may help clarify the meaning to a certain extent, for instance, the context may make it 
clear that the word refers to a tree, but an interpreter will still not know the specific kind of tree. The 
word itself does not generate any thought. It is not that the word is inherently meaningless, but that 
it is meaningless to this particular interpreter. A good example of this kind of meaninglessness is a 
language that is unknown to an interpreter. The words of this language are not meaningless in the 
abstract, but are meaningless to this particular interpreter.  
 
Sometimes, however, the factual or verbal context may make the meaning of a word somewhat 
clear even if the word is heard for the first time. Jerome K Jerome asks the question, “[W]hat 
materials for a wife do you think you will get out of the empty-headed coquettes you are raving and 
tearing your hair about?”153 He answers:  
 
You will get the jaded face, and the dull, lustreless eyes, and the untidy hair with the dye showing on it. 
You will get dirty, shabby frocks and slommicking dressing-gowns, such as your cook would be 
ashamed to wear. 
 
A reader who had never encountered the word ‘slommicking’, would probably still realise that it 
had a negative connotation and referred to unsightly clothing. Still, this understanding is somewhat 
vague and would need to be confirmed.154 
 
In other situations, the context is less helpful. In Mark Twain’s novel The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn Tom Sawyer decides to start a band of robbers and discusses this with his friend 
Ben Rogers:155 
 
“Now,” says Ben Rogers, “what’s the line of business of this Gang?” 
                                               
152 Hudson, above n 128, at 4. 
153  Jerome K Jerome The Diary of a Pilgrimage (JW Arrowsmith, Bristol, 1891) at 183. 
154  The Oxford English Dictionary gives ‘slommicking’ as variant of ‘slammakin’ and defines the adjectival form of 
‘slammakin’ as “untidy, slovenly” JA Simpson and ESC Weiner (eds) The Oxford English Dictionary (2ed, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) vol 15 at 649. 
155 Mark Twain The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Penguin Books Limited, London, 1985) at 57-58 (italics in 
original). 
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“Nothing only robbery and murder,” Tom said. 
… 
“Must we always kill the people?” 
“Oh, certainly. It’s best. Some authorities think different, but mostly it’s considered best to kill them. 
Except some that you bring to the cave here and keep them till they’re ransomed.” 
“Ransomed? What’s that?” 
“I don’t know. But that’s what they do. I’ve seen it in books; and so of course that’s what we’ve got to 
do.” 
“But how can we do it if we don’t know what it is?” 
“Why blame it all, we’ve got to do it.” 
… 
“how in the nation are these fellows going to be ransomed if we don’t know how to do it to them? … 
Now what do you reckon it is?” 
“Well I don’t know. But per’aps if we keep them till they’re ransomed, it means that we keep them till 
they’re dead.” 
… 
“So somebody’s got to set up all night and never get any sleep, just so as to watch them. … Why can’t a 
body take a club and ransom them as soon as they get here?” 
 
Tom had seen the word ‘ransom’ in books. Apart from knowing that it was what kidnappers did to 
hostages, the word was meaningless to him. Therefore, he guessed its meaning. By the end of the 
extract, the boys started to use ‘ransom’ as a synonym for ‘kill’. This shows that the context does 
not always clarify meaning. It also shows that a danger with meaninglessness is that interpreters 
may guess the meaning of a word they do not know and arrive at the wrong meaning. 
 
Meaninglessness can occur when a speaker attempts to describe something that is ineffable for him 
or her. Earlier this chapter gave an example of a Russian speaker, Pnin, using the word ‘quittance’ to 
describe a receipt.156 Pnin used this word because the item he was trying to describe (a receipt) was 
ineffable for him in English. The man at the information booth replied, “What’s that?” showing that 
this word was meaningless to him.  
 
The danger is more significant, however, when interpreters think they know the meaning of a word, 
but are wrong. That is, when interpreters are not aware that they do not know the relevant 
conventions. If a word is not associated with any thought in the mind of an interpreter, it is unlikely 
that there will be an attempt at interpretation. If, however, a word is unknowingly associated with 
                                               
156 See text accompanying n 130. 
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the wrong thought, the result will be a misinterpretation.  
 
4 Communication 
 
To illustrate the nature of communication in a complete way, it is useful to put Diagram 3.2 
(Speaking) and Diagram 3.4 (Interpretation) together to form Diagram 3.6, below. 
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Diagram 3.6 depicts the process of communication. This diagram should be read from left to right. 
A referent generates a thought in the mind of a speaker. The speaker then encapsulates this thought 
in a word. This word generates a thought in the mind of an interpreter, which refers to a referent. 
For intelligible communication, the two thoughts should be as similar as possible and the two 
referents should be the same.  
 
One problem with Diagram 3.1 (Word, Thought and Referent) is that the acts of speaking and 
interpretation are conflated, and, although this diagram is useful in pointing out the indirect nature 
of the connection between words and referents, it does not clearly show the two sides of 
communication. Diagram 3.6 shows that communication involves two thoughts, which each refer to 
a referent. It also shows that the speaker and the interpreter share the word. Communication can 
thus be viewed as the process of a speaker translating thoughts about referents into words and an 
interpreter translating those words into thoughts about referents. Communication theorists refer to 
these processes as encoding (by speakers) and decoding (by interpreters).157 
 
For successful communication, the two referents should be the same. If a speaker points to a 
referent to indicate the meaning of a word,158 the referents would be the same, and the thoughts 
would be very similar. Moreover, if a speaker refers to a physical object with which the interpreter 
is familiar, it is likely that the referents will be identical. A speaker may see an object and later refer 
to it with language. The interpreter, however, may have never seen this object. In this situation, the 
speaker’s thought is based on direct experience with the referent and the interpreter’s thought is an 
imagination of this referent. Therefore, these thoughts may be quite different. These thoughts, 
however, still refer to the same referent. Although it may be possible to imagine situations in which 
successful communication occurs even though an interpreter arrives at a different referent from the 
speaker, in most situations where successful communication occurs the interpreter’s referent will be 
the same as the speaker’s referent. 
 
It is impossible for the two thoughts in Diagram 3.6 to be absolutely identical. The fact that they are 
in two different people means that they cannot be identical. Successful communication, however, is 
dependent on the two thoughts being as similar as possible. 
 
                                               
157 Potter, above n 14, at 47. 
158 This is referred to as giving an ostensive definition: F Waismann (R Harre (ed)) The Principles of Linguistic 
Philosophy (Macmillan and Co Limited, London, 1965) at 94. 
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In Diagram 3.6 the word ‘speaking’ is used for the connection between a referent and a word, and 
the word ‘interpretation’ is used for the connection between that word and a referent. Thus, when 
the word at issue stands for an identifiable referent, both speaking and interpretation involve an 
indirect connection. As seen in the speaking and interpretation sections of this chapter, speaking 
could also be depicted by the connection between the speaker’s thought and the word and 
interpretation could be depicted by the connection between the word and the interpreter’s thought.  
 
The use of language conventions makes the process of communication possible. Speakers 
encapsulate thoughts in language by using conventions and thoughts are generated in interpreters’ 
minds based on these conventions. If the relevant conventions are not known, things are ineffable 
for speakers and words are meaningless to interpreters. Therefore, speakers need to indicate the 
language conventions that they are employing and interpreters need to pay attention to such 
indications. The four groups of considerations given in Chart 3.1 are indicators of language 
conventions to which interpreters need to pay attention.  
(a) Thought transmission 
 
The difficulties involved in communication can be made clearer by a discussion of the two thoughts 
in Diagram 3.6. The centre of Diagram 3.6 (Communication) can be extracted to form Diagram 3.7, 
below, which shows the relationship between the thought in the mind of the speaker and the thought 
in the mind of the interpreter. 
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In Diagram 3.7159 the similarity between the two thoughts determines the effectiveness of the 
communication. This similarity is determined by the language conventions associating the word 
with the thoughts. Communication can therefore be defined as the transmission of a thought from 
one person to another,160 and this transmission is made possible by the use of language conventions. 
 
Two possible mistakes are that the speaker chooses the wrong word or the interpreter understands 
the word wrongly. For instance, if a speaker is thinking of a wolf, but says ‘dog’, a different thought 
will be generated in the mind of the interpreter from that in the mind of the speaker. Alternatively, if 
a speaker says the word ‘wolf’, but the interpreter understands the word ‘wolf’ to refer to a dog, the 
interpreter will again have a different thought from the speaker. Both mistakes, unless caused by a 
slip of the tongue by the speaker or a mishearing by the interpreter, are based on a wrong 
understanding of language conventions, that is, either the speaker understanding the word ‘dog’ to 
refer to a wolf or the interpreter understanding the word ‘wolf’ to refer to a dog.  
 
On the speaker’s side, such a mistake could be caused because the thing was ineffable for the 
speaker. For instance, the speaker may not have known the language conventions associated with 
wolves, and therefore may have guessed that wolves could be described by the word ‘dog’. On the 
interpreter’s side, this mistake could be caused because the word was meaningless to the interpreter. 
For instance, the interpreter may not have known the language conventions associated with the 
word ‘wolf’, and therefore may have guessed that this word referred to dogs.  
 
 
 
                                               
159 As mentioned in relation to Diagram 3.6, the words ‘encapsulated by’ and ‘generates’ can represent speaking and 
interpretation, and thus Diagram 2.7 could be a diagram of communication. Diagram 2.7, however, would be an 
incomplete depiction of communication because it does not take into account the fact that thoughts refer to things. 
160 The linguist Roy Harris disagrees with this view and has pejoratively labelled it ‘telementation’: see Roy Harris The 
Language Myth (Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, London, 1981). The basic objection to this ‘telementation’ 
view of communication was expressed by Michael Toolan: “Crucial to telementation, or ‘ideas-transfer’ is the 
assumption, which is either false, unprovable or irrelevant … that when A speaks to B the same idea that A used and 
encoded into speech is picked out, highlighted, or recreated in B’s head.” “A Few Words on Telementation” (1997) 
19 Language Sciences 79 (italics in original). As the discussion related communication has made clear, it is 
impossible for thoughts to be exactly the same. This, however, does not mean that the goal of communication should 
not be for them to be as similar as possible. Therefore, communication can be viewed as the transmission of 
thoughts from one person to another as long as it is borne in mind that this does not mean that the speaker’s actual 
subjective thought is transferred to the interpreter. Rather, this means that the interpreter’s thought needs to be as 
similar to the speaker’s thought as is possible. 
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(b) Simplified view of communication 
 
Diagram 3.8, below, is formed by extracting the bottom line of Diagram 3.6 (Communication). 
 
 
 
In Diagram 3.8, a speaker refers to a referent with a word by speaking and an interpreter 
understands this word to refer to a referent by interpretation. Successful communication occurs 
when the two referents are the same. This diagram illustrates a naïve view of communication in 
which everything is objective and the connection between words and referents is direct without 
intervening thoughts.  
 
Because interpreters do not have access to speakers’ subjective thoughts, interpretation is 
necessarily objective. It should not, however, be considered objective in a naïve way. Rather, 
interpreters need to take into account the indications of speakers’ thoughts. To do this, interpreters 
need to pay attention to the considerations in Chart 3.1. Interpreters can commit fallacies when they 
neglect such considerations. 
 
Furthermore, based on Diagram 3.8, it would appear that the interpreter’s main task is the discovery 
of a referent. As has been seen, in some cases there may be no identifiable referent, and, even when 
there is, an interpreter needs to pay attention to the way the referent is being viewed by the speaker, 
which means that the focus of the interpreter should be on the speaker’s thought, and not merely on 
the referent identified by the speaker.  
 
In some situations, however, it may seem convenient to take Diagram 3.8 as a model of 
communication. For instance, if a speaker refers to ‘Mount Rushmore’, it may seem intuitive to say 
the words refer to the mountain given that name, and Diagram 3.8 may seem to be an adequate 
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illustration of communication in this situation. This is because the referent is concrete and easily 
identifiable and the language conventions are well known. This does not mean that the connecting 
thoughts are not needed, but just that they can be taken for granted. Having said this, Diagram 3.6 
(Communication) would still be a more accurate illustration of communication even in this kind of 
situation.  
 
C Interpretation Fallacies 
 
This chapter has so far provided a general analysis of language, focusing on the processes of 
speaking and interpretation. This analysis of language has shown the role of language conventions 
in connecting words to thoughts and how mistakes can be made due to ignorance of such 
conventions. This analysis has also shown that the goal of an interpreter should be to objectively 
ascertain a speaker’s meaning. The remainder of this chapter will identify and analyse two 
interpretative fallacies that can be committed in the ordinary interpretation of language. These 
fallacies correspond to two fallacies that can be committed in judicial interpretation.  
 
The interpretation fallacies identified in this section are caused by a misunderstanding concerning 
the nature of meaning. There is no natural or necessary connection between words and their 
meanings. Therefore, words do not necessarily have specific meanings associated with them.161 The 
interpretation fallacies identified in this chapter are caused by the unconscious assumption that there 
is a fixed relationship between words and their meanings.   
 
1 Definition of an interpretation fallacy 
 
Interpretation has been defined as an interpreter objectively ascertaining a speaker’s meaning. It 
may therefore seem that any time an interpreter reaches a different meaning from a speaker the 
interpreter has committed an interpretation fallacy. This, however, is too simple a view of 
interpretation. 
 
                                               
161 This also means that there is no direct correspondence between words and their referents. There is a direct one-to-
one correspondence between a word and its referent only in the case of proper nouns, for instance, people’s names 
(see Kempson, above n 102, at 13). For this reason, it is a little inaccurate to speak of proper nouns having meaning 
(at 14). 
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It has been pointed out that if a speaker does not clarify the language conventions he or she is using, 
an interpreter cannot be expected to ascertain the speaker’s meaning.162 This can be illustrated by a 
conversation between Alice and Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s novel Through the Looking 
Glass. Humpty Dumpty tells Alice:163  
 
“there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents –” 
“Certainly,” said Alice. 
“And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!” 
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said. 
… “Of course you don’t – till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’” 
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice objected. 
“‘When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said … “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more 
nor less.”  
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”  
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.” 
 
If Humpty Dumpty had not clarified what he meant by the word ‘glory’, that is, if he had not 
clarified the language convention he was employing, Alice could not have been expected to 
interpret his statement correctly. She would be justified in assuming the word was being used with 
its existing meaning. In this situation, the interpreter and the speaker are assigning different 
meanings to this word. The interpreter, however, has not made any errors in objectively ascertaining 
the speaker’s meaning. Rather, the speaker has not clarified the meaning he has associated with the 
word. Therefore, if Alice assumed that ‘glory’ was being used with its existing meaning, this 
interpretation would not be fallacious.  
 
Whether or not such an instance of interpretation is wrong is a matter of definition, but it is not 
fallacious because the interpreter has not made any errors in objectively ascertaining the speaker’s 
meaning. The difference between the speaker’s meaning and the interpreter’s meaning was due to 
the fact that the speaker did not clarify the convention that was being employed. A speaker can 
always claim that he or she subjectively meant something different from the meaning that an 
                                               
162  See Chapter Three B.2. 
163  Carroll, above n 148, at 224 (italics in original). Lawyers have often referred to Lewis Carroll’s Alice novels and to 
this conversation in particular. Peter F Sloss wrote a book entitled Alice’s Adventures in Jurisprudentia in which 
Alice visited an imaginary kingdom Jurisprudentia. He stated: “Some years ago, while reading a decision of the 
California Supreme Court which discussed how a court should determine the meaning of a contract, I was struck 
with the thought that the question before the Court was the same question that Alice posed to Humpty Dumpty. This 
story flowed naturally from this simply observation.” Alice’s Adventures in Jurisprudentia (Borogrove Press, 
Belvedere (Cal), 1982) at 3.  
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interpreter reached.164 Such a claim by a speaker should not automatically make interpretations 
fallacious. Whether an instance of interpretation is fallacious should depend on the whether the 
interpreter has taken into account the objective indications of the speaker’s meaning.  
 
In some situations, an interpreter may not be aware of sufficient contextual information to interpret 
a word correctly. A good example of this can be seen with the misinterpretation of the word ‘cat’ in 
the following conversation: 165 
 
“What we want is the army to take over this country. See a bit of discipline then, we would … Flog ‘em, 
is what I say. Give ‘em something to remember across their backsides.” He paused and swigged tea. 
“What’s wrong with the cat?” he said, so that anyone coming in at that moment, Alan thought, would 
have supposed him to be enquiring after the health of the family pet. 
 
If someone coming in at that moment understood the word ‘cat’ to be a reference to the family pet, 
this would be a misinterpretation. In this situation, however, it would be reasonable for such a 
person to expect that the word ‘cat’ referred to the animal, not the cat-o’nine-tails. On the one hand, 
this is not the speaker’s fault, because the speaker has provided sufficient contextual clues to clarify 
what he means. Therefore, the interpretation is wrong. Still, it is not an unreasonable interpretation. 
An interpreter could not be expected to know that he or she needed to be aware of more contextual 
information to interpret the word correctly. The interpreter has associated the word with a different 
meaning from the speaker, but the interpreter cannot be blamed for this. It is thus an excusable 
misinterpretation. 
 
In other situations, a word may be ambiguous even if the interpreter is aware of all the relevant 
contextual information. In Richmal Crompton’s novel Just William’s Luck, two boys, William and 
Douglas, are talking about King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table:166 
 
“Well, about this Arthur man,” said William … “They made him King and he started knights.” 
“What d’you mean, started nights?” said Douglas. “There’ve been nights an’ days ever since the world 
began.” 
 
The words ‘knight’ and ‘night’ are homophones, that is, they are words “which are pronounced the 
                                               
164  This is dealt with in the law by evidentiary restrictions in relation to interpretation (see n 344).  
165  Ruth Rendell Make Death Love Me (Arrow Books, London, 1980) at 29. This example was given in Thomas, above 
n 118, at 3. 
166  Richmal Crompton Just William’s Luck (George Newnes Limited, London, 1949) at 25.  
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same, but have different spellings and meanings”.167 Douglas’ interpretation was wrong, but it was 
an excusable misinterpretation in this context. William’s use of the word ‘knight’, however, was not 
deliberately misleading. Therefore, although the interpretation was wrong, it should not be 
considered fallacious, because it was a reasonable interpretation given the information available to 
the interpreter. There were no significant relevant considerations that Douglas ignored.  
 
It is important to define for the purposes of this thesis what makes an instance of interpretation 
fallacious. If an interpretation is reasonable based on the information that is available to the 
interpreter, the interpretation is not fallacious, even if the interpreter associates the word with a 
different meaning from the speaker. If a speaker uses a word in a misleading way, an interpreter 
cannot be blamed for arriving at a different meaning from the speaker. Moreover, even if a speaker 
does not use a word in a misleading way, yet an interpreter still arrives at a different meaning from 
the speaker, the interpretation is not fallacious if it was reasonable. An interpretation fallacy needs 
to involve an unreasonable interpretation.  
 
An instance of interpretation is justified when an interpreter takes into account all the considerations 
which indicate a speaker’s meaning. Four kinds of relevant considerations that interpreters may 
need to take into account have been given in Chart 3.1. The context of the speaking may indicate 
that interpreters need to investigate certain matters before arriving at an interpretation. Therefore, 
the considerations that interpreters need to take into account may include information that it is 
reasonable to expect interpreters to discover and not just information apparent from the immediate 
context of speaking. The considerations that interpreters need to take into account will be referred to 
as ‘relevant considerations’.  
 
The goal of interpretation is for an interpreter to objectively arrive at the same meaning as the 
speaker. An interpreter can do this by taking into account certain relevant considerations. A 
consideration is relevant when it is an indicator of the specific meaning the speaker is expressing. A 
consideration that is not an indicator of this specific meaning is irrelevant, and should not be taken 
into account by interpreters. Such considerations will be referred to as ‘irrelevant considerations’. 
 
Although the goal of an interpreter is to reach the same meaning as the speaker, in some instances 
an interpreter may not be able to check his or her meaning with the speaker.168 In this situation, it 
                                               
167  Howard Jackson Words and Their Meaning (Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow, 1988) at 4. 
168  For instance, in the interpretation of written texts. 
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cannot be determined whether the interpreter has reached a different meaning from the speaker’s 
subjective meaning. Furthermore, even if the interpreter has reached a different meaning from the 
speaker, the interpretation may have been reasonable. Therefore, there needs to be a test for when 
an instance of interpretation is fallacious that does not depend on the speaker’s subjective meaning.  
 
An instance of interpretation is not fallacious if the interpreter takes into account all the necessary 
relevant considerations. This means that the interpretation is reasonable, even if the interpreter 
arrives at a different meaning from the speaker’s subjective meaning. For the purpose of this thesis, 
an instance of interpretation is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant consideration and 
it is most likely that a different meaning would have been reached if that consideration had been 
omitted, or when it omits a relevant consideration and it is most likely that a different meaning 
would have been reached if that consideration had been taken into account. Fallacies may involve 
the introduction of more than one irrelevant consideration and the omission of more than one 
relevant consideration. Because it cannot be definitively said that an interpreter would have reached 
a different meaning if he or she had taken into account a certain relevant consideration or had 
omitted a certain irrelevant consideration, the test for fallacious interpretation has to depend on 
whether it is most likely that a different meaning would have been reached.  
 
The mere fact that a certain irrelevant consideration has been taken into account or that a certain 
relevant consideration has been neglected by an interpreter does not make an instance of 
interpretation fallacious. An instance of interpretation is fallacious when the inclusion of an 
irrelevant consideration or the neglect of a relevant consideration affects the meaning that is 
reached. It is fallacious when it is most likely that the interpreter would have reached a different 
meaning if he or she had taken into account the relevant considerations and omitted any irrelevant 
considerations. In most situations, this will mean that the interpreter reaches a different meaning 
from the speaker, but the key point is not merely that the meaning is different from the speaker, but 
that it is an unreasonable meaning.  
 
2 Words and meanings 
 
After providing a general definition of fallacious interpretation, it is necessary to identify specific 
fallacies that can be committed during interpretation. Because words are arbitrary labels, one word 
may be used with more than one meaning and two different words may be used with the same 
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meaning.169 This means that different meanings can be associated with the same word and the same 
meaning can be associated with different words.170  
 
If the same word has been given different meanings by a speaker and an interpreter, the interpreter 
may assume that the use of the same word implies the same meaning is being expressed by the 
speaker. If different words have been given the same meaning by a speaker and an interpreter, the 
interpreter may assume that the use of a different word implies a different meaning is being 
expressed by the speaker. These assumptions can cause interpreters to introduce an irrelevant 
consideration and neglect relevant considerations. Therefore, these assumptions can result in 
fallacious interpretations.  
 
This chapter will look at two interpretation fallacies. The first fallacy involves the assumption 
‘same word, therefore, same meaning’ and can be called the ‘same word’ fallacy.171 The second 
fallacy involves the assumption ‘different word, therefore, different meaning’ and can be called the 
‘different word’ fallacy.172 These fallacies occur when an interpreter introduces the consideration of 
the meaning a word can be given, and this consideration is irrelevant for this specific instance of 
interpretation. This irrelevant consideration then causes the interpreter to reach a meaning that most 
likely would not have been reached if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted and the 
relevant considerations had been taken into account. These fallacies are instances of the general 
fallacy defined in the previous section and involve the introduction of an irrelevant consideration 
and usually also involve the omission of relevant considerations. As will be seen, some instances of 
misinterpretation can be viewed as either the ‘same word’ fallacy or the ‘different word’ fallacy.  
 
3 Same word, therefore, same meaning 
 
This section discusses an interpretation fallacy that involves the assumption: ‘same word, therefore, 
same meaning’. The goal of interpretation is for interpreters to objectively discover the meaning 
                                               
169 This has been noted by various writers, for instance, Ullmann, above n 70, at 46-48; Robert H Thouless Straight and 
Crooked Thinking (2ed, Pan Books Limited, London, 1953) at 77; and Ogden and Richards, above n 18, at viii. 
170  It is difficult to say two words have been given exactly the same meaning, but they can be sufficiently similar in 
meaning to view them as having the same meaning for practical purposes. 
171  When these fallacies are named, single quotation marks are used around the words ‘same word’ and ‘different word’ 
because this is clearer when this name appears in a sentence. 
172  These are not the only kind of interpretation fallacies that can be committed in ordinary interpretation. Fallacies can 
be committed any time irrelevant considerations are introduced and relevant considerations are omitted.  
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that speakers have given to the word173 being interpreted. A speaker may use a word with a certain 
meaning. The interpreter may associate this word with a different meaning. Thus, the same word 
has been associated with different meanings by the speaker and the interpreter. The ‘same word’ 
fallacy involves the interpreter making an assumption that because the speaker has used a word that 
the interpreter has associated with a certain meaning, the speaker has given this word this meaning.  
 
There are three steps involved in this fallacy: first, the speaker uses a word with a certain meaning; 
second, the interpreter associates this word with a different meaning; and, third, the interpreter 
concludes that because the same word that the interpreter has associated with a certain meaning has 
been used, the same meaning has been expressed. The missing premise is the assumption that words 
only have one meaning.174 
 
Put another way, this fallacy involves the interpreter making an assumption that because the word 
being interpreted can have a certain meaning, it has been given that meaning by the speaker. The 
fact that a certain word can be given a certain meaning, however, does not mean that it is always 
given that meaning.  
 
What makes an instance of interpretation fallacious, however, is not this assumption by itself. There 
are situations where such an assumption can lead to the correct interpretation. Fallacies occur when 
this assumption is incorrect and the meaning that the speaker is expressing is not the meaning that 
the interpreter has associated with the word. Thus, the interpreter introduces an irrelevant 
consideration of the meaning a word can have when it is being used to express a different meaning. 
If this irrelevant consideration causes the interpreter to reach a meaning which it is most likely 
would not have been reached if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted and any relevant 
considerations had been introduced, the interpretation is fallacious. This section will give some 
examples of situations in which interpreters fallaciously draw the conclusion: ‘same word, 
therefore, same meaning’. 
 
In a book first published in 1925, the Roman Catholic apologist G K Chesterton stated: 175  
                                               
173  In this discussion of fallacies, the term ‘word’ should be understood to mean the language being interpreted, and it 
not limited to single words. 
174  This does not necessarily mean that the interpreter believes that words only have one meaning, but this may be a 
subconscious assumption. At least it can be said that the interpreter has overlooked the fact that the same word can 
be given different meanings, and the implication of this fact for interpretation: that there needs to be a discovery of 
the specific meaning the speaker has given to the word.   
175  GK Chesterton The Everlasting Man (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1993) at 11 (capitalisation in original). 
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It would be better to see … the prayer-book as fantastic as the prayer-wheel and the Cross as crooked as 
the Swastika. Then at least we should not lose our temper as some of the sceptical critics seem to lose 
their temper, not to mention their wits. 
 
Chesterton’s point was that the prayer-book and the cross should be viewed as strange and 
unfamiliar items. When this book was published, the swastika would have been primarily known as 
an Indian religious symbol. A modern reader, however, may view the swastika as a symbol of 
Nazism. If the word was given this meaning, this would be a fallacious interpretation. The use of 
the same word does not necessarily imply that the same meaning is being expressed. 
 
In this situation, the use and significance of the symbol (the swastika) changed over time, but the 
word describing it remained the same. Therefore, the meaning of the word describing this symbol 
changed. The modern meaning of this word is irrelevant when interpreting early references to it.176 
The relevant consideration in relation to the word ‘swastika’ is the meaning of the word at the time 
of the book was published. When interpreting written language, time is an important part of the 
factual background.177 An interpretation which introduced the irrelevant consideration of the 
modern meaning of this word and omitted the relevant consideration of the meaning of the word at 
the time it was used would be fallacious. 
 
The ‘same word’ fallacy can also be committed when interpreting technical terms. For instance, the 
term ‘vapors’ in the following passage from Milton’s Paradise Lost may cause confusion:178 
 
When Adam wak’t, so custom’d, for his sleep 
Was Aery light, from pure digestion bred, 
And temperate vapors bland, which th’ only sound 
Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora’s fan, 
Lightly dispers’d … 
 
This confusion is clarified when it is seen that “vapors is a definite medical term meaning the 
                                               
176  A thing may change over time, but the word describing it may remain the same. The fact that the word has not 
changed may cause an interpreter to overlook changes that have occurred with the thing. To combat this it is 
sometimes necessary for speakers to use a different word. For example, the term ‘neo-Nazi’ is useful to refer 
specifically to modern Nazis as opposed to historical Nazis.  
177  This corresponds to consideration 1.4 in Chart 3.1. 
178  John Milton (Merritt Y Hughes (ed)) Paradise Lost (The Odyssey Press, Indianapolis, 1962) at 113 (italics in 
original). 
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exhalations of digestion.”179 In this passage, it is not merely that an old meaning has been given to 
the word ‘vapors’, but a technical meaning has been given to this word.180 An interpreter may 
assume ‘vapors’ referred to fog or mist. This would be a wrong interpretation. 
 
Whether or not this interpretation would be considered fallacious for the purposes of this thesis 
depends on how reasonable such an interpretation was. Since this is not a flagrant misinterpretation, 
but an understandable one, such an interpretation, although wrong, would probably not be 
considered to be fallacious. It would only be fallacious if the interpretation was unreasonable given 
the relevant considerations that the interpreter should have taken into account. If the interpreter was 
an expert who would be expected to conduct detailed research regarding the meaning of the word 
being interpreted, the technical meaning of the word would be a relevant consideration. If the 
interpreter was a layman, it is arguable that an interpretation that missed this technical meaning 
would not be fallacious, although it would be wrong. This is because the technical meaning of this 
word would not be a relevant consideration that a layman would be expected to take into account. 
 
This type of fallacy does not always involve the misinterpretation of a specific word, but can 
involve the misinterpretation of a phrase or an entire sentence. Furthermore, even if the literal 
meaning of the language being interpreted is correctly understood, the force of the utterance may be 
misunderstood. A good example of this can be seen in Charles Dickens’ novel Pickwick Papers.181 
In a very funny scene in the book, Mr Pickwick tries to tell his landlady, Mrs Bardell, that he wants 
to employ a handyman. Mrs Bardell misunderstands Mr Pickwick’s statement, and thinks that he is 
asking her to marry him:182 
 
“Mrs. Bardell,” said Mr. Pickwick, at the expiration of a few minutes.  
“Sir,” said Mrs. Bardell again.  
“Do you think it’s a much greater expense to keep two people, than to keep one?” 
“La, Mr. Pickwick,” said Mrs. Bardell, colouring up to the very border of her cap, as she fancied she 
observed a species of matrimonial twinkle in the eyes of her lodger; “La, Mr. Pickwick, what a question!” 
“Well, but do you?” inquired Mr. Pickwick. 
 
In this case, the misunderstanding was not primarily concerning the literal meaning of the words 
                                               
179  Ibid, at 113, footnote 5 (italics in original). 
180  This corresponds to consideration 1.2 in Chart 3.1. 
181  Charles Dickens The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (Chapman and Hall, London, 1858) [Pickwick 
Papers].  
182  Ibid, vol 1 at 159 (italics in original).  
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spoken. Rather, the misunderstanding related to Mr Pickwick’s intention in uttering these words. 
Whereas Mr Pickwick was referring to employing a handyman, Mrs Bardell thought he was 
referring to marrying her. Both of these meanings can conceivably come within the meaning of the 
phrase ‘keep two people’. 
 
What makes this interpretation fallacious is that such an interpretation was not justified by the 
factual context of the utterance.183 The misinterpretation in this case was due to Mrs Bardell’s 
feelings for Mr Pickwick as seen later in the passage when it says: 184  
 
She had long worshipped Mr. Pickwick at a distance, but here she was, all at once, raised to a pinnacle to 
which her wildest and most extravagant hopes had never dared to aspire. 
 
These feelings caused Mrs Bardell to introduce an irrelevant consideration. The relevant 
consideration in this case is the meaning of the phrase ‘keep two people’ in the context in which it 
was uttered: a lodger talking to his landlady. In this context, it is likely that this phrase refers to 
employing someone. The irrelevant consideration is its possible meaning in a different context. If 
Mr Pickwick intended to propose to Mrs Bardell, it is likely that he would make a much more 
definite statement, especially considering the legal consequence of a marriage proposal at the time 
the book was published.185  
 
This fallacy can also be committed due to differences of terminology between disciplines or within 
a single discipline. In The Meaning of Meaning Ogden and Richards discuss the various meanings 
given to the word ‘meaning’ by philosophers and the disputes that this difference in terminology 
caused.186 They note that a group of American professors who had published a collection of essays 
had “revised and redrafted their language until it met the approval of all other essayists.”187 Ogden 
and Richards quote the essayists saying: “[O]ur familiarity with one another’s MEANING has 
enabled us to understand methods of expression from which at first we were inclined to dissent.”188 
They claim that these professors had “been continuously improving their mutual terminology in the 
full view of the public for over a decade.”189 If a word has been used with a specific meaning within 
                                               
183  This corresponds to consideration 1.4 in Chart 3.1. 
184  Pickwick Papers, above n 181, at 160. 
185  Later in the book, Mrs Bardell sues Mr Pickwick for a breach of a promise of marriage (ibid, at 254).  
186  Ogden and Richards, above n 18, at ch 8. 
187  Ibid, at 164. 
188  Ibid (capitalisation in original). 
189  Ibid. 
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an interpreter’s discipline,190 it is easy for such an interpreter to expect that speakers will use this 
word in the same way. If a speaker in a different discipline uses this word with a different meaning, 
the interpreter can easily commit the ‘same word’ fallacy.  
 
The ‘same word’ fallacy occurs because an interpreter assumes that because a certain meaning can 
be given to the word a speaker is using, the speaker is using the word with that meaning. When this 
assumption is incorrect, it can cause the interpreter to introduce an irrelevant consideration (the 
meaning the word can be given) and neglect the relevant considerations which indicated the 
meaning that the speaker is giving the word. An instance of interpretation is fallacious if the 
introduction of this irrelevant consideration causes the interpreter to reach a meaning that it is most 
likely he or she would not have reached if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted and the 
relevant considerations had been taken into account. Furthermore, it is probable that the meaning 
the interpreter reaches in this situation will be different from the meaning the speaker has given to 
the word. To avoid this fallacy an interpreter should identify the specific meaning given to a word 
when it is used. To do this, the interpreter needs to pay attention to the relevant considerations 
which indicate this meaning and ignore any irrelevant considerations.   
 
4 Different word, therefore, different meaning 
 
This section discusses an interpretation fallacy that involves the assumption: ‘different word, 
therefore, different meaning’. A speaker may use a word with a certain meaning. The interpreter 
may associate this meaning with a different word. Thus, different words have been associated with 
the same meaning by the speaker and the interpreter. The ‘different word’ fallacy involves the 
interpreter making an assumption that because a different word from the word the interpreter has 
associated with a certain meaning has been used by a speaker, the speaker has given this word a 
different meaning.  
 
There are three steps involved in this fallacy: first, the speaker uses a certain word with a certain 
meaning; second, the interpreter associates this meaning with a different word; and third, the 
interpreter concludes that because a different word from the word the interpreter has associated with 
a certain meaning has been used, a different meaning has been expressed. The missing premise is 
                                               
190  This corresponds to consideration 1.2 in Chart 3.1. 
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the assumption that words can only be associated with one meaning.191 
 
Put another way, this fallacy involves the interpreter making an assumption that because a meaning 
can be given to certain word, speakers must use that word to express that meaning. The fact that a 
certain meaning can be associated with certain word, however, does not mean that this meaning is 
only associated with that word. This section will give some examples of situations in which 
interpreters fallaciously draw the conclusion: ‘different word, therefore, different meaning’. This 
fallacy is difficult to explain clearly in the abstract, but will be made clear by the examples given in 
this section.   
 
The popular book Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus makes the claim that men and 
women speak different languages.192 Some of the examples given in this book can be viewed as 
examples of the ‘different word’ fallacy. The book makes the claim that men interpret women’s 
language literally, whereas “[t]o fully express their feelings, women assume poetic license and use 
various superlatives”.193 For instance, it is claimed that men respond to women’s statement such as, 
“We never go out” with claims such as, “That’s not true. We went out last week.”194 If this occurred, 
the man would be making the assumption that because the woman is using different words from the 
words he would use to express the same feelings, she is not expressing those feelings.195 Whether or 
not such an interpretation is fallacious depends on how reasonable this assumption is. If the factual 
context of the speaking makes the woman’s meaning clear,196 this assumption would be unjustified 
and the resulting interpretation would be fallacious.  
 
The previous section identified fallacies caused by the same word being used with different 
meanings in different disciplines. Fallacies are also created when different words are used with the 
same meaning in different disciplines. In a book on communication theory, Em Griffin notes that 
communication professor Robert Craig has identified “seven established traditions of 
                                               
191  An interpreter may not actually believe this, but at least it can be said that the interpreter has overlooked the fact that 
the same meaning can be expressed by different words. Compare, n 174. 
192 Gray, above n 56, at 59. The linguist Deborah Cameron sought to refute the ideas in this book with her book The 
Myth of Mars and Venus (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). Whether or not the claims regarding language in 
this book are correct, the examples given still illustrate this fallacy. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid, at 60. 
195 Zechariah Chafee gives a humorous example of this kind of misunderstanding. He recounts a young wife 
complaining, “When I ask Charles if he loves me, he acts as if I were asking for information.” Chafee, above n 22, 
at 382. Here the phrase ‘Do you love me?’ is interpreted as a request for information, rather than a request for a 
display of affection. A popular book dealing with this topic is Barbara Annis Same Words, Different Language (Judy 
Piatkus (Publishers) Limited, London, 2003).  
196  This corresponds to consideration 1.4 in Chart 3.1. 
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communication theory”.197 These traditions have “distinct, alternative vocabularies”.198 Griffin 
notes that “scholars within a given tradition talk comfortably with each other, but often take 
potshots at those who work in other camps.”199 It is likely that some of these disputes are caused by 
different words being used with the same meaning.200 An interpreter may assume that because a 
speaker uses a different word from the word the interpreter would use to express a certain meaning 
in the interpreter’s discipline, a different meaning is being expressed by the speaker. This may cause 
the interpreter to overlook the relevant consideration of the meaning that is given to this word in 
speaker’s discipline. In such a situation, the interpretation would usually be fallacious because the 
meaning of the word in the speaker’s discipline is a relevant consideration.201  
 
This fallacy can also be committed because different words are used with the same meanings in two 
countries which have variations of the same language. For example, an American reader of the 
Lewis Carroll novel Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There202 might assume that 
the term ‘looking-glass’ referred to some unknown kind of furniture and not a mirror, because the 
word ‘mirror’ was not used. Such an interpretation would be fallacious, because the interpreter is 
not justified in making the assumption that a different meaning is being expressed. Rather, the 
interpreter should be aware of the possibility of geographical variations in language, and therefore 
should investigate and find the meaning of the word rather than simply assuming it does not refer to 
a mirror.  
 
The ‘different word’ fallacy occurs because an interpreter assumes that because a certain meaning 
can be expressed by a certain word, a speaker is not expressing that meaning when the speaker uses 
a different word. When this assumption is incorrect, it can cause the interpreter to introduce an 
irrelevant consideration (the fact that a different word can be used to express a certain meaning) and 
neglect the relevant considerations which indicated the meaning that the speaker is giving the word. 
An instance of interpretation is fallacious if the introduction of this irrelevant consideration causes 
the interpreter to reach a meaning that it is most likely he or she would not have reached if this 
                                               
197  Em Griffin A First Look at Communication Theory (McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003) at 21. 
198  Ibid, quoting from Robert T Craig “Communication Theory as a Field” (1999) 9 Communication Theory 119 at 130. 
199  Griffin, above n 197, at 22. 
200  In relation to art criticism, Martin Gardner noted “controversies between Marxian critics and their opponents 
concerning the nature and value of propaganda in art suffer … from a melange of linguistic confusion. The same 
words are used by the opposing sides (sometimes by the same side) with widely different meanings, and different 
words are used with the same meanings.” Martin Gardner “Art, Propaganda, and Propaganda Art” in Order and 
Surprise (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984) 29 at 29. 
201  This corresponds to consideration 1.2 in Chart 3.1. 
202 Carroll, above n 148, 133. 
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irrelevant consideration had been omitted and the relevant considerations had been taken into 
account. Also, it is probable that the meaning the interpreter reaches when committing this fallacy is 
different from the meaning the speaker has given to the word. To avoid this fallacy, an interpreter 
should pay attention to the relevant considerations which indicate the speaker’s meaning and ignore 
any irrelevant considerations. 
 
5 Discussion of ‘same word’ fallacy and ‘different word’ fallacy 
 
An interpreter’s goal is to objectively discover a speaker’s meaning. The two fallacies that have 
been discussed in this chapter are caused by the interpreter relying on an irrelevant association of a 
word with a certain meaning and ignoring the relevant considerations which indicate the speaker’s 
meaning. These fallacies both involve the implicit assumption that each word has a single meaning 
corresponding to it. Thus the assumption – ‘one word, therefore, one meaning’ – gives rise to two 
specific fallacies: ‘same word, therefore, same meaning’ and ‘different word, therefore, different 
meaning’.  
 
The problem with both fallacies is that the interpreter has made an irrelevant association of a word 
and a meaning and this association governs the interpretation. The interpreter may have made this 
association prior to the act of interpretation or may have made this association during the process of 
interpretation. For the ‘same word’ fallacy, the interpreter has not discovered the meaning of the 
speaker because the word being interpreted can be given a different meaning. For the ‘different 
word’ fallacy, the interpreter has not discovered the meaning of the speaker because the interpreter 
would not use the word being interpreted to express the speaker’s meaning. With both fallacies, the 
interpreter has found that it is possible to associate a word with a certain meaning. This association, 
however, was not relevant for this specific instance of interpretation.  
 
Therefore, with both fallacies the interpreter is distracted by possible meanings that words can have, 
rather than focusing on what the speaker has used words to mean. This is due to a misunderstanding 
about the nature of meaning. These fallacies are committed because interpreters overlook two 
aspects of the association between words and meanings: arbitrariness and conventionality. Because 
the association between words and meanings is arbitrary, there is no fixed association. This means 
that interpreters cannot merely discover any association between a word and a meaning, but need to 
ascertain the specific meaning the speaker has expressed. Because this association is conventional, 
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interpreters can discover this association by paying attention to relevant considerations which 
indicate the conventions that the speaker has employed.  
 
Both fallacies involve the introduction of a basic irrelevant consideration – the meaning a word can 
have. This leads to the omission of the relevant considerations which indicate the meaning the word 
is being given by the speaker. It is helpful to list the specific irrelevant considerations that 
interpreters took into account and the relevant considerations that interpreters neglected in the 
examples that have been given.  
 
In relation to the ‘same word’ fallacy, the irrelevant considerations introduced by interpreters 
included: the current meaning of a word when interpreting a text written at a time when the word 
had a different meaning, the general meaning of a word when it is being used with a technical 
meaning, a possible intention that can be attributed to a speaker when using certain words that does 
not fit the factual context of the utterance being interpreted, and the meaning of a word in a certain 
discipline when that word is being used in the context of another discipline. These are all examples 
of meanings the words being interpreted can be given which are irrelevant to the act of 
interpretation at issue. Therefore, in these examples, the interpreters were distracted by the 
irrelevant consideration of the meaning that can be associated with a certain word. The relevant 
considerations that were omitted included: the meaning of the word at the time of writing, the 
technical meanings that can be given to a word, the intention of the speaker as indicated by the 
factual context of the utterance, and the meaning of a word in the discipline in which it is being 
used.  
 
In relation to the ‘different word’ fallacy, the irrelevant considerations introduced included: the fact 
that the interpreter would use a different word to express the same feeling, the fact that the 
interpreter would use a different word in his or her discipline, and the fact that a different word is 
used in a different country that uses a variation of the same language. These are examples of the 
meaning certain words (the different words which the speaker did not use) can have. Therefore, in 
these examples, the interpreters were distracted by the irrelevant consideration of the word that can 
be associated with a certain meaning. The relevant considerations omitted included: the gender of 
the speaker, the way words are used in the speaker’s academic discipline, and the meaning of the 
word in the speaker’s country.  
 
Some of these interpretation fallacies can be viewed as instances of either fallacy. For example, a 
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man may misinterpret a woman’s statement, “We never go out” because she is using different words 
from the ones he would use to express the same meaning. This is the ‘different word’ fallacy. 
Alternatively, he may misinterpret this statement because he would use the same word to express a 
different meaning. This is the ‘same word’ fallacy. Therefore, this misinterpretation can be caused 
by the introduction of the irrelevant consideration of the words the interpreter would use to express 
the same meaning (‘different word’ fallacy), or the introduction of the irrelevant consideration of 
the meaning the interpreter would express by those words (‘same word’ fallacy). In both situations, 
the introduction of the irrelevant consideration results in the neglect of the relevant considerations 
indicating the speaker’s meaning. 
 
An interpretation that does not arrive at the speaker’s subjective meaning is not necessarily 
fallacious for the purposes of this thesis. An instance of interpretation is fallacious when it takes 
into account irrelevant considerations and omits relevant considerations and it is most likely that the 
interpreter would have reached a different meaning if he or she had taken into account the relevant 
considerations and omitted any irrelevant considerations. Relevant considerations that interpreters 
need to take into account include both information the interpreter can deduce from the context of 
speaking and information that the interpreter may not know directly from the context but should 
know that they need to discover. For instance, when interpreting an ancient text, an interpreter 
should know that they need to investigate the meanings that words had at the time the text was 
written. 
 
Moreover, it is difficult to say definitively that an interpreter has arrived at a different meaning from 
the speaker, because there is no way of definitively ascertaining the speaker’s subjective meaning. It 
can be said, however, that the interpretation is fallacious given the relevant considerations that were 
omitted and the irrelevant considerations that were introduced and given the fact that a different 
meaning would most likely have been reached if any irrelevant considerations had been omitted and 
any relevant considerations had been introduced.  
 
6 Interpretation fallacies and categorisation 
 
It is useful to view these fallacies in relation to categorisation. This will show the underlying 
reasons for these fallacies and the relationship between them in a clearer way. It will also show the 
sorts of situations in which they are usually committed. Furthermore, in Chapter Four judicial 
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interpretation will be viewed explicitly in relation to categorisation, and this analysis will show how 
ordinary interpretation can also be viewed in relation to categorisation.  
 
Language is a way of labelling the various items in the world. It would be too much strain on 
people’s memory and too inconvenient if everything had to be designated by a proper noun. For this 
reason, items are grouped in categories and these categories are given names. When learning a 
language, people learn a system of categories. Therefore, except in the case of proper nouns,203 
words can be viewed as the names of categories of items. When words are used, they can refer to an 
entire category (for example, ‘cars’) or to a specific item in a category (for example, ‘my car’). To 
view a reference to a specific item in terms of categorisation may seem strange. For instance, if a 
speaker refers to ‘my father’, it may seem strange to claim that he or she is using a category name 
in such a description. Still, the word ‘father’ is the name of a category designating a certain 
relationship, and to refer to ‘my father’ is to designate a member of this category.  
 
When a speaker uses a word to express a meaning, he or she is employing the name of a category to 
refer to an item. To ascertain the meaning of this word is to determine the item that has been 
referred to by this word. Interpretation can therefore be viewed as the discovery of the items 
speakers have assigned to categories. The word being interpreted can be viewed as a category, and 
the meaning of this word can be viewed as an item that has been assigned to this category. 
 
The item being categorised corresponds to the meaning rather than the referent for two reasons. 
First, words always have meanings, but do not always correspond to identifiable referents. Second, 
even if there is an identifiable referent, the way this referent is being viewed is an important 
component of the meaning of the word, and viewing the item as the referent would not take this 
component of meaning into account. If, however, a word has an identifiable referent and the way 
this referent is being viewed by the speaker does not make a significant difference to interpretation, 
it can be convenient to view the item being categorised as this referent.204 
                                               
203 Although two people may have the same name, they are not named in this way because of a certain common 
characteristic. Therefore, proper nouns do not designate categories: Hospers, above n 106, at 9. Fallacies, however, 
can be committed due to confusion over the referent of a proper noun, and such fallacies can still be viewed as 
mistakes of categorisation (see n 452).  
204  When legal interpretation involves categorisation, it is always with reference to a specific situation or matter. 
Therefore, in Chapter Four, the item will be this situation. When legal interpreters include this item in the category 
designated by the word being interpreted, it will be viewed as the referent of this word, rather than the meaning. This 
is because it is an identifiable situation, and differences in the way this item is viewed by the legal speaker and legal 
interpreter are not legally significant unless they mean that the item should be assigned to a different legal category. 
Therefore, such differences are still taken into account by viewing the item designated by a word as the referent of 
that word. This difference in the way legal interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation is discussed at 
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The interpretation fallacies that have been discussed in this chapter can be viewed in relation to 
categorisation. The ‘same word’ fallacy occurs when the speaker and the interpreter associate 
different meanings with the same word. In relation to categorisation this is when the speaker and the 
interpreter assign different items to the same category. For example, Mrs Bardell thought that the 
phrase ‘keep two people’ was being used to refer to marriage. Thus, there was an ambiguity in 
relation to the phrase ‘keep two people’ because Mr Pickwick was using it with one meaning 
whereas Mrs Bardell interpreted it with a different meaning.205 This interpretation was fallacious 
because Mrs Bardell made an unjustifiable association of these words with marriage and ignored the 
relevant considerations that indicated that Mr Pickwick was using them with a different meaning.  
 
The ‘different word’ fallacy occurs when the speaker and the interpreter associate different words 
with the same meaning. In relation to categorisation, this is when the speaker and interpreter have 
assigned the same item to different categories. For example, a speaker and an interpreter may 
associate the same meaning with two different words: ‘mirror’ and ‘looking-glass’.206 The words 
‘mirror’ and ‘looking-glass’ are synonymous – they have the same meaning. The speaker may 
express this meaning with the word ‘looking-glass’ and the interpreter may associate this meaning 
with the word ‘mirror’. A fallacy would be committed if the interpreter had a fixed association of 
this meaning with the word ‘mirror’ and could not see that the speaker was expressing the same 
meaning with a different word.  
 
Thus, the ‘same word’ fallacy and the ‘different word’ fallacy each involve errors of categorisation. 
The ‘same word’ fallacy involves different items being assigned to the same category and the 
‘different word’ fallacy involves the same item being assigned to different categories. These two 
possibilities with categorisation are depicted in Diagram 3.9, below.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Chapter Four B.1(a). 
205  As has been seen, Mrs Bardell’s belief was unjustified. Therefore, there was not a genuine ambiguity with this 
phrase in the context in which it was used. Rather, Mrs Bardell’s belief created an unjustifiable ambiguity with the 
phrase which led to her wrong interpretation. 
206  In relation to this example, it may be clearer to say that the same referent was associated with different words by the 
speaker and the interpreter, but for consistency this example will be viewed as the association of the same meaning 
with different words. 
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Diagram 3.9 illustrates two possibilities with categorisation. In this diagram, the items correspond 
to the meanings of words and the categories correspond to the words themselves. The dotted lines 
indicate that the connection between a category and an item is not fixed, but is arbitrary. 
 
The left-hand side of this diagram illustrates different items being put in the same category. This 
occurs when the same word (category) can be associated with two or more meanings (items). For 
example, the phrase ‘keep two people’ can be associated with two meanings: marriage and 
employment. The right-hand side of this diagram illustrates one item being put in two different 
categories. This occurs when two different words (categories) can be associated with the same 
meaning (item). For example, the words ‘mirror’ and ‘looking-glass’ can both be associated with the 
same meaning.  
 
It is important to note that these two possibilities with categorisation are not necessarily 
problematic. Indeed, they are an expected result of the arbitrary nature of the relationship between 
words and meanings. Difficulties can arise when these possibilities occur in concrete instances of 
interpretation, specifically, when speakers and interpreters give different meanings to the same word 
or the same meaning to different words. When a speaker and an interpreter give different meanings 
to the same word, the ‘same word’ fallacy can result. When a speaker and an interpreter give the 
same meaning to different words, the ‘different word’ fallacy can result. 
 
The difficulty with the ‘same word’ fallacy is not with the word but the meaning: there are two 
possible meanings. The difficulty with the ‘different word’ fallacy is not with the meaning, but the 
word: there are two possible words. These are opposite difficulties. With the ‘same word’ fallacy the 
interpreter is distracted by the wrong meaning; with the ‘different word’ fallacy the interpreter is 
distracted by the wrong word. In both cases, however, the interpreter has made an unjustified 
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association of a word and a meaning.  
 
Diagram 3.10, below, illustrates the possible associations of categories with items in the abstract. 
 
 
 
This diagram shows that the inclusion of an item in a category is arbitrary. Any item can be put in 
any category. That is, any meaning can be expressed by any word. On the one hand, an interpreter 
may have an expectation that Category 1 would be used to designate Item 2, but the speaker may 
use Category 1 to refer to Item 1. That is, an interpreter may expect that a certain word will be used 
to express a certain meaning but the speaker may use that word to express a different meaning. This 
can result in the ‘same word’ fallacy. On the other hand, an interpreter may have an expectation that 
Item 1 would be assigned to Category 2, but the speaker may assign Item 1 to Category 1. That is, 
an interpreter may expect that a certain meaning would be expressed with a certain word, but the 
speaker may express that meaning with a different word. This can result in the ‘different word’ 
fallacy. 
 
This shows that both fallacies are caused by the interpreter’s belief that a certain word is associated 
with a specific meaning, but one is a belief focused more on a word, and the other is a belief 
focused more on a meaning. When these beliefs are irrelevant to the act of interpretation at issue, 
they can result in fallacies. These two irrelevant beliefs are the basic irrelevant considerations 
related to the two specific fallacies identified in this chapter.  
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Two possible categorisation fallacies are illustrated in Diagram 3.11, below. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3.11 shows the basic conceptual problems with the two fallacies discussed in this chapter 
from the point of view of categorisation.  
 
The left-hand side of the diagram depicts the ‘same category’ fallacy, which corresponds to the 
‘same word’ fallacy. This fallacy involves the assumption: ‘same category, therefore, same item’. 
With the ‘same category’ fallacy, the interpreter has associated a category with an item. The 
speaker, however, has assigned a different item to this category. That is, the interpreter has 
associated a certain word with a meaning, but the speaker has used the same word to express a 
different meaning. Fallacies can occur when the interpreter assumes that because the same word has 
been used, the same meaning has been expressed. The result of this fallacy is that the interpreter 
assigns the wrong item to the category, that is, the interpreter associates the wrong meaning with the 
word being interpreted. For example, marriage is associated with the words ‘keep two people’ when 
these words are being used to refer to employment. 
 
The right-hand side of the diagram depicts the ‘different category’ fallacy, which corresponds to the 
‘different word’ fallacy. This fallacy involves the assumption: ‘different category, therefore, 
different item’. With the ‘different category’ fallacy, the interpreter has assigned an item to a 
category. The speaker, however, has assigned this item to a different category. That is, the 
interpreter has associated a certain meaning with a certain word, but the speaker has expressed this 
meaning with a different word. Fallacies can occur when the interpreter assumes that because a 
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different word has been used,207 a different meaning has been expressed. The result is that the 
interpreter assigns the item to the wrong category. That is, the right meaning is not associated with 
the word being interpreted. For example, the correct meaning is not associated with the word 
‘looking-glass’.  
 
Two things should be noted about this diagram. First, the arrows in the diagram are important. With 
the ‘same category’ fallacy, the interpreter has associated a category with an item: a word with a 
meaning. With the ‘different category’ fallacy the interpreter has associated an item with a category: 
a meaning with a word. In both situations the interpreter has associated a certain word with a certain 
meaning. This association of the interpreter can cause these two fallacies when it is irrelevant to the 
act of categorisation at issue. This association, therefore, is the basic irrelevant consideration that 
causes interpreters to commit these fallacies.  
 
Second, it is useful to compare the results of the two fallacies. The ‘same category’ fallacy results in 
the interpreter assigning an item to a category which the speaker did not assign to this category. 
That is, it results in the interpreter giving a meaning to a word which the speaker did not give to this 
word. The ‘different category’ fallacy results in the interpreter not assigning an item to a category 
which the speaker has assigned to this category. That is, it results in the interpreter not giving a 
meaning to a word which the speaker has given to this word. In both cases, the word being 
interpreted is not given the meaning that the speaker has given it. 
 
It is worth noting that it is not the mere difference of meaning between the speaker and the 
interpreter that makes an interpretation fallacious. What makes an interpretation fallacious is that 
the interpreter is not justified in reaching a different meaning from the speaker. Thus, Diagram 3.11 
depicts the result of these two fallacies, but this same result could also occur in a situation where an 
interpreter reaches a different meaning from a speaker in a non-fallacious way. If the meaning an 
interpreter reaches is based on the relevant considerations and does not introduce any irrelevant 
considerations, it is not fallacious, even if it results in the speaker and the interpreter giving 
different meanings to a word.  
 
 
                                               
207  The interpreter does not always have to have a specific different word in mind. For this fallacy to be committed it is 
sufficient if the interpreter believes that the word that needs to be used to express a certain meaning should be 
different from the one the speaker has used. 
80 
 
The basic ideas in this section are summarised in relation to categorisation in Chart 3.2, below. 
 
Chart 3.2  ‘Same Category’ Fallacy and ‘Different Category’ Fallacy 
Same Category, therefore, Same Item Different Category, therefore, Different Item 
Interpreter expects a certain category will 
include a certain item. 
Interpreter expects a certain item will be 
included in a certain category. 
Speaker assigns a different item to this 
category.  
Speaker assigns this item to a different 
category. 
Two items are assigned to the same category by 
the speaker and the interpreter. 
One item is assigned to two different categories 
by the speaker and the interpreter. 
Interpreter concludes same category, therefore, 
same item. 
Interpreter concludes different category, 
therefore, different item. 
Interpreter assigns a different item to the 
category from the speaker. 
Interpreter does not assign the same item to the 
category as the speaker. 
 
These same ideas are summarised in relation to words and meaning in Chart 3.3, below. 
 
Chart 3.3    ‘Same Word’ Fallacy and ‘Different Word’ Fallacy 
Same Word, therefore, Same Meaning Different Word, therefore, Different 
Meaning 
Interpreter expects a certain word will be 
associated with a certain meaning. 
Interpreter expects a certain meaning will be 
expressed by a certain word. 
Speaker uses this word to express a different 
meaning. 
Speaker expresses this meaning with a different 
word. 
Interpreter concludes same word, therefore, 
same meaning. 
Interpreter concludes different word, therefore, 
different meaning. 
Interpreter gives a different meaning to the 
word from the speaker. 
Interpreter does not give the same meaning to 
the word as the speaker. 
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7 Limitations of this analysis 
 
The goal of this part of this chapter has been to identify certain specific interpretation fallacies that 
correspond to fallacies that can be committed in legal interpretation. Therefore, it has not been 
necessary to discuss many different kinds of fallacies that can be committed in the ordinary 
interpretation of language. Furthermore, it has not been necessary to discuss in detail the possible 
variations that can occur with the fallacies that have been identified. It is sufficient if a few clear 
prototypical examples of fallacies are identified which can be compared with fallacies in legal 
interpretation. This means that the analysis in this chapter is quite limited. It is useful as a 
foundation for the discussion of legal interpretation in the following chapter, but is incomplete as a 
general description of fallacies in the ordinary interpretation of language.  
 
D Language and Thought 
 
This chapter has discussed language and interpretation fallacies. A fundamental issue that has not 
been addressed in detail is the relationship between language and thought. When language is 
viewed in relation to categorisation, however, it is possible to address this issue. This section will 
briefly discuss the relationship between language and thought from the point of view of 
categorisation. This discussion will provide a way to address some of the general questions about 
the law raised in Chapter Two. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that language can be viewed as a sign system.208 Since 
words are the names of categories, language can also be viewed as a classificatory system or a 
classificatory scheme.209 Therefore, language provides a system of categories which is used to label 
thoughts and experiences. Because language provides such a classificatory scheme, it is probable 
that language should exert some influence on thought.  
 
This view that language provides a way to classify the objects in the world is uncontroversial.210 
                                               
208  See text accompanying n 68. 
209  “[I]ndividual lexical items function as elements in a generalizing of classifying system, whereby we assign portions 
and aspects of our experience to categories which are recognised by people who have learnt our language.” RA 
Waldron Sense and Sense Development (Andre Deutsch, London, 1967) at 77.  
210  “The lexicon of a language, as well as the grammar, embodies a system of meanings: a certain interpretation and 
classification of the universe.” Anna Wierzbicka “‘Apples’ Are Not a ‘Kind of Fruit’: The Semantics of Human 
Categorization” (1984) 11 American Ethnologist 313 at 314. 
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Moreover, language provides a way to classify and retain information and ideas and to pass them on 
to subsequent generations.211 This view of language was eloquently expressed by Richard Trench in 
a striking metaphor:212 
 
It was something for the children of Israel, when they came into Canaan, to enter upon wells which they 
digged not, and vineyards which they had not planted, and houses which they had not built; but how 
much vaster a boon, how much more glorious a prerogative, for any one generation to enter upon the 
inheritance of a language which other generations by their truth and toil have made already a receptacle 
of choicest treasures, a storehouse of so much unconscious wisdom, a fit organ for expressing the 
subtlest distinctions, the tenderest sentiments, the largest thoughts, and the loftiest imaginations, which 
at any time the heart of man can conceive. 
 
This quotation highlights the positive and constructive influence that language can have on thought. 
There have been various views about the extent to which language influences thought,213 and many 
writers have noted that there is some influence.214 It is easy to view this influence sceptically and 
focus on the restriction that language imposes on thought.215 This view may be strengthened by a 
consideration of the fallacies identified in this chapter. 
 
The much more important point, however, is that often it is language that enables thought.216 This 
enabling is due to the fact that language provides a classificatory scheme within which thoughts can 
be expressed, and the richness of this classificatory scheme is a great benefit to thought. The 
categorisation that language provides plays an important role in relation to memory,217 
                                               
211  See n 13. 
212  Trench, above n 66, at 24.  
213  An early influential theorist who emphasised the effect that language has on thought was Benjamin Lee Whorf. See 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (John B Carroll (ed)) Language, Thought and Reality (The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 
1956). Although his views fell out of fashion, there has been a revival of a similar view recently. For a recent 
popular article discussing research related to how different languages shape thought, see Lera Boroditsky “How 
language shapes thought” (February, 2011) Scientific American 63. 
214  For instance, Stephen Ullmann states: “We have come to regard the vocabulary as a kind of framework, a ready-
made system of classification, which we inherit from our ancestors and which shapes and fashions our own vision of 
the universe.” Ullmann, above n 70, at 91. Simeon Potter noted that the “so-called Whorfian hypothesis ‘that a 
man’s world-outlook is determined by his linguistic upbringing’ has probably been exaggerated by its more 
exuberant proponents, and yet few experienced philologists would gainsay its intrinsic truth.” Potter, above n 14, at 
173.  
215  For instance, Alexander Bryan Johnson states: “The names are at present so identified and confounded with the 
external existences, that we cannot discover the subordination which language bears to the realities of nature but are 
continually … imputing to nature limitations, classifications, ambiguities, imperfections, and properties, of various 
kinds, which truly belong to language alone.” A Treatise on Language (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1836) at 50. 
216  Randolph Quirk notes that “language does not only have [a] restrictive influence on thought: language also 
conditions our thinking in a positive and constructive way.” Quirk, above n 10, at 54. 
217  WVO Quine notes “Actual memories mostly are traces not of past sensations but of past conceptualization or 
verbalization.” Word and Object (MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1960) at 3. 
83 
 
imagination218 and thinking generally.219 
 
E Conclusion 
 
This section answers the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. These answers provide a 
summary of the main ideas in this chapter. 
 
1. What is the goal of interpretation? 
 
The goal of interpretation is for an interpreter to objectively arrive at the same meaning as the 
speaker. Although a speaker’s meaning is subjective, speakers employ language conventions to 
make their meanings clear. These language conventions are agreed associations of words with 
thoughts. Therefore, they are objective indicators of a speaker’s meaning. An interpreter can 
ascertain a speaker’s meaning by paying attention to various considerations which indicate these 
conventions, and thus indicate the speaker’s meaning. These considerations include: the general 
conventional meanings of words, the specific conventions that apply in certain areas, the verbal 
context of an utterance, and the factual context of an utterance. In this chapter, these considerations 
have been called ‘relevant considerations’. Therefore, the goal of interpretation is for an interpreter 
to arrive at the same meaning as a speaker by taking into account relevant considerations which 
indicate the speaker’s meaning.  
 
2. Is it always unjustifiable for an interpreter to arrive at a different meaning from a speaker? 
 
Although the goal of interpretation is for an interpreter to arrive at the same meaning as a speaker, 
there are situations in which an interpreter can justifiably arrive at a different meaning from a 
speaker.  
 
                                               
218  Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks: “A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will 
come the day after tomorrow? … Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a 
language.” Wittgenstein Investigations, above n 63, at 174. This quotation illustrates that language makes it possible 
to think about future events in a concrete way. 
219  Monroe Beardsley notes: “Each of use carries around an elaborate and constantly growing classification-scheme for 
sorting out experience – if we did not, we would find life even more confusing than it is.” Thinking Straight (4th ed, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc, New Jersey, 1975) at 111. Marina Yaguello states that “[t]o name … is at the same time to 
categorize, to organize the world. Words have the power to form concepts: the word actually creates the concept just 
as much as the concept necessitates the word.” Language through the Looking Glass (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998) at 70-71. 
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A speaker may use language in a misleading way and may not provide sufficient indications of his 
or her meaning. In such a situation, an interpreter may reach the meaning that seems to be indicated 
by the language in the context of the utterance by taking into account various relevant 
considerations. The fact that the interpreter reaches a different meaning from the speaker’s 
subjective meaning does not make the interpretation unjustifiable because the interpreter has taken 
into account all the considerations which indicate the speaker’s meaning. Furthermore, although the 
interpreter has reached a different meaning from the speaker, this does not necessarily mean that 
such an interpretation is wrong because the speaker has used language in a misleading way. 
Whether or not such an interpretation is wrong is really a matter of definition. 
 
In other situations a speaker may not mislead an interpreter, but an utterance may be ambiguous or 
unclear and for this reason an interpreter may reach a different meaning from the speaker. If the 
interpreter takes into account all the relevant considerations which indicate the speaker’s meaning, 
such an interpretation is not unjustified. It can be said that such an interpretation is reasonable, even 
though the interpreter has reached the wrong meaning. 
 
An interpreter should have the goal of reaching the same meaning as a speaker, but whether or not 
the same meaning is reached does not depend on the interpreter only but also on the speaker and on 
the nature of the utterance.  
 
3. What makes an instance of interpretation fallacious? 
 
Interpretation should be based on relevant considerations. A consideration is irrelevant when it is 
not an indicator of the specific meaning that the speaker is expressing. An instance of interpretation 
is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant consideration and it is most likely that a 
different meaning would have been reached if that irrelevant consideration had been omitted. An 
instance of interpretation is also fallacious when it omits a relevant consideration and it is most 
likely that a different meaning would have been reached if that relevant consideration had been 
taken into account. Put simply, an instance of interpretation is fallacious when it reaches a meaning 
that is unreasonable given the relevant considerations that the interpreter should have taken into 
account. In most situations, this will mean that the interpreter reaches a different meaning from the 
speaker.  
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4. What kinds of fallacies are possible with interpretation?  
 
Two specific fallacies have been identified in this chapter. First, the ‘same word’ fallacy. This 
fallacy occurs when an interpreter assumes that because the word being interpreted can have a 
certain meaning it has been given this meaning by the speaker. Second, the ‘different word’ fallacy. 
This fallacy occurs when an interpreter assumes that because a certain meaning can be associated 
with a certain word, the speaker must be expressing a different meaning when the speaker uses a 
different word.  
 
When these assumptions are incorrect, they introduce an irrelevant consideration. With the ‘same 
word’ fallacy, this irrelevant consideration is the meaning a word can have when it has not been 
given that meaning. With the ‘different word’ fallacy, the irrelevant consideration is the word that 
can be used to express a certain meaning when that meaning has been expressed by a different 
word. 
 
When an interpreter introduces these irrelevant considerations and it is most likely that a different 
meaning would have been reached if these irrelevant considerations had not been introduced and the 
relevant considerations had been taken into account, the interpretation is fallacious.  
 
5. Why are these fallacies committed? 
 
The ‘same word’ fallacy is committed when an interpreter has a fixed association of a certain word 
with a certain meaning and does not look beyond this association to the specific meaning that the 
speaker is expressing. The ‘different word’ fallacy is committed when an interpreter has a fixed 
association of a certain meaning with a certain word and does not look beyond this association to 
the specific meaning that the speaker is expressing. 
 
6. What is the consequence of these fallacies? 
 
The consequence of these fallacies is that the meaning that the interpreter arrives at is unjustified. 
Furthermore, in most situations it will be a different meaning from the speaker. 
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7. How should an instance of interpretation be analysed to see whether it is fallacious? 
 
There are three steps involved in analysing an instance of interpretation to determine whether it is 
fallacious. First, it is necessary to elicit the relevant considerations related to this act of 
interpretation. Second, it needs to be determined whether the considerations that the interpreter 
introduced were relevant. Third, it needs to be determined whether it is most likely that the 
interpreter would have reached a different meaning if any irrelevant consideration had been omitted 
and the relevant considerations had been introduced. If it is most likely that a different meaning 
would have been reached, the interpretation is fallacious. 
 
8. How can interpreters avoid fallacies? 
 
Although every interpreter associates words with meanings, these associations should not be fixed, 
but should be open to change. The connection between words and meanings is arbitrary. Therefore, 
interpreters should not have fixed associations of words with meanings. Furthermore, this 
connection is conventional. Therefore, interpreters need to pay attention to the relevant 
considerations which indicate the conventions that speakers are employing. 
  
9. What is the way to arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when fallacies have 
been committed? 
 
An interpretation is fallacious when interpreters omit relevant considerations and introduce 
irrelevant considerations and this causes the interpreters to arrive at a meaning that they most likely 
would not have arrived at if they had taken into account all the relevant considerations and had 
omitted any irrelevant considerations. An alternative non-fallacious interpretation, therefore, is an 
interpretation that takes into account relevant considerations and does not introduce any irrelevant 
considerations. This will mean that a different meaning is reached.  
 
This chapter has discussed the ordinary use of language and has identified two interpretation 
fallacies that can be committed in ordinary interpretation. In Chapter Four, the analysis in this 
chapter will be used as a basis from which to analyse legal interpretation and the fallacies that 
judges can commit. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW AND JUDICIAL FALLACIES 
 
A Introduction 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis discussed the close relationship between law and language and 
highlighted the importance of judicial interpretation. Chapter Three focused on the ordinary 
interpretation of language and fallacies that can be committed in such interpretation. This chapter 
(Chapter Four) continues the analysis of language in the law and judicial interpretation220 begun in 
Chapter Two in the light of the discussion of the ordinary interpretation of language in Chapter 
Three. It will also identify some fallacies in legal interpretation, corresponding to the fallacies in 
ordinary interpretation identified in Chapter Three. 
 
Legal interpretation has become a significant focus of academic writing in recent years,221 with 
many approaches to interpretation being discussed.222 Furthermore, the topic of law and language 
has been investigated in a number of recent books.223 In this chapter, legal interpretation224 will be 
approached in a fresh way by comparing it with ordinary interpretation, that is, by using the analysis 
                                               
220  This chapter will sometimes use the word ‘interpretation’ to refer to judicial interpretation if this meaning is clear 
from the context. 
221 For discussions of this academic focus on interpretation, see Brian Bix “H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in 
Legal Theory” (1999) 52 SMU L Rev 167; Michael S Moore “The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for 
the Worse?” (1989) 41 Stan L Rev 871; and Philip P Frickey “From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of 
Theory in Statutory Interpretation” (1992) 77 Minn L Rev 241.  
222 For a discussion of various approaches in relation to statutory interpretation, see William N Eskridge, Philip P 
Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (Foundation Press, New York, 2006). The 
authors distinguish three kinds of theories of statutory interpretation: intentionalist theories, textualist theories, and 
dynamic theories (at ch 6).  
223  These include Hutton, above n 20; Peter M Tiersma Legal Language (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999); 
Dennis Patterson Meaning, Mind and Law (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 2008); Charles W 
Collier Meaning in Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009); and Sanford Schane Language and the Law 
(Continuum, London, 2006).  
224  As mentioned in n 52, the phrases ‘legal interpretation’ and ‘judicial interpretation’ are both being used to refer to 
interpretation by the judiciary, but the phrase ‘legal interpretation’ will be used when this interpretation is being 
contrasted with ordinary interpretation. 
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of ordinary interpretation in Chapter Three as a point of departure.225 Existing approaches to legal 
interpretation form the background to the analysis in this chapter, but this analysis is constructed on 
the basis of the discussion of ordinary interpretation in Chapter Three.226 Thus, this chapter does not 
merely summarise or develop existing views on judicial interpretation, but provides a new way to 
analyse judicial interpretation and detect certain fallacies. 
 
The language investigated in this chapter is language interpreted in the course of judicial decisions, 
specifically, the language of statutes, regulations and other legal documents such as contracts and 
wills. As will be seen, however, it is possible to apply some of the analysis in this chapter to judicial 
decision-making that does not involve the explicit interpretation of language.227 Furthermore, this 
chapter focuses on the judicial interpretation of language that involves the categorisation of specific 
matters within the legal categories designated by the language being interpreted.228  
 
This chapter has two main parts. The first part of this chapter (Chapter Four B, Language in the 
Law) analyses the processes of legal speaking and legal interpretation. The second part (Chapter 
Four C, Judicial Fallacies) identifies fallacies in judicial interpretation. 
 
B Language in the Law 
 
In ordinary language, the relationship between words and thoughts is arbitrary, yet conventional. 
These two factors are also present in legal language.229 The words interpreted by the judiciary are 
arbitrary labels and are usually chosen based on existing language conventions.  
 
                                               
225 There have been various attempts to construct theories of legal interpretation, see, for instance, Michael S Moore “A 
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation” (1985) 58 S Cal L Rev 277; Larry A DiMatteo “A Theory of Interpretation in 
the Realm of Idealism” (2006) 5 DePaul Bus & Comm LJ 17; and Jim Evans “Sketch of a Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation” [2005] NZ L Rev 449. The project embarked on in this thesis is far less ambitious than a full-blown 
theory of legal interpretation, which may be impossible in principle. For an article arguing against constructing a 
theory of meaning in the law, see Dennis Patterson “Against a Theory of Meaning” (1995) 73 Wash U L Q 1153. 
This thesis, however, does provide an original approach to critiquing instances of legal interpretation and detecting 
fallacies. 
226  In this chapter certain important words and phrases are defined and need to be distinguished from similar 
expressions that have been used by other writers. These words and phrases include: ‘legal word’, ‘legal category’, 
‘item’, ‘legal speaking’, ‘legal ineffability’, ‘legal/judicial interpretation’, ‘legal meaninglessness’, ‘relevant legal 
consideration’, ‘verbal category’, and ‘judicial fallacy’. These definitions are collected in Appendix One, Glossary.  
227  See the paragraph accompanying n 311. 
228  This is discussed at Chapter Four B.1.(a). 
229  The phrase ‘legal language’ is used in this chapter to refer to the language of legal documents that are subject to 
judicial interpretation.  
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In Chapter Three, it was pointed out that language conventions are shown by the context in which 
words are used. In some instances when a word is used in a legal context it is given a specific legal 
meaning. For example, the word ‘instrument’ when used in a legal setting may refer to a legal 
document, not to a tool, and the word ‘consideration’ may refer to some payment or action that 
makes a contract legally binding, not to careful thought.230 In these situations, the specific language 
conventions that apply can be viewed as legal language conventions. This kind of changing of 
conventions is common in many academic disciplines and other groups in society and is not unique 
to the law. The creating of new conventions by the use of words in a special way in a certain area 
gives words technical meanings in addition to their ordinary meaning.231 Therefore, in some 
instances, the meaning given to words in a legal context may be considered as a kind of technical 
meaning, similar to technical meanings in other areas. 
 
It was also pointed out in Chapter Three that conventions can be explicitly changed by providing 
definitions. Striking instances of this can be seen in the law; for example, the Freshwater Fish 
Farming Regulations 1983 (NZ) give a definition of ‘fish’ that includes seaweed.232 Since this 
meaning is explicitly given in these regulations, it is comparable to a stipulative definition in 
ordinary language.233 Definitions given in legal documents, therefore, may be stipulative in the 
same way that definitions in academic disciplines, such as philosophy, can be stipulative.234  
 
To view legal interpretation as merely ascertaining meanings based on language conventions 
existing in the community generally, or even conventions existing in the law or specifically created 
for certain legal documents, is to view it as essentially the same as ordinary interpretation. There 
are, however, some important differences between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation. 
At this stage, three differences can be noted.  
 
First, as mentioned in Chapter Two, legal interpretation often results in, and may even be viewed as, 
                                               
230  For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of the language that is used in the law, see David Mellinkoff The 
Language of the Law (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1963). 
231 Judges sometimes take account of such technical meanings when interpreting documents drafted in the context in 
which such meanings are employed. For a discussion of this in relation to contract interpretation, see Kim Lewison 
The Interpretation of Contracts (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) at 116-117. 
232 The Freshwater Fish Farming Regulations 1983, reg 2(1). 
233 “‘[S]trict’, ‘narrow’, ‘technical’ and ‘legal’ meanings are examples of the special assignment of a particular meaning 
to particular words. These are simply the rarefied conventional usages of a caste of human speakers of language, 
namely lawyers.” McMeel, above n 23, at 258.  
234  There is an important difference, however, between legal dictionaries and dictionaries of technical terms in other 
disciplines, for instance, medical dictionaries. Legal dictionaries do not merely provide the legal meaning of words, 
but also state the law. Therefore, an entry in a legal dictionary can become out of date due to a judicial decision or 
the enactment of a statute. See also Chapter Five C. 
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the application of the law to factual situations. The result of ordinary interpretation, however, is that 
the interpreter objectively ascertains the speaker’s meaning. Legal interpretation, therefore, can be 
distinguished from ordinary interpretation on the basis of its result: it can result in the law being 
applied to specific situations. 
 
Second, the goal of legal interpretation can be distinguished from the goal of ordinary 
interpretation. The goal of ordinary interpretation is to discover meaning. It can be said, however, 
that the goal of legal interpretation is often to implement the law. It has been said that “the principal 
function of a legislative drafter is to enshrine policy in an accurate and precise manner … the 
communication of the law is an entirely different task.”235 Although this statement may be 
contested, it is clear that the goal of legislative drafting is not merely the successful communication 
of meaning but is also the accurate embodiment of the law.236 Similarly, the goal of legal 
interpretation – including both statutory interpretation and the interpretation of other legal 
documents – is not merely the discovery of meaning, but may also be the accurate implementation 
of the law.  
 
Third, in Chapter Three it was pointed out that the governing factor for successful communication 
in ordinary language is the correct use of language conventions on the part of speakers and the 
correct discovery of such conventions on the part of interpreters. The governing factor for the 
implementation of the law in legal interpretation, however, is that the interpretive decision is based 
on relevant legal considerations.237 Language conventions are employed in the drafting of legal 
documents. One reason these conventions are employed is that they involve a convenient 
conceptual groupings of items. The writers of legal documents use conventions, however, not 
merely for the purpose of communicating information about items, but also for the purpose of 
giving these items a legal status. For this reason, legal interpretation needs to take into account not 
merely the conventional meaning of the words being interpreted, but also certain legal 
considerations which determine the legal status that should be given to the items under 
consideration. Therefore, it may be said that legal interpretation should not merely be governed by 
language conventions, but also by legal considerations.  
                                               
235 Brian Hunt “Plain Language in Legislative Drafting: An Achievable Objective or a Laudable Ideal?” (2003) 24 
Statute L Rev 112 at 122.  
236 A similar view has also been held by linguists who have studied legal language: “To speak of legal language as 
communicating meaning is in itself rather misleading … it is designed not so much to enlighten language-users at 
large as to allow one expert to register information for scrutiny by another.” David Crystal and Derek Davy 
Investigating English Style (Longman Group Limited, London, 1969) at 193-194. 
237 This notion of relevant legal considerations is discussed again at Chapter Four B.3.  
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This thesis investigates legal interpretation generally, and is not limited to the interpretation of 
statutes. In this section, the claims have been made that legal interpretation involves the application 
of the law to factual situations, the implementation of the law, and involves giving items a legal 
status. It may be thought that such claims are only true of statutory interpretation. In any instance of 
judicial interpretation, however, including the interpretation of a contract or a will, the decision that 
is reached is a legally-binding, authoritative decision. It is a decision regarding the law in relation to 
the dispute at hand.238 In this sense, it is the application of the law to the subject matter in dispute 
and thus the implementation of the law in relation to the dispute. Furthermore, when judicial 
interpretation relates to a specific item, it results in this item being given a legal status.  
 
Therefore, legal interpretation can be distinguished from ordinary interpretation on three grounds. 
These two types of interpretation can have different consequences, goals, and governing factors. Put 
simply, in ordinary interpretation the primary task is to discover the meaning of a speaker and in 
legal interpretation the primary task is often to make a legal decision regarding the application of 
the law.239 These three distinctions are important, but they do not conclusively prove that the 
process of legal interpretation is fundamentally different from the process ordinary interpretation. 
The question of whether the process of legal interpretation is fundamentally different from ordinary 
interpretation will be addressed later in this chapter after legal interpretation has been analysed in 
more detail.240  
 
A number of commentators, including judges, have viewed legal interpretation, including both the 
interpretation of statutes and other legal documents, as essentially similar to ordinary interpretation. 
Michael Zander stated: “Statutory interpretation is a particular form of a general problem – the 
understanding of meaning or, more broadly still, communication.”241 Writing extra-judicially, 
Justice Kirby noted: 242  
 
                                               
238  As was mentioned in n 44, this does not mean that it can be said that all legal documents that judges interpret 
embody the law. 
239  Of course, this legal decision can be viewed as, and is often viewed as, the discovery of the meaning of the words 
being interpreted. The point being made here is that this discovery of meaning is not an end in itself, but is 
determined by the legal decision the court needs to make regarding the specific matter before the court. 
Furthermore, as will be seen in this chapter, the view that judges are merely involved in discovering meaning can be 
misleading. 
240  At Chapter Four B.4. 
241 Michael Zander The Law-Making Process (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 127. 
242 Michael Kirby “Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts” (2003) 24 Stat L 
Rev 95 at 99 [“Grand Theory”]. 
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Whether in a written contract or an Act of Parliament, the proper approach to the task of interpretation is 
to attempt to read the words as they would be understood in everyday life …. 
 
Lord Hoffmann remarked that the result of a fundamental change in contract law has been:243 
 
to assimilate the way in which [contractual] documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense 
principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old 
intellectual baggage of ‘legal’ interpretation has been discarded. 
 
If such claims are correct, it is all the more important that the process of ordinary interpretation is 
understood clearly, and that legal interpretation be explicitly viewed in terms of it and not 
mistakenly distinguished from it.  
 
Writing regarding the interpretation of tax treaties, Brian Arnold noted that “interpretation is a 
fundamental, universal, and intuitive human activity that applies to all forms of human 
communication”.244 He further noted: 245 
 
Interpretation of language is an intuitive skill that we acquire without the benefit of formal instruction … 
we do not have to be taught that language is purposive; that aspect of language is inherent in its nature as 
the primary means of human communication. Nor do we have to be taught that all language is context 
dependent; we learn this informally at a young age. 
 
As has been seen in Chapter Three, however, even with ordinary interpretation it is dangerous for 
interpreters to merely rely on their intuition when engaging in interpretation.246 It is likely that this 
will also be true of legal interpretation, whether it is viewed as essentially the same as ordinary 
interpretation or as a different activity altogether.  
 
Although some differences between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation can be pointed 
                                               
243 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at 912. For 
discussions of Lord Hoffman’s decision in this case, see Adam Kramer “Common Sense Principles of Contract 
Interpretation (and how we’ve been using them all along)” (2003) 23 Oxford J Legal Stud 173 and Ewan 
McKendrick “The Interpretation of Contracts: Lord Hoffmann’s Re-Statement” in Sarah Worthington (ed) 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 139. 
244 Brian J Arnold “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 
2 at 2.  
245 Ibid, at 4. 
246  For instance, the fallacies identified in Chapter Three were committed because of a misunderstanding regarding the 
nature of meaning.  
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out in the abstract, the actual process of legal interpretation needs to be discussed in some detail to 
discover whether it differs fundamentally from ordinary interpretation. The remainder of this 
chapter, therefore, will analyse language in the law and legal interpretation on the basis of the 
analysis of ordinary language and interpretation in Chapter Three. This analysis will clarify the 
nature of legal interpretation, will show whether legal interpretation is fundamentally different from 
ordinary interpretation, and, most importantly, will provide a way to identify fallacies in legal 
interpretation.  
 
1 Legal words, legal thoughts and legal referents 
 
Just as the connection between words and referents is indirect in ordinary interpretation, in legal 
interpretation the connection between legal words and legal referents is also indirect. This is 
illustrated in Diagram 4.1, below, which is based on Diagram 3.1 (Word, Thought and Referent). 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.1 illustrates the relationship between words in the law, the thoughts they signify, and the 
things to which these thoughts refer. This diagram shows that the three elements that are present in 
ordinary language can also be identified in relation to legal language.  
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The singular term ‘legal word’ has been used in this diagram for simplicity. This does not mean, 
however, that this diagram merely applies to the use of single words. This diagram can also apply to 
the use of more than one word to stand for a legal referent. Furthermore, the other diagrams in this 
chapter which use the term ‘legal word’ can also apply to the use of more than one word. 
 
On the left-hand side is the legal word. This should be understood as a word that is subject to 
judicial interpretation.247 Diagram 4.1, therefore, applies to quite a specific range of words. It does 
not apply to all language used in a legal setting or to all language used by legal professionals,248 but 
it applies to the language of legal documents that are subject to interpretation by the judiciary. On 
the right-hand side is the legal referent, which is that to which the legal word refers. The connection 
between the legal word and the legal referent is not direct, but is through the legal thought.  
 
The legal thought is harder to define and shows a shortcoming of this diagram. It is not merely the 
thought of the interpreting judge.249 If it were, this diagram would merely illustrate judicial 
interpretation. The thought of the ‘legal speaker’250 is also relevant. This diagram, therefore, 
although useful in showing the indirect relationship between legal words and legal referents, has the 
same shortcoming as Diagram 3.1: it conflates the processes of speaking and interpretation. Having 
said this, it is important to note that there is more involved in the legal thought in Diagram 4.1 than 
the thought in Diagram 3.1. Legal language conventions may be relevant to this legal thought, and 
not merely ordinary language conventions. More importantly, this legal thought may be influenced 
by considerations related to the law itself.  
 
The nature of the legal referent in Diagram 4.1 may also be different from an ordinary referent. 
Since judges authoritatively determine what legal words refer to, it can be said that the authoritative 
recognition of a legal referent requires judicial interpretation. In ordinary interpretation, if it is 
difficult for interpreters to identify the referent of a word, this referent can sometimes be identified 
by the speaker. In legal interpretation, however, there is the need of judicial interpretation for a 
referent to be authoritatively identified. Speakers cannot change an instance of judicial 
interpretation by clarifying the referents they were seeking to identify. For an instance of judicial 
                                               
247  This thesis will focus on the interpretation of statutes, regulations and other legal documents, such as contracts and 
wills. It will not cover the interpretation of judicial decisions. Therefore, this ‘legal word’ should be understood to 
refer to a word in these legal documents that is subject to judicial interpretation.  
248 For instance, lawyers, judges, and legal academics. 
249 It is necessary to use the singular word ‘judge’ here because even in situations where a number of judges concur, 
judgments are still delivered by individual judges.  
250 The ‘legal speaker’ and the act of ‘legal speaking’ are discussed in Chapter Four B.2.  
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interpretation to be changed there is the need for the decision to be either reversed on appeal or 
changed by legislative action. Thus, the authoritative recognition of the referent requires judicial 
interpretation.251  
 
Moreover, legal interpretation often occurs with reference to a definite situation. If a judge decides 
that this situation comes within the meaning of the word being interpreted, this situation can be 
considered to be the referent of that word. This means that once a word has been judicially 
interpreted and a judge has decided that a certain situation comes within the meaning of this word, 
the word has an identifiable referent. In ordinary language, the fact that a word has been interpreted 
does not necessarily mean that it has been given an identifiable referent.252  
 
Furthermore, the two relationships depicted in this diagram can be distinguished from those in 
ordinary language. The relationship between the legal word and the legal thought is not merely 
governed by conventions. As will be seen, certain legal considerations may override these 
conventions.253 The relationship between the legal thought and its legal referent is still automatic 
because the thought is just a conceptual representation of the referent. It is useful, however, to view 
this thought as being actively applied to a referent in judicial interpretation, rather than passively 
referring to a referent. This is because there is the need of a judicial decision to connect a legal 
thought to a legal referent. It is not enough for judges to merely think of a certain referent when 
interpreting a word or to identify a referent outside the context of a judicial decision. For a referent 
to be officially identified it needs to be explicitly stated in a judicial decision.254  
 
Therefore, a consideration of the elements in Diagram 4.1 and the connections between them shows 
that certain important distinctions can be made between legal language and ordinary language. Both 
the nature of each element in this diagram and the connections between them can be distinguished 
                                               
251 This does not mean that there needs to be a judicial decision to recognise every referent referred to in a legal 
document. The vast majority of legal documents function effectively without any judicial decisions on their 
meaning. What this does mean is that if there is a dispute regarding a referent, there is the need of a judicial decision 
to authoritatively resolve this dispute. 
252  For instance, in an example given in Chapter Three, Stephen Potter correctly interpreted what the doctor meant by 
the word ‘attraction’, but he did not identify a specific referent for this word (see text accompanying n 145). 
253 Although these considerations may be viewed as part of the factual background which shows what the conventions 
are, they are different from the kind of considerations present in ordinary language. This is discussed at Chapter 
Four B.4.  
254  It could be said that this distinction between a thought referring to a referent and a thought being applied to a 
referent is merely two ways of viewing the same action. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the application 
of the legal thought to a referent involves the application of the law to that referent. To say the law ‘refers to’ a 
certain situation is different in meaning from saying that the law has been ‘applied to’ that situation. In relation to 
legal speaking, however, it may be accurate to say that the thought of the legal speaker refers to a certain referent. 
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from the nature of the elements and their connections in Diagram 3.1. 
 
(a) Approach to language in the law and judicial interpretation: categorisation 
 
This section will discuss the approach to language in the law and judicial interpretation in this 
chapter. This chapter focuses on instances of judicial interpretation which involve categorisation. 
This does limit the scope of this chapter, but, as will be seen, a crucial group of instances of judicial 
interpretation that are legally significant involve categorisation. Judicial interpretation is often 
viewed as involving the discovery of the meaning of the words being interpreted. In this chapter, 
judicial interpretation will be viewed as involving the categorisation of the item at issue within the 
legal category designated by the words being interpreted. This section will introduce this way of 
viewing legal interpretation and will show how it is different from the way ordinary interpretation 
was viewed in relation to categorisation in Chapter Three.  
 
There are some important differences between the processes of speaking and interpretation in 
ordinary language and these processes in the law. Whereas in ordinary interpretation, there is often a 
single speaker whose language is being interpreted, in legal interpretation, there may not be a single 
speaker. For instance, in relation to statutes, there are the legislators and in relation to contracts, 
there are two parties. Furthermore, even if a single speaker is identifiable, interpreters often do not 
have access to such a speaker to clarify what he or she meant. For instance, in relation to wills, the 
speaker is dead. Even in cases where the speakers are living, interpreters are often prohibited from 
asking them to give evidence regarding what they intended their language to mean. Furthermore, 
even if there is a speaker and his or her intentions are clear, these intentions may not be relevant to 
the situation at issue. When drafting a legal document, a speaker sometimes does not anticipate a 
certain situation occurring. If such a situation occurs, an interpreter will still have to make a 
decision regarding the meaning of the speaker’s words with reference to this situation.255 For these 
reasons, it may be difficult to directly compare speaking in a legal context with speaking ordinarily. 
 
Furthermore, legal interpretation is different in various ways from ordinary interpretation. In 
ordinary interpretation, the task is often to ascertain the speaker’s intention. In legal interpretation, 
                                               
255  This can occur, for instance, in the interpretation of a contract where the dispute concerns a matter the parties did not 
contemplate at the time the contract was drafted: see DW McLauchlan “Contract Interpretation: What Is It About” 
(2009) 31 Sydney L Rev 5 at 9. 
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the task may be to impute a presumed intention when no actual intention existed. Moreover, 
because legal interpretation involves the application of the law, the interpreter needs to be aware of 
various legal considerations, and not just the linguistic meaning of the words being interpreted. 
Furthermore, legal interpretation takes place in a very specific framework with a hierarchy of 
courts, the possibility of appeal, binding precedent, evidentiary rules, and various canons of 
interpretation. For these reasons, it may be difficult to directly compare legal interpretation with 
ordinary interpretation. 
 
Chapter Three discussed how ordinary interpretation can be viewed as categorisation. To compare 
legal interpretation with ordinary interpretation and to analyse legal interpretation based on ordinary 
interpretation it is necessary to find a level at which they are similar. Despite the differences 
between these kinds of interpretation, there is an essential similarity which can be seen clearly when 
they both are viewed in relation to categorisation.256 Thus, viewing legal interpretation as 
categorisation makes it easier to compare legal interpretation with ordinary interpretation. More 
importantly, viewing legal interpretation as categorisation provides a useful way to critique 
instances of legal interpretation and detect interpretation fallacies. Therefore, in this chapter, legal 
interpretation will be viewed as categorisation.  
 
To clarify what it means to view legal interpretation as categorisation, it is necessary to define some 
important concepts. When legal interpretation is viewed in terms of categorisation, the word or 
words being interpreted can be viewed as the name of a legal category. Legal speaking257 can be 
viewed as the creation of such legal categories. Legal interpretation can be viewed as the 
assignment of items to legal categories, that is, legal categorisation. The matter before the court that 
prompted the instance of legal interpretation and that needs to be either included within the category 
designated by the word being interpreted or excluded from this category can be viewed as an item 
that needs to be categorised. There are various legal considerations relevant to the assignment of 
items to legal categories. These are considerations judges need to bear in mind when engaging in 
legal categorisation, and correspond to the considerations relevant to ordinary interpretation.  
 
To make this clear it is helpful to view Diagram 4.1 in relation to categorisation. The legal word on 
the left-hand side, which is a word subject to judicial interpretation, can be viewed as the name of a 
legal category. The thought at the apex of the triangle, which corresponds to the meaning of the 
                                               
256  This is shown at Chapter Four C.6. 
257  ‘Legal speaking’ will be defined and discussed in detail at Chapter Four B.2. 
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word being interpreted, is a thought concerning the item or items in the legal category. This thought 
is therefore governed by any considerations relevant to the inclusion of items in the category. The 
referent on the right-hand side is an item that has been included within the legal category. 
 
It is important to point out a difference between the legal categorisation that this chapter focuses on 
and the categorisation in ordinary interpretation discussed in Chapter Three. In Chapter Three, when 
ordinary language was viewed in relation to categorisation, the meaning of the word was viewed as 
the item being categorised within the category designated by the word. Therefore, because words 
always have meanings, on this analysis ordinary interpretation always involves categorisation. If the 
meaning given to the word in legal interpretation is viewed as the item being assigned to the legal 
category, legal interpretation also always involves categorisation. When viewing legal interpretation 
in relation to categorisation, however, it is helpful to view the act of categorisation in a slightly 
different way. This way of viewing the act of categorisation will, on the one hand, mean that legal 
interpretation does not always involve categorisation. On the other hand, however, it will mean that 
the discussion of legal interpretation in terms of categorisation will provide a very helpful way to 
analyse judicial decisions and to identify fallacies in such decisions. 
 
In ordinary interpretation, it is the act of speaking that prompts interpretation. Legal interpretation, 
however, is often prompted by a certain situation occurring or is in relation to a certain matter. For 
instance, a statute may need to be judicially interpreted when someone does a certain act that may 
come within the scope of one of the provisions of the statute. Similarly, a contract may need to be 
judicially interpreted when a certain situation arises and there is a dispute regarding the meaning of 
the language in the contract in relation to that situation. Furthermore, a will may need to be 
interpreted when there is a dispute about the person who is a beneficiary under the will. The 
meaning of the word being interpreted, therefore, has to be determined in relation to this situation or 
matter, and not in the abstract. 
 
When legal interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation, it is useful to view the matter 
before the court which has prompted the interpretation as the item that needs to be categorised. This 
matter can include a variety of things. It can be an event that has occurred (for example, a person 
committing a crime), an object or objects that are in dispute (for example, certain plots of land when 
the issue is the plot of land to which a contract refers), or a person (for example, a beneficiary under 
a will). The key point is that there is often a definite matter or situation to which the interpretation 
relates. This matter or situation can be viewed as the item which needs to be categorised. This 
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chapter will focus on instances of judicial interpretation which involve such categorisation. 
Therefore, this chapter will not focus on situations where courts merely determine the meaning of a 
word in the abstract and this determination of meaning does not relate to the situation before the 
court. Although such a determination of meaning can be viewed as categorisation based on the 
description given in Chapter Three, it will not be viewed as legal categorisation in this chapter. 
Therefore, an instance of judicial interpretation involves categorisation whenever it relates to a 
specific matter and has the effect of deciding the legal status of that matter. 
 
In Chapter Three, the item being categorised was equated with the meaning of the word rather than 
the referent. There were two reasons for this. First, some words do not have identifiable referents. 
Second, even if they do, the way the referent is viewed by the speaker is an important consideration 
and is part of the meaning of the word, and to equate the item with the referent could mean that the 
way this referent is being viewed is neglected. In this chapter (Chapter Four) the item being 
categorised is equated with the situation or matter before the court. When this item is included 
within the legal category designated by the word being interpreted, it will correspond to the referent 
of the word. There are two reasons why it can correspond to the referent, rather than the meaning. 
First, there is a definite identifiable situation that can be posited as the referent. Second, the way this 
situation is viewed by speakers is only legally significant if it affects the way this situation will be 
treated in the law, that is, the way it will be categorised.258 Therefore, if the way the item is being 
viewed by a speaker is legally significant, this will affect the legal category to which it should be 
assigned, and this would mean that it becomes the referent of a different word. For this reason, to 
equate the item included within a legal category with the referent of the word designating that legal 
category will not mean that legally significant differences in the way this item is being viewed by 
speakers are neglected. 
 
The way that legal interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation, therefore, differs from the 
way ordinary interpretation was viewed in relation to categorisation in Chapter Three. This 
difference, however, reflects an essential difference between these two kinds of interpretation. In 
ordinary interpretation, interpreters are focused on discovering the meaning that has been given to a 
word by a speaker. Viewed in relation to categorisation, this involves the discovery of the item that 
is within a category. Therefore, the item to be categorised can be viewed as the meaning that needs 
to be discovered. In legal interpretation, judges are often focused on whether the matter or situation 
                                               
258 Similarly, the force of the speaker’s utterance, that is, the speaker’s intention regarding the matter to which he or she 
is referring, is only significant if it affects the way this item should be categorised. 
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before the court fits within the language being interpreted. Viewed in relation to categorisation, this 
involves the decision whether to categorise an item within the legal category designated by the 
word being interpreted. Therefore, the item to be categorised can be viewed as the matter or 
situation before the court. Thus, because the focus of legal interpretation is different from the focus 
of ordinary interpretation, when these two kinds of interpretation are viewed in relation to 
categorisation they need to be viewed in a different way. 
 
The court may decide that the item at issue in an interpretive decision fits within the legal category 
designated by the word being interpreted. Alternatively, the court may exclude this item from this 
category. Therefore, the focus in legal interpretation is not merely on a certain category and the item 
that should be assigned to it, but on a specific item and whether it should be assigned to a certain 
category. This does not mean that the act of categorisation in legal interpretation is essentially 
different from categorisation in ordinary interpretation. The basic act of categorisation is the same – 
it involves the assignment of an item to a category – but the focus of the interpreter is different. In 
ordinary interpretation the focus is on the category. In legal interpretation the focus is on the item.  
 
Therefore, this thesis is limited to instances of judicial interpretation where the judge needs to 
decide whether a certain situation should be assigned to or excluded from the legal category 
designated by the word being interpreted. This is an important point about the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis is not concerned with judicial interpretation that is not in relation to any specific 
situation or judicial interpretation that is concerned with a specific situation, but does not concern 
whether or not that situation should be included within the legal category designated by the word 
being interpreted.  
 
An objection to limiting the scope of this thesis in this way is that it does not cover all instances of 
judicial interpretation. It is true that there are situations in which judges merely determine the 
meaning of words, and this determination does not involve the assignment of items to legal 
categories. For example, obiter dicta statements made by judges concerning the meaning of a 
certain word in the course of a decision or instances of judicial interpretation which merely involve 
a clarification of the law may not relate to any specific item. Such interpretation is not within the 
scope of this thesis. Since judicial interpretation often occurs in the context of a specific dispute, 
however, it often involves categorisation. This is because the dispute is related to a specific matter 
that either needs to be assigned to the legal category designated by the word being interpreted or 
excluded from this category. Such instances of judicial interpretation are important because they 
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involve the application of the law to specific factual situations. Therefore, they are a crucial group 
of instances of judicial interpretation that are legally significant in a particular way. Focusing on 
instances of judicial interpretation that involve the legal categorisation of the specific item before 
the court, therefore, provides a convenient way to limit this thesis to these particular legally 
significant instances of interpretation. 
 
There are, however, some interpretive decisions that involve the application of the law to factual 
situations that may not seem to involve such categorisation. For instance, a court may have to 
decide whether a contract or a trust has been created by a legal document, and this may depend on 
the interpretation of certain language.259 It may seem that this act of interpretation does not involve 
categorisation, but merely involves determining the legal significance of the words being 
interpreted. The words being interpreted, however, refer to certain items. These items are within the 
legal category created by these words. Determining the legal significance of these words involves 
determining the nature of the legal category to which the items designated by these words have been 
assigned. Even though it may not seem intuitive to view such a decision as categorisation, it has the 
effect of determining the legal significance of the category to which certain items have been 
assigned, and, in this sense, can be viewed as categorising these items within a category with this 
significance.260  
 
Therefore, in many situations when judges interpret language, they determine meaning in relation to 
specific items and this interpretation results in items being given a legal status. Thus, these items are 
either included within a legal category or excluded from a legal category. Both the acts of including 
an item within a legal category and excluding an item from a legal category can be considered as 
acts of categorisation. Therefore, it can be said that this chapter only focuses on certain instances of 
judicial interpretation, but these instances of judicial interpretation are legally significant in an 
important way.  
 
An objection to viewing legal interpretation in terms of categorisation is that it creates unnecessary 
complications. There needs to be a discussion of legal categories in addition to legal words and of 
the considerations relevant to legal categorisation in addition to legal thoughts. Viewing legal 
                                               
259  In some situations, determining whether, for instance, a trust has been created by a document is a separate activity 
from interpreting the language in this document. In other situations, the meaning of the language, and especially the 
intention expressed in the language, may be crucial in determining whether a trust has been created. See Chapter 
Four C.7 
260  For a discussion of an example of this kind of interpretation showing how it involves categorisation, see the 
paragraph accompanying n 509. 
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interpretation in terms of categorisation, however, provides a useful way to avoid certain fallacies. 
Moreover, as will be seen, in various respects an approach focused on categorisation is clearer than 
an approach based either on the meaning of words or on the intention of speakers.261  
 
The points made in this section can be briefly summarised. In this chapter judicial interpretation 
will be viewed as categorisation. Although both ordinary interpretation and legal interpretation are 
similar in that they involve categorisation, there is an essential difference in focus between them. 
Ordinary interpretation is focused on the discovery of meaning, that is, the discovery of an item in a 
category. Legal interpretation that involves categorisation is focused on correctly applying the law 
to the situation before the court, that is, deciding whether to assign an item to a category. For this 
reason, in this chapter the situation before the court will be viewed as the item that needs to be 
categorised within the legal category designated by the word being interpreted. This will provide a 
very helpful way both to analyse legal interpretation and to identify fallacies in such interpretation. 
 
Diagram 4.1 has the same limitations as Diagram 3.1. A problem with Diagram 3.1 (Word, Thought 
and Referent) was that it did not distinguish between the processes of speaking and interpretation. 
Similarly, Diagram 4.1 does not distinguish between speaking and interpretation in the law. The 
word ‘signifies’ conflates the distinction between a legal speaker encapsulating a thought in a word 
and this word generating a thought in the mind of a legal interpreter. Furthermore, the words ‘refers 
to’ conflate the distinction between a referent generating a thought in the mind of a legal speaker 
and a legal interpreter applying a thought to a referent.  
 
The shortcomings of Diagram 4.1 can also be seen when legal language is viewed in terms of 
categorisation. Legal interpretation can be understood as assigning a matter to a category and legal 
speaking can be understood as establishing a category to which items need to be assigned by 
interpretation. Diagram 4.1 does not distinguish between these two acts. Moreover, Diagram 4.1 
does not distinguish between the legal speaker’s referent and the legal interpreter’s referent. That is, 
it does not distinguish between the item or items that prompted the creation of a legal category, and 
the item which is assigned to this category by interpretation.262 This diagram is therefore only of 
limited usefulness. To see the way language functions in the law in more depth it is necessary to 
separate the processes of legal speaking and legal interpretation, that is, the processes of the 
creation of legal categories and the assignment of matters to such categories.  
                                               
261  See the paragraph accompanying n 499 and the following two paragraphs. 
262  In some cases these items may be the same, but, especially in statutory interpretation, they may be different. 
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2 Legal speaking 
 
Chapter Three discussed speaking, which was defined to include writing. This chapter (Chapter 
Four) will use the phrase ‘legal speaking’ to designate a corresponding process in the law. The 
phrase ‘legal speaking’263 is used to refer to the entire process by which the language being 
judicially interpreted comes into being and is given meaning by legal speakers. The word ‘drafting’ 
is too narrow to describe this process because ‘drafting’ only applies to one stage in this process.264  
 
Legal speaking is depicted in Diagram 4.2, below, which is based on Diagram 3.2 (Speaking). 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.2 depicts the process of legal speaking. This process involves the creation of the words 
of a document that is subject to judicial interpretation and the assignment of a meaning to these 
words by legal speakers. On the left-hand side is the legal referent. The referent generates the 
thought in the mind of the legal speaker, which thought is then encapsulated by the legal word. As 
will be seen, however, there are difficulties with merely viewing legal speaking as the encapsulation 
                                               
263 For simplicity, the term ‘speaking’ will sometimes be used in this chapter to refer to legal speaking when the context 
makes it clear that this does not refer to ordinary speaking. Similarly, the term ‘speaker’ will sometimes be used to 
refer to the legal speaker. 
264  For instance, a previous judicial decision regarding the meaning of a certain provision in a statute may be relevant 
when that provision is being interpreted. As will be seen, in relation to this act of interpretation, this previous 
decision can be considered as part of the act of ‘legal speaking’, but it would be misleading to refer to it as 
‘drafting’. 
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of a thought regarding a referent in language. Difficulties occur with the notions of the ‘legal 
speaker’, the ‘legal referent’ and the ‘legal thought’. These difficulties have been briefly mentioned 
previously in this chapter, but it is useful to consider them here in more detail.  
 
This section will begin by discussing the elements in this diagram. It will discuss the legal speaker 
and the act of legal speaking, the legal speaker’s referent, the legal speaker’s thought, and the legal 
speaker’s word. It will show how these elements differ from corresponding elements related to 
speaking in ordinary language and how it is useful to view legal speaking in relation to 
categorisation. It will then use an example of legal speaking to illustrate these points. It will 
conclude by eliciting some considerations that legal interpreters need to bear in mind in relation to 
the act of legal speaking. 
 
First, the legal speaker is not the same as a speaker ordinarily. There are some situations in which it 
is easy to identify a legal speaker. For instance, when interpreting a will, it is useful to view the 
testator as the legal speaker.265 In other situations, however, there may not be a specific person who 
can be considered to be the legal speaker. For instance, in relation to statutes, it is difficult to posit a 
single speaker to whom the speaking can be attributed. Furthermore, when interpreting a specific 
provision, judges have to bear in mind previous interpretive decisions related to that provision. 
These previous interpretations affect the meaning of the provision and therefore can be considered 
as part of the act of legal speaking in relation to subsequent interpretations. Thus, the legal speaker 
is not limited to the legislators or the drafters of the statute, but may include judges. Therefore, 
factors relevant to legal speaking can include both considerations relating to the initial creation of a 
document and relating to subsequent interpretations of that document. For this reason, it is helpful 
to view legal speaking as the process by which legal categories are created. When viewed in this 
light, it can be seen that ‘legal speaking’ is not limited to a single act of speaking, but includes all 
that is relevant to the creation of legal categories designated by certain words.  
 
When analysing specific instances of interpretation, it may be misleading to use the term ‘legal 
speaker’ if such a speaker cannot be easily identified. It is still useful, however, to refer to a ‘legal 
speaker’ and to the act of ‘legal speaking’ when analysing this process in the abstract. Therefore, 
this chapter will use the term ‘legal speaking’ to designate the process of the creation of legal 
categories and will use the term ‘legal speaker’ to refer to the person or persons responsible for this 
                                               
265  The fact that wills are usually drafted by lawyers does not change this because wills express a testator’s intentions 
and it is the testator who signs the will. 
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creation.  
 
In some situations, legal speaking does involve a specific person encapsulating a thought in 
language. When such language is being interpreted, it is still helpful to view this act of 
interpretation as categorisation, because viewing it merely as the discovery of meaning can cause 
certain important legal considerations to be either overlooked or misapplied when they are 
introduced.266  
 
Second, the legal speaker’s referent is not the same as a speaker’s referent ordinarily. In Chapter 
Three, a speaker’s referent was the thing to which the speaker’s thought referred. In that chapter, it 
was not necessary to posit referents for certain words. The legal speaker’s referent can be defined as 
the items which legal speakers have included in the legal category by the process of legal speaking. 
This referent can include objects, categories of objects, actions, and factual situations. Therefore, in 
every situation where a legal speaker uses a certain word to designate a certain item, it is useful to 
posit a legal speaker’s referent for that word. 
 
A legal speaker, however, may create a legal category without having any specific items in view. In 
such a situation, it is not useful to posit a legal speaker’s referent. For instance, a statutory provision 
may be drafted without a specific situation in view, or there may be a general clause in a contract or 
a will that has been included without the drafters considering any specific item or situation that 
should fall within it.  
 
In many situations, however, the act of legal speaking does result in items being included within the 
legal category by legal speakers. The most obvious items would be the items that prompted the 
creation of the legal category. For instance, if a contract relates to the sale of a specific building, the 
language describing this building in the contract can be viewed as the name of a legal category and 
the building itself can be viewed as the item the legal speaker267 has assigned to this category. 
Moreover, when a word in a statutory provision is judicially interpreted, the judge may include a 
specific item in the legal category designated by this word. This means that subsequent interpreters 
may need to bear such an item in mind, and, in relation to these subsequent interpreters, this item 
can be considered to be part of the legal speaker’s referent in relation to this word. For this reason, 
                                               
266  See the paragraph accompanying n 499. 
267  Although there are two parties in relation to a contract, for simplicity it is still useful to use the singular term 
‘speaker’.  
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an act of judicial interpretation in relation to a certain word may be viewed as part of the act of 
‘legal speaking’ for a subsequent interpreter of that word. 
 
Thus, the legal speaker’s referent comprises any items that have been included within the legal 
category at the time the word describing the category is interpreted, some of which have been 
officially included in the category by judges and others which were included within the category 
when it was created but have not been judicially recognised. It is useful to group all these items 
together under the term ‘legal speaker’s referent’, because they are all items that an interpreter may 
need to take into account in deciding whether to assign a new item to this category. The point being 
made here is not that all these items have the same legal status, but that they are all relevant when 
considering the act of legal speaking generally. This shows that there is a significant difference 
between the legal speaker’s referent and the referent in ordinary speaking.  
 
Third, the legal speaker’s thought is not the same as a speaker’s thought ordinarily. It has been 
pointed out that there may be no single person to whom this thought can be attributed. This is even 
clearer once it is seen that the act of legal speaking includes not merely the original speaker or 
speakers, but may also include subsequent interpreters. 
 
The legal speaker’s thought is of the referent, that is, it is of the item or items which have been put 
within the legal category designated by the word. In this sense, these items generate the thought. 
Speakers, however, assign items to categories for specific reasons. The speaker’s thought is of 
certain items which have been included in a legal category, but this thought relates to the reason the 
items have been included in the category. Put another way, the thought relates to the reason certain 
items have been given a legal status with an attendant legal consequence. The legal speaker’s 
thought, therefore, is different from a thought regarding a referent in ordinary speaking because it 
includes various legal considerations. This legal thought can be considered the legal speaker’s 
meaning.  
 
Importantly, even if it is not possible to ascribe any thoughts to any specific legal speaker, it is still 
usually possible to discern reasons for the creation of a legal category. Such reasons do not 
necessarily need to be viewed in relation to thoughts, but can be viewed simply as the reasons items 
are included in a legal category. Even in situations where there is no actual thought that can be 
attributed to a speaker regarding a certain matter that is before the court, these legal reasons are still 
relevant to an interpretive decision. 
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Fourth, the legal word on the right-hand side of Diagram 4.2 is a word in a legal document that is 
subject to judicial interpretation. It can be viewed as the word (or words) that has been chosen to 
designate a certain legal category. This word is usually chosen based on existing language 
conventions. Alternatively, the word may have been explicitly defined in the legal document, and 
new conventions may have been established. The speaker’s use of the legal word results in the 
creation of a legal category and the meaning this word has been used to express indicates the 
speaker’s intention regarding the items that should be included within this category.  
 
Therefore, it is useful to view Diagram 4.2 explicitly in relation to categorisation. On this view, the 
legal word is the name of the legal category. The legal referent includes any items that have been 
assigned to this category by the process of legal speaking. The legal thought is a thought that 
comprises all the considerations relevant to the inclusion of these items in this category. Thus, legal 
speaking can be viewed as the creation of legal categories. When a legal category is created by legal 
speaking, this often also involves as the assignment of certain items this legal category. This 
assignment, however, should be distinguished from the assignment of items to legal categories by 
judicial interpretation, because if the legal speaker’s assignment of a certain item is in dispute, there 
needs to be an act of judicial interpretation to authoritatively decide whether this item should be 
assigned to this legal category.   
 
Diagram 4.2, therefore, could have been drawn explicitly in relation to legal categorisation with an 
item generating a thought which is encapsulated in the legal category to which the item is assigned. 
This, however, would make it difficult to compare legal speaking with ordinary speaking. 
Moreover, in this chapter it will still be useful in some instances to refer to the ‘legal referent’ in 
addition to items, and it will usually be necessary to refer to ‘legal words’ in addition to legal 
categories. Therefore, the diagrams in the remainder of this chapter will depict legal words, legal 
thoughts, and legal referents, but the discussion in this chapter will be in relation to categorisation. 
 
An example of statutory drafting should make the nature of legal speaking clearer. Section 3(1) of 
the Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK) made it an offence to use trailers, defined in the Act as 
‘vehicles’,268 on a road without pneumatic tyres. If this provision was being interpreted, and the 
judge focused on the word ‘vehicle’, this word can be considered the legal word designating a legal 
                                               
268  Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK), s 1. 
108 
 
category. Initially, the items in this category would seem to include the items commonly described 
by the word ‘vehicle’. These items would comprise the speaker’s referent and the legal speaker’s 
thought would be a thought regarding these items.  
 
This legal speaker’s thought, however, is not merely a thought regarding certain items, but is also a 
thought regarding the legal status that these items should be given. Therefore, in relation to the 
word ‘vehicle’ in this Act, this thought includes the reason for the law, which in this instance is 
probably the protection of the surface of roads.269 There may be items which could damage the 
surface of roads, but which would not normally be considered to be vehicles. Therefore, there may 
be items which should be within this legal category, even though they are not necessarily the items 
that are conjured up by the conventional meaning of the word ‘vehicle’. The interpretation section 
of this chapter will discuss a judicial decision interpreting this provision to show what sorts of 
considerations should be taken into account in the interpretation of this word ‘vehicle’.270 
 
This example shows that various considerations are relevant to the legal speaker’s thought. These 
can be viewed as considerations relevant to the act of legal speaking, that is, to the establishment of 
a legal category. There is the reason for the category, for instance, the protection of roads. There are 
the items that are to be included in the category, for instance, items that damages roads. Then there 
is the word that has been used to encapsulate the category, for instance, the word ‘vehicle’.  
 
To aid interpretation, speakers need not only to use language to describe the items in the legal 
category based on linguistic conventions, but also need to make the reason for the existence of the 
legal category clear. This can be done in a variety of ways: by providing definition sections in a 
legal document, by giving examples of items that certain provisions in the document are designed to 
capture, or by explicitly stating the reason for a provision in a document.271  
 
Chapter Three, of this thesis, discussed ordinary speaking and concluded that it involved the use of 
language conventions to encapsulate thoughts in language. This section has discussed a 
corresponding process in the law, which can be called ‘legal speaking’. It is helpful to view ‘legal 
                                               
269 This was noted by Lord Goddard CJ in Garner v Burr [1951] 1 KB 31 at 33. This case will be discussed in Chapter 
Four B.3.  
270  See the paragraph accompanying n 299. 
271  The techniques that can be used to make legal documents clear are emphasised by the plain legal language 
proponents. See for instance, Richard Wydick Plain English for Lawyers (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 1998), 
Michele Asprey Plain Language for Lawyers (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2003), Mark Adler Clarity for Lawyers 
(2nd ed, The Law Society, London, 2006), and Peter Butt and Richard Castle Modern Legal Drafting: A Guide to 
Using Clearer Language (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). 
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speaking’ as everything that is involved in the creation of a legal category, rather than merely an act 
in which a person encapsulates a thought in language. It is possible to elicit four general groups of 
considerations relevant to this act of legal speaking. These considerations comprise the legal 
speaker’s thought. 
 
First, the word that has been used to describe the legal category is important. This word may have 
been chosen based its conventional meaning or may have been explicitly defined. This meaning can 
help clarify which items should be in the category. Second, there is the reason that the legal 
category has been created. This is the reason the legal consequence should apply to items in this 
category. Third, one or more items may have been assigned to the legal category by the act of 
speaking. These can include items assigned to the category by the initial creation of the category 
and also items assigned to the category by judges in subsequent interpretations of the word 
designating the category. These items show what the category is designed to capture. Fourth, there 
may be general legal considerations related to the category that has been set up.272  
 
Thus, there are four groups of considerations that are relevant to the act of legal speaking: linguistic 
considerations, considerations related to the category itself, considerations related to items in the 
category, and general legal considerations. As will be seen later in this chapter, interpreters need to 
bear these considerations in mind when engaged in interpretation.273 Furthermore, in specific 
instances of interpretation, even though it may be difficult to identify a legal speaker to whom a 
thought can be attributed, these four groups of considerations are still relevant.  
 
(a) Legal ineffability 
 
Before a legal category has been created there is a thing that needs to be categorised (the item) and 
a legal thought regarding it, but no legal word. This is depicted by Diagram 4.3, below, which is 
based on Diagram 3.3 (Ineffability). 
 
                                               
272  For example, policy considerations that do not relate to the specific purpose of this legal category, but to legal, 
economic or social principles that are relevant to this category.  
273  Therefore, even though this section has focused on legal speaking, the goal of this section is mainly to highlight 
matters that interpreters need to bear in mind in relation to the act of legal speaking. 
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Just as Diagram 3.3 (Ineffability) did not refer to things intrinsically incapable of being expressed in 
language, Diagram 4.3 does not refer to things intrinsically incapable of being legally categorised. 
Legal ineffability refers to a situation in which a legal speaker does not know which words to use to 
correctly encapsulate a legal thought. Put another way, the legal speaker does not know the specific 
language necessary to create a legal category with a certain consequence. Therefore, the thought 
regarding this category can be considered legally ineffable for this speaker.  
 
Legal ineffability may occur because a speaker is not aware of certain conventions that apply in the 
law. In most situations, legal speakers are free to use any words they want to express their 
intentions. To make these intentions clear, however, it is better if they follow existing legal 
conventions.  
 
As with ineffability ordinarily, if legal speakers are aware that they do not know the correct legal 
conventions, they will probably not attempt to create legal categories. Difficulties can occur when 
speakers are not aware of the existing legal conventions, but still attempt to draft legal documents. 
Such a situation can be considered to be the result of legal ineffability, rather than an instance of 
legal ineffability, because the speaker’s thought has been expressed. In such a situation, however, 
the courts may not give effect to the legal speaker’s intentions.   
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In the past, in certain jurisdictions the common law has sometimes required specific words be used 
to achieve a certain legal result.274 Legal speakers who were not aware of these requirements may 
have been unable to create the legal categories necessary to achieve this kind of result. These kinds 
of requirements, however, are less common today.  
 
In some instances, however, there may be rules of interpretation which mean that a speaker should 
not use certain language. For instance, a legal speaker may intend to create a trust. If this speaker 
uses precatory language – that is, language expressing a wish or desire rather than a definite 
command – the court may conclude that no trust was created. Alyssa A DiRusso noted:275  
 
A person’s language is often judged to show lack of intent – meaning that no trust is created – when he or 
she uses ‘precatory’ language: words of preference or guidance rather than explicit direction. 
 
If speakers are not aware of this approach to interpretation, they may express their intention in 
polite language, rather than as an explicit direction. In such a situation, it could be that a court does 
not recognise that these words create a trust. 
 
When precatory language is used, the courts sometimes recognise a ‘precatory trust’, which is a 
“trust created by certain words, which are more like words of entreaty and permission than of 
command or certainty.”276 In the American Court of Appeals case Sanger v Sanger277 the issue was 
whether a will created a precatory trust.278 The testator, Barbara Sanger, included the following 
provision in her will:279 
 
In the event I own a home as of the date of my death, it is my wish that if any child of mine wishes to 
reside in such home he or she shall be allowed to by my other children …. 
 
The testator’s son claimed that this provision created a precatory trust. The Court held that their 
                                               
274  For instance, David M Becker noted: “To ‘B and her heirs’ is an acknowledged language format. At one time it was 
the only phrase that would accomplish the creation of a fee simple absolute. Today, although it is not the only way to 
create such estate, ‘and heirs’ remains a popular and reliable format for achieving this result.” “Debunking the 
Sanctity of Precedent” (1998) Wash U L Q 853 at 859 (italics in original). 
275  Alyssa A DiRusso “He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory Words in Wills” (2007) 22 Wis 
Women’s LJ 1 at 2. 
276  Henry Campbell Black (Joseph R Nolan and Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley eds) Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, West 
Publishing Co, St Paul (Minn), 1990) at 1176 quoted in Frank L Schiavo “Does the Use of ‘Request,’ ‘Wish,’ or 
‘Desire’ Create a Precatory Trust or Not?” (2006) 40 Real Prop Probate & Trust J 647 at 650. 
277  Sanger v Sanger (2003) 268 Wis2d 846 (CA). This case is briefly mentioned in Schiavo, above n 276, at 663-664. 
278  Sanger v Sanger, ibid, at [1]. 
279  Ibid, at [2]. 
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primary goal was “to discern and give effect to the testator’s intent.”280 The court then stated:281  
 
The general rule is that ‘precatory’ words in a will, such as ‘it is my wish,’ are construed as 
recommendations to the devisee, but are not binding commands, as they would be if made to the personal 
representative …. 
 
Therefore, because the words being interpreted were directed to the devisees, and not to the 
executor, no trust was created. The testator may have intended to create a trust, but because of the 
language used, the Court did not recognise a trust. Thus, the testator’s intention may have been 
frustrated.282  
 
Legal ineffability occurs when legal speakers do not know the correct language to use create a legal 
category with a certain consequence. It describes a situation where a certain legal thought – that is, 
an intention that a legal consequence should apply to certain items – is ineffable for a particular 
speaker. A speaker, however, may still attempt to create a legal category with a certain legal 
consequence. If he or she does not use the right legal conventions, however, the court may not give 
effect to their intentions. This is similar to communication failing in ordinary language because 
speakers are not aware of the correct conventions.283 This is most likely to occur in situations where 
laymen draft legal documents, for instance, it can occur with home-made wills.  
 
3 Legal interpretation 
 
Legal interpretation is depicted in Diagram 4.4, below, which is based on Diagram 3.4 
(Interpretation). 
 
                                               
280  Ibid, at [5] 
281  Ibid. 
282  This thesis will return to this decision and discuss whether it was fallacious in this chapter at C.5. 
283  For instance, the use of the word ‘quittance’ discussed at Chapter Three B.2.(a). 
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Diagram 4.4 depicts the process of legal interpretation, that is, the process of the judicial 
interpretation of language. Legal interpretation can be defined as the process by which judges 
assign a meaning to certain words.284 In relation to legal interpretation, the view has been expressed 
that:285  
 
[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain … the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. 
… 
Where the language is plain and admits of not more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does 
not arise …. 
 
On this view, there is no need of interpretation if statutory language is unambiguous.286 It is much 
clearer, however, to view any assignment of a meaning to a word as interpretation. In many cases 
this assignment of meaning is simple and almost automatic. In other cases, more is involved. It is 
                                               
284  Arthur Corbin defined interpretation as “the process whereby one person gives a meaning to the symbols of 
expression used by another person” Arthur L Corbin Corbin on Contracts (West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1960) vol 3 
at 2. Corbin stated that in relation to contract interpretation, both words and conduct may require interpretation (at 
3). This chapter will focus on the interpretation of words, not conduct. Earlier in this thesis a distinction was drawn 
between the interpretation of words and the interpretation of the law. This chapter will focus on the interpretation of 
words and not merely the interpretation of the law. As has been noted, this chapter is limited to interpretation that 
involves categorisation.  
285 Caminetti v United States (1917) 242 US 470 (SC) at 485. 
286  Compare the quotation by Lord Steyn in n 490. 
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not helpful, however, to distinguish between these two acts and view only one as ‘interpretation’, 
since they both involve the same basic activity.  
 
Diagram 4.4 is similar to Diagram 4.1 (Legal Word, Legal Thought and Legal Referent), but it 
specifically depicts the process of legal interpretation and not just the relationship between words, 
thoughts and referents in the law. In Diagram 4.4, the act of interpretation begins on the left-hand 
side with the word being interpreted.287 This word generates a certain thought in the mind of the 
interpreting judge. This thought is then applied to a referent. Thus, the connection between the legal 
word being interpreted and the legal referent for which the word stands is indirect, and is through 
the legal thought.  
 
This section will begin by discussing each of the elements depicted in this diagram and the 
relationship between them. It will then discuss some cases involving the judicial interpretation of 
language. Following this, it will elicit some considerations that judges need to bear in mind when 
engaged in interpretation. It will conclude by briefly comparing legal interpretation to ordinary 
interpretation and comparing an approach to legal interpretation focused on categorisation to an 
approach to legal interpretation focused on the discovery of an intention.  
 
The ‘legal word’ in Diagram 4.4 is the specific language being interpreted by a judge. This thesis is 
limited to the interpretation of legal documents such as statutes, contracts and wills. It does not 
cover the interpretation of other judicial decisions.288 Therefore, the legal word is the word or words 
in such documents that require interpretation. 
 
This legal word is the same as the legal word identified in the legal speaking section. Thus, the legal 
speaker and the legal interpreter share the word. This word may have been defined in the document 
being interpreted, or may have been selected on the basis of a meaning it is usually used to express. 
An interpreter, however, cannot merely rely on ordinary language conventions to interpret this word 
since other considerations may be relevant to an interpretive decision. For this reason, it is helpful if 
this word is viewed as the name of a legal category to which items can be assigned by judicial 
interpretation and not merely a word for which a linguistic meaning needs to be discovered.  
                                               
287 For convenience, the term ‘word’ is used rather than ‘words’. Judicial interpretation, however, may be of a phrase or 
an entire sentence, and not merely a single word. The analysis and the fallacies identified in this chapter apply both 
to the interpretation of single words and of more than one word.  
288 However, previous judicial decisions regarding the meaning of a word in a legal document that is being interpreted 
are relevant.  
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The legal thought at the apex of the triangle is the thought in mind of a specific person: the 
interpreting judge.289 Therefore, in one sense, the thought of the legal speaker is more complicated 
than the thought of the legal interpreter. There may, however, be more considerations relevant to the 
thought of the legal interpreter than the thought of the legal speaker. Viewed in relation to 
categorisation, the thought of the legal speaker involves such matters as the reason for the existence 
of the legal category and the reason certain items should be assigned to the category. The legal 
interpreter, however, may have to bear in mind not only the factual context at the time of the initial 
creation of the category, but also the factual context at the time of interpretation.290 Viewed in 
relation to categorisation, the interpreter may need to take into account two periods of time: the time 
when the category was first created and the time at which this act of categorisation is taking 
place.291 Put simply, the interpreter’s thought includes whatever considerations are relevant to the 
assignment of an item to the category designated by the word being interpreted. These 
considerations will be given in more detail later in this section. This thought can be viewed as the 
legal interpreter’s meaning. 
 
Legal interpretation that involves categorisation is always in relation to a specific situation. This 
situation is the item that needs to be categorised. This item can be a physical object, a category of 
objects, an action or a situation. The item is whatever is being given a legal status by the act of 
interpretation. When this item is assigned to the category designated by the word being interpreted, 
this item is the legal interpreter’s referent in relation to this word.  
 
Diagram 4.4 states that the legal thought is applied to the legal referent. The words ‘applied to’ 
rather than ‘refer to’ are used in this diagram because the thought does not merely spontaneously 
refer to the referent, but is deliberately applied to the referent by the authoritative decision of a 
                                               
289  As mentioned in n 249, it is useful to view judicial decisions as the interpretation of an individual person even when 
other judges concur. 
290  This is true both of statutory interpretation, where interpreters may need to posit a legislative intention concerning a 
matter that never occurred to the legislators and the interpretation of other legal documents such as contracts where 
interpreters may need to attribute a presumed intention to the parties. 
291  Some theories of statutory interpretation focus on the original legislative intention and others focus more on the 
purpose behind the statute and applying this purpose in light of the situation at issue. That is, some focus more on 
the time of the creation of the category and others focus more on the time an interpretive decision is being made. 
The point being made here is that both periods of time are potentially relevant for interpreters. Maimon 
Schwarzschild notes: “Several broad theoretical approaches to interpretation are on offer. They include textualism 
(or ‘plain meaning’ …); original intent; history and precedent; adapting to (what are believed to be) present-day 
popular expectations and needs; and ‘philosophy’, in the sense of doing what is right in accordance with the best 
ethical thought.” “Mad Dogmas and Englishmen: How Other People Interpret and Why” in J Goldsworthy and T 
Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot, 2002) 93 at 93.  
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judge. The application of this thought to the referent is the application of the law to this referent and 
is the inclusion of this referent within the legal category designated by the word being interpreted. 
 
Judicial interpretation either results in the inclusion of the item at issue within the legal category 
designated by the word being interpreted or the exclusion of this item from this category. If 
interpretation results in the inclusion of the item in the category, that item is the referent in Diagram 
4.4. If, however, judicial interpretation does not result in the inclusion of an item in the category, the 
judge may still identify the kind of item that should be included in the category. In this situation, the 
item identified by the judge is the legal interpreter’s referent. Thus, the interpreter’s referent is 
whatever item the judge identifies as fitting within the category.  
 
A judge may have to make an interpretive decision regarding whether a specific item fits within the 
legal category designated by a certain word. The judge may exclude this item from the category, 
and may not indicate what kind of item should be included within the category. In such a case, there 
is no interpreter’s referent. However, there is still an item and there still has been a legal decision 
regarding the status of that item. This shows that the primary focus of instances of legal 
interpretation which involve categorisation should not be on giving a meaning to the word being 
interpreted, but should be on categorising the item under consideration. This difference in focus will 
be discussed again at the end of this section. 
 
Diagram 4.4 can be viewed in relation to the assignment of items to legal categories. The legal word 
on the left-hand side is the name of a legal category, the legal thought at the apex of the triangle is a 
judge’s thought which comprises all the considerations relevant to the assignment of items to this 
category, and the legal referent on the right-hand side is an item that has been assigned to the 
category by an act of interpretation.  
 
It will be helpful to give some examples to illustrate the process of judicial interpretation. As 
mentioned in the previous section, under the Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK) it was an offence to use 
trailers on a road without pneumatic tyres.292 In March 1950, Lawrence Burr was charged with this 
offence while towing an empty poultry shed fitted with iron wheels along a road behind a tractor. At 
first instance, he was found not guilty. The word ‘trailer’ was defined as a ‘vehicle’ in the Act, so 
the Court focused on the word ‘vehicle’.293 The Court decided that the poultry shed was not a 
                                               
292 Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK), s 3(1). 
293  Ibid, s 1. 
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‘vehicle’ within the Act, “because it was not an instrument or thing by which persons or goods were 
conveyed”.294  
 
On appeal, Burr was convicted of the offence. Lord Goddard CJ stated that:295 
 
[A]ccording to the dictionary definition, a ‘vehicle’ is primarily to be regarded as a means of 
conveyance provided with wheels … and used for the carriage of persons or goods … but I think that 
the Act is clearly aimed at anything which will run on wheels which is being drawn by a tractor …. 
 
His Lordship noted that one of the reasons for the regulations296 was “the protection of road 
surfaces; and, as this vehicle had ordinary iron tyres, not pneumatic tyres, it was liable to damage 
the roads.”297 In a concurring judgment, Hilbery J stated:298  
 
Having regard to the purpose of the Act … I am satisfied that we ought to give a generous construction to 
the material words … I am satisfied that, for the purpose of the Act, this poultry house on wheels being 
drawn along the highway was a vehicle. 
 
This case illustrates that judicial interpretation does not merely involve ascertaining the linguistic 
meaning of words, but is also governed by legal considerations, in this instance, the purpose of the 
Act which was the protection of roads.  
 
In Garner v Burr, the word ‘vehicle’ needed to be interpreted so as to include certain items that 
should come within the legal category designated by this word and to exclude items that should not. 
The decision of the lower Court appears to have been made based on the common meanings of the 
words ‘vehicle’ and ‘trailer’. On appeal, this decision was reversed because of a legal reason: the 
purpose of the Act. The judges had to decide whether the item (the poultry shed) fitted within the 
legal category designated by the word ‘vehicle’. The considerations relevant to this decision were 
not merely linguistic considerations concerning the conventional meaning of this word, but also 
included the legal consideration of the purpose of the Act.  
 
This analysis of Garner v Burr may lead to the conclusion that legal interpretation is fundamentally 
                                               
294 Garner v Burr, above n 269, at 32.  
295 Ibid, at 33. 
296 There is a reference to ‘regulations’ here because under the Act it was an offence to use a vehicle which did not 
comply with the applicable regulations. 
297 Garner v Burr, above n 269, at 33. 
298 Ibid, at 34. 
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different from ordinary interpretation. This conclusion would be based on the assumption that the 
word would have been interpreted differently in ordinary language. It was the context of the Act, 
however, specifically the purpose of the Act, which determined the meaning of the word ‘vehicle’ in 
this decision. This is similar to the way in which context determines meaning ordinarily. Ordinarily, 
interpreters also take into account the purpose of speaking. As will be seen, however, it can 
sometimes be easy to make commit fallacies legal interpretation if legal interpretation is viewed as 
merely ascertaining the meaning of words based on context. It can be much clearer if it is viewed as 
categorisation based on certain relevant considerations. 
 
The purpose behind the language being interpreted is an important legal consideration since it is the 
reason the legal category designated by that language was established. This thesis, however, does 
not merely advocate a purposive approach to legal interpretation. There are relevant legal 
considerations that do not relate to the purpose of the Act. For instance, if the poultry shed was 
being used to convey a critically injured person to a hospital to receive urgent medical care, it may 
be that the courts would decide that it was not a vehicle.299 In this case, an overriding consideration 
would be the need to provide urgent medical care and this general consideration may be held to be 
more important than the specific purpose behind the statute.300 Because judges are limited to 
interpreting statutory provisions and cannot draft exceptions to these provisions, the term ‘vehicle’ 
would need to be interpreted so as to include items which should be put within this legal category 
and to exclude items which should not be put within this category.  
 
Garner v Burr also highlights the fact that interpreters need to bear in mind not only the original 
context of the legal speaking, but the factual situation before the court. In ordinary interpretation, 
the meaning of a word is governed by the thought of the speaker. In the law, meaning is not merely 
governed by the speaker’s thought, but is also determined by the decision that needs to be made in 
relation to the situation before the court. The task of legal interpreters is to implement the law in 
changing contexts and not merely to discover a speaker’s meaning.  
 
Moreover, legal interpretation does not merely involve identifying specific items to which speakers 
have referred, but may involve determining whether a new item should fit within an existing 
                                               
299 In such a situation, it may be that either the police would not press charges or that the court would acknowledge that 
it was a vehicle but would not enter a conviction. To establish this exception as precedent, however, the court may 
decide that the poultry shed was not a vehicle for the purposes of this Act. 
300 It could be said that in this situation the judge is not interpreting, but simply making a decision. The judge, however, 
would usually frame this decision in terms of the interpretation of the word ‘vehicle’. 
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category of items. In Garner v Burr, the word ‘vehicle’ designated a legal category, but the task of 
the interpreter was not merely to determine which items had prompted the creation of this category, 
but to decide whether the item at issue (the poultry shed) should be assigned to this category. To do 
this, judges needed to determine whether the item at issue was analogous to the existing items in the 
legal category. As will be seen, however, even if a judge needs to ascertain the specific item referred 
to by a legal speaker, it is still useful to view this act of interpretation as categorisation.301 
  
Although judicial interpretation does not merely involve ascertaining linguistic meaning, the law 
needs to be intelligible to the public. Therefore, judges should not merely assign items to legal 
categories based on legal considerations while ignoring the linguistic meaning of the word being 
interpreted. This was pointed out clearly in the American case McBoyle v United States302 where the 
issue was whether an aeroplane was a motor vehicle for the purpose of an Act dealing with the theft 
of motor vehicles. In his decision Justice Holmes stated:303 
 
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or 
steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world 
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. … When a rule of conduct is laid 
down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute 
should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon 
the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used.  
 
Thus, on Justice Holmes’ view, the judiciary should not overly extend the meaning of words, and 
thus the scope of legal categories, merely on the basis of legal policy or a supposition as to the 
legislature’s intentions. To do so would be unfair to the public who are regulated by the words of 
statutes. The test Justice Holmes proposes to ascertain whether an extension of meaning is 
unwarranted is the sort of pictures a word evokes in the mind of the ordinary reader. 
 
Justice Holmes’ approach introduces another important consideration. The fact that public are 
regulated by statutes is a relevant consideration and a reason why words should be given a meaning 
with which the public are familiar. Therefore, Justice Holmes claimed that this meaning should not 
be extended to cover a new situation merely because a similar policy seems to apply.  
 
                                               
301  See the paragraph accompanying n 499. 
302 McBoyle v United States [1931] 283 US 25 (SC). 
303 Ibid, at 27. 
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It is useful to view Justices Holmes’ statement in the light of another case decided by Lord Goddard 
CJ, Corkery v Carpenter.304 In this case, the defendant was riding a bicycle while drunk. The Court 
found the defendant guilty of being drunk while in charge of a carriage under section 12 of the 
Licensing Act 1872 (UK) by deciding that this bicycle was a carriage within the words of this 
section. Lord Goddard CJ stated:305  
 
In this case the object of the Act is clear: it is the protection of the public and the preservation of public 
order; and for this purpose, I think, a carriage can include any sort of vehicle, certainly a vehicle which 
is capable of carrying a person …. 
 
His Lordship concluded: “I am clearly of the opinion that the words of the Licensing Act are wide 
enough to embrace a bicycle under the expression ‘carriage’.”306  
 
It is unlikely that the word ‘carriage’ could evoke a bicycle in anyone’s mind307 or that the word 
‘vehicle’ could evoke a wheeled poultry shed in anyone’s mind. Therefore, the test set out by Justice 
Holmes cannot be applied too strictly. Although it is true that legislation should ideally be 
intelligible to the public whom it regulates, this has not stopped the judiciary interpreting language 
counter-intuitively. If Justice Holmes’ test of intelligibility were strictly followed on every occasion, 
it would place a great restriction on the application of the law. Therefore, the common meaning of a 
word, or the thought a word would evoke in someone’s mind, is only one consideration relevant to 
an interpretive decision, and needs to be weighed up against other relevant considerations.  
 
The cases discussed in this section illustrate the basic procedure involved in judicial interpretation. 
When engaged in interpretation which involves categorisation, judges need to determine whether a 
certain item should be assigned to the legal category designated by the words being interpreted. 
These words have often been chosen based on their ordinary meaning and, in the case of statutes, 
this document regulates the public. Therefore, there are important reasons why judges should give 
these words a meaning that they would ordinarily have. In some situations, however, judges need to 
include an item within this legal category which would not normally be described by these words. 
The practical result of including this new item within this category is that the legal meaning of the 
                                               
304 Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102.  
305  Ibid, at 105. 
306  Ibid, at 107. 
307 Indeed, as the lawyer for the defendant pointed out, a bicycle is explicitly contrasted with a carriage in the popular 
song Daisy Bell: ‘It won’t be a stylish marriage, I can’t afford a carriage, But you’ll look sweet upon the seat Of a 
bicycle made for two.” Ibid, at 103 (capitalisation in original). 
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words being interpreted is altered.308  
 
This section has only given examples of statutory interpretation. This analysis can also apply to the 
interpretation of other documents. This will be shown by the fallacy analysis later in this chapter.309 
Moreover, the analysis in this section can even apply to judicial decisions which do not involve the 
interpretation of language at all. This can be seen by a consideration of a very famous case, the 
House of Lord’s decision of Donoghue v Stevenson.310  
 
The specific details of this decision are not relevant for the purposes of this discussion, but it can be 
viewed as deciding the scope of the tort of negligence. Viewed in this way, the issue was whether 
the factual situation of a snail being found in a bottle of ginger-beer fitted within the legal category 
of situations where a manufacturer is liable for damages for negligence. Thus, the Court had to 
determine the legal status of this item (the action of allowing the snail into the bottle) by deciding 
whether it fitted within this legal category. Such a decision has significant ramifications because a 
decision to include this item within this legal category means that analogous items should also be 
within this category. To decide whether the item should fit within this category, various relevant 
legal considerations needed to be taken into account. These were considerations related to the tort of 
negligence. Such a decision, therefore, also involves categorisation, even though it does not involve 
the interpretation of language.311  
 
This section has shown that legal interpretation can be viewed as categorisation based on a variety 
of relevant considerations. In the legal speaking section, four groups of considerations relevant to an 
act of legal speaking were identified: linguistic considerations, considerations related to the legal 
category, considerations related to items, and general legal considerations. When the word created 
by this act of legal speaking is being interpreted, interpreters may need to take into account these 
four groups of considerations. 
 
Legal interpretation, however, is not merely governed by these considerations related to legal 
                                               
308 Thus, the word obtains a specific ‘legal meaning’ in addition to its ordinary meaning. This is an important argument 
against simplistic attempts to clarify legal language. No matter how clear the language appears when originally 
drafted, once it has been legally interpreted, it may get a legal meaning and this apparent clarity may become 
misleading. 
309  At Chapter Four C.4. 
310  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
311  This sort of categorisation will not be discussed in this chapter. The point being made here is that the analysis in this 
section does not only apply to situations when the judiciary explicitly interprets language, but can apply more 
broadly to judicial decision-making generally. 
122 
 
speaking. It is useful here to elicit the kinds of considerations that can be relevant to legal 
interpretation which involves categorisation. These considerations can also be put in four groups: 
considerations related to the word being interpreted, considerations related to the legal category that 
is designated by this word, considerations related to items relevant to this act of categorisation, and 
general legal considerations. These are considerations that can be included within the legal 
interpreter’s thought at the apex of the triangle in Diagram 4.4.  
 
First, there are considerations related to the word being interpreted. The interpreter needs to pay 
attention to the correct linguistic conventions associated with the word. These include both ordinary 
language conventions and legal conventions. The legal conventions are seen both in specific 
definitions and in conventions existing in the law generally. There is also the verbal context. This is 
inseparable from the consideration of the linguistic conventions because it is the verbal context 
which shows which conventions apply. The verbal context in relation to a certain word or phrase 
includes the sentence it is in, the paragraph it is in, the entire text it is in and other related texts. 
Furthermore, there is the factual background. This also shows the relevant linguistic conventions. 
All these points can be summarised by saying that legal interpreters need to pay attention to the 
correct linguistic meaning of the word or words being interpreted. This linguistic meaning is a 
relevant consideration because it shows the speaker’s intention in relation to the legal category 
designated by that word. Also, in relation to statutory interpretation, if possible words should be 
given the meanings that the public would expect them to have since the public are regulated by 
statutes. Viewed in relation to categorisation, the considerations related to the word being 
interpreted show the reason for the legal category and the items which the public would expect to be 
included within the category.  
 
Second, there are considerations related to the legal category that the word designates. These 
include the reason312 for or the purpose of legal category.313 In many cases, the same reasons that 
prompted the creation of a category should govern the assignment of matters to that category. These 
                                               
312  In relation to statutory interpretation, there are arguments against the courts consulting Hansard. These arguments, 
however, are based on the fact that Hansard is not a relevant consideration. These were discussed by Lord Steyn 
extra-judicially in Johan Steyn “Interpretation: Legal Texts and their Landscape” in Basil S Markesinis (ed) The 
Coming Together of the Common Law and the Civil Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 79 at 87-88. Steyn quotes 
Lord Renton who noted that in piloting a Bill “one often [has] to change one’s mind on particular clauses, or even on 
a principle, in order to get the Bill passed. So Hansard inevitably contains contradictions or ambiguous statements 
by those responsible.” (at 87). Steyn also quotes Lord Hoffmann who stated that “trying to find guidance in a 
minister’s attempt to made sense of his or her departmental brief at short notice while standing at the despatch box is 
usually a hopeless quest.” (at 87).  
313  Such considerations include the purpose behind the relevant area of law. For instance, when interpreting a contract, 
the purpose in relation to the legal category at issue may include purposes relevant to contract law generally. 
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reasons need to be viewed in relation to the specific act of categorisation at issue. Another important 
consideration is the consequence of assigning an item to the category or excluding an item from the 
category. Also, there may need to be a consideration of other legal categories, and how they relate to 
this legal category.314   
 
Third, there are considerations related to items relevant to this act of categorisation. These include 
items that prompted the creation of the category, items already in the category,315 and items that 
have been excluded from the category. These items help to show what the category is designed to 
capture. Subsequent items are often included in this category by analogy with the items already in 
the category or items that prompted the creation of the category. If the item at issue is significantly 
different from the item that prompted the creation of the category, there needs to be a determination 
whether this difference is legally significant.316 If the legal speaker did not contemplate whether the 
item at issue should be included within the legal category, the court needs to make this decision on 
the basis of the general purpose of the category and whether the inclusion of the item within the 
category would be consistent with this purpose. It is also important for judges to bear in mind how 
items that are analogous to the item at issue have been dealt with in the law. 
 
Fourth, there are more general legal considerations. These include any relevant rules of 
interpretation, for instance, rules relating to how to resolve ambiguities. Furthermore, general policy 
considerations are relevant.317 Lastly, there are considerations related to the law generally.318 These 
rules, policy considerations, and general legal considerations need to be applied with reference to 
the act of categorisation at issue. 
 
There also are various limits on interpretation, including limits on judicial discretion and 
                                               
314  For instance, when considering whether to assign a certain item to a legal category, the fact that this item is already 
captured by a different legal category may be a relevant consideration. 
315  These items may have different legal statuses. They include items that speakers have assigned to the category that 
have not been judicially recognised, items that judges have officially assigned to the category, and even items that 
judges have said would hypothetically be in the category in obiter dicta statements.  
316  It may also be possible in ordinary interpretation for the item the interpreter assigns to a category to be different 
from the item that prompted the speaker’s creation of the category. This was not mentioned in Chapter Three, 
however, because it is not common in ordinary interpretation. If a speaker said, ‘Please get me some vegetables from 
the shop’, the way the word ‘vegetables’ should be interpreted would depend on what was available at the shop 
(compare the discussion concerning the faithful servant in Levi, above n 97, at 940-953).  
317  For instance, there may be considerations related to economic efficiency. Policy considerations would also include 
such matters as the need to provided urgent medical care mentioned in the hypothetical variation on Garner v Burr 
earlier in this chapter (see the paragraph accompanying n 299). 
318  For instance, that the law should be intelligible and should be applied consistently. General legal considerations 
would also include pragmatic considerations, for instance, the argument that if certain evidence was admissible, 
there would be greater uncertainty and cost (See Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 at [35]). 
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evidentiary limits that courts need to bear in mind.319 The application of such limits needs to be 
viewed in relation to this act of categorisation, though they are not really considerations that judges 
should bear in mind while engaged in interpretation, but are practical restrictions on interpretation.  
 
These considerations relevant to legal interpretation are given in the Chart 4.1, below. 
 
Chart 4.1     Relevant Legal Considerations for Judges 
1 Consideration related to the word being 
interpreted. 
1.1 The correct linguistic meaning of the word 
shown by the verbal context and the factual 
background. 
2 Considerations related to the legal category. 2.1 Reasons for the legal category. 
2.2 The consequence of the assignment of an 
item to the category or the exclusion of an item 
from the category. 
2.3 Other legal categories. 
3 Considerations related to items relevant to this 
act of categorisation. 
3.1 The item/s that prompted the creation of the 
category. 
3.2 The item/s already in the category. 
3.3 Items in other categories. 
3.4 Analogous items to the item at issue. 
4 General legal considerations. 4.1 Rules of interpretation. 
4.2 Policy considerations. 
4.3 Considerations related to the law generally. 
 
The considerations in Chart 4.1320 are all relevant legal considerations because they are all related to 
the act of categorisation before the court. They are either related to the specific category at issue or 
to the specific item at issue. Even general legal considerations (consideration 4.3) are only relevant 
if they can be related to the act of categorisation before the court. To say that certain considerations 
are relevant to this act of categorisation means that they are either reasons that support the inclusion 
of the item at issue within the legal category or the exclusion of the item from this category. The 
considerations given in Chart 4.1 are not exhaustive, and it may be possible to discover more 
considerations within each group or other groups of considerations. Any further considerations, 
                                               
319  See Chapter Four C.7. 
320  Consideration 1.1 corresponds to all the considerations in Chart 3.1. 
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however, would have to be related to the specific act of categorisation that is before the court.  
 
Consideration 1.1 is the correct linguistic meaning of the word being interpreted. The reason this 
consideration is relevant is that it shows the reason for the legal category and, in the case of 
statutory interpretation, if possible words should be given their correct linguistic meaning because 
the law needs to be intelligible to the public. This means that the reasons for consideration 1.1 can 
be given as consideration 2.1 and consideration 4.3. For this reason, it may be thought that 
consideration 1.1 is unnecessary. It is useful, however, to include this as a separate consideration 
because it is often the most important consideration in relation to judicial interpretation.  
 
Therefore, legal interpretation can be viewed as categorisation, and this categorisation is governed 
by various relevant considerations. Viewing legal interpretation in terms of categorisation is helpful 
in that it elicits these four groups of considerations that are potentially relevant to judicial 
interpretation.321 Some specific considerations can be put within a number of these groups, for 
instance, a relevant precedent could be viewed as a meaning that has been judicially assigned to the 
word or as an item already assigned to the category. These considerations can be viewed as 
considerations relevant to determining the meaning of the word being interpreted, but are clearer 
when viewed as considerations relevant to an act of legal categorisation.  
 
Chapter Three referred to ‘relevant considerations’. The considerations identified in this chapter are 
called ‘relevant legal considerations’ to distinguish them from the considerations discussed in 
Chapter Three. For simplicity, the term ‘relevant considerations’ will sometimes be used to refer to 
these relevant legal considerations.322 The analysis of judicial fallacies later in this chapter will 
provide more specific examples of these relevant legal considerations.323  
 
The fact that these four groups of considerations can be elicited does not mean that judicial 
interpretation is a simple or straight-forward exercise. In relation to a specific act of interpretation, 
                                               
321  Many of these considerations are given in books on legal interpretation. For instance, Ruth Sullivan’s book Statutory 
Interpretation (2nd ed, Irwin Law Inc, Toronto, 2007) is structured according to various approaches to statutory 
interpretation and includes chapters on ‘ordinary meaning’ (Chapter 3), ‘technical meaning and meanings fixed by 
law’ (Chapter 4), ‘original meaning’ (Chapter 6), ‘the entire context’ (Chapter 8), ‘textual analysis’ (Chapter 9), 
‘purposive analysis’ (Chapter 10), ‘consequential analysis’ (Chapter 11), and ‘policy analysis’ (Chapter 12). In this 
thesis, however, these various considerations are all linked to the essential act that judges are engaged in: assigning 
items to legal categories.  
322  For instance, the phrase ‘relevant considerations’ is used in the abstract to this thesis because there is no need in that 
context to distinguish relevant legal considerations from the considerations relevant in ordinary interpretation. 
323  At Chapter Four C.3 and C.4. 
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judges need to weigh up the various relevant considerations to make a decision.324 Moreover, there 
may be relevant considerations that support different interpretations. The point being made in this 
section is that all these considerations are potentially relevant to judicial interpretation.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a way to detect fallacies in judicial interpretation. The goal of 
this section has been to view judicial interpretation from the point of view of categorisation and to 
elicit some considerations which would be relevant to such an act of categorisation. An instance of 
legal interpretation which takes such considerations into account is legally justified.  
 
It is helpful to briefly compare this analysis with the analysis of ordinary interpretation in Chapter 
Three.325 In relation to ordinary interpretation, the focus is on an interpreter objectively discovering 
the speaker’s meaning. To do this, there is the need for the interpreter to take into account a number 
of considerations. In relation to legal interpretation which involves categorisation, the focus is on a 
legal interpreter assigning an item to the correct legal category. To do this, there is also the need for 
the legal interpreter to take into account a number of considerations.  
 
Since both ordinary interpretation and legal interpretation can be viewed as categorisation based on 
relevant considerations there is an essential similarity between these two kinds of interpretation. 
There is, however, an important difference between them. The considerations that are relevant to 
legal interpretation are not identical to the considerations are relevant to ordinary interpretation. In 
ordinary interpretation, interpreters needed to pay attention to considerations which determine the 
conventions speakers are using. The considerations that are relevant to legal interpretation, 
however, are not limited to factors relevant to the act of legal speaking.326  
 
Legal interpretation can be viewed, and is often viewed, as the discovery of meaning. In some 
                                               
324  This thesis will not discuss in detail how judges should determine how much weight to accord to various 
considerations. There are, however, a few basic principles that are useful in determining this. First, concrete 
considerations should usually outweigh abstract ones: see Eskridge, above n 222, at 250. Secondly, in many 
situations a consideration in relation to original meaning may be less important than the way the law should apply to 
the situation before the court. Thirdly, specific considerations should be accorded more weight than general ones. 
325  At Chapter Three B.3. 
326  This shows a shortcoming of Diagram 4.4. Although the thought of the legal speaker is generated by the word, it is 
not merely governed by linguistic considerations but also by broader legal considerations. Therefore, although this 
diagram is useful when comparing legal interpretation to ordinary interpretation, it should not be taken as a 
comprehensive illustration of legal interpretation. 
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situations, it may be more accurate to view it as the declaration of meaning.327 Still, the goal is for 
the judiciary to arrive at the meaning of the word being interpreted. This is true by definition, but 
obscures an important distinction between ordinary interpretation and legal interpretation. In 
ordinary interpretation, the interpreter is focused on the word being interpreted and the task is to 
give a meaning to this word. Viewed in relation to categorisation, in ordinary interpretation the 
interpreter is focused on the category and the task is to assign an item to this category. In legal 
interpretation which involves categorisation, the interpreter is focused on the situation before the 
court and the task is to determine whether this situation is captured by the word being interpreted.328 
Viewed in relation to categorisation, in legal interpretation, the interpreter is focused on the item at 
issue and the task is to decide whether to assign this item to the legal category designated by the 
word being interpreted.  
 
Therefore, legal interpretation which involves categorisation is not merely a matter of discovering a 
meaning, but of categorising the situation before the court. Viewing this kind of legal interpretation 
as the discovering of the meaning of a word is approaching the task from the wrong direction. The 
meaning given to the word is the result of legal interpretation, but is not the primary goal. Judges 
should not begin with the category and look for the item, but should begin with the item and 
determine whether it should be assigned to the category. The legal interpreter’s meaning can be 
considered as the thought at the apex of Diagram 4.4. The task of interpretation, however, is not 
merely to arrive at this thought, but to decide whether to assign the item at issue to the legal 
category under consideration. Therefore, viewing legal interpretation in terms of categorisation can 
be clearer than viewing it in terms of the discovery of meaning.  
 
In some situations, viewing legal interpretation in terms of categorisation is also clearer than an 
approach to legal interpretation based on the discovery of an intention. Writing extra-judicially, 
Justice Michael Kirby stated that a statute “is prepared by many hands and submitted to a decision-
maker of many different opinions, so … to talk of a single ‘intention’ is self-deception.”329 Also 
writing extra-judicially, Chief Justice Spigelman stated:330  
                                               
327 See Tiersma “Ambiguity”, above n 24, at 1097. The distinction that Tiersma draws between interpretation and 
construction in this article is different from the distinction drawn by Arthur Corbin discussed in the paragraph 
accompanying n 516. 
328 In relation to statutory interpretation, Rupert Cross stated: “[I]nterpretation is the process by which the courts 
determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them.” Rupert 
Cross (John Bell and George Engle (eds)) Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed, Butterworths, London, 1995) at 34. 
329  Kirby “Grand Theory”, above n 242, at 98-99. 
330  JJ Spigelman “The poet’s rich resource: Issues in statutory interpretation” (2001) 21 Aust Bar Rev 224 at 225-226 
[“Statutory Interpretation”]. 
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The concept of attributing an intention to a legislature poses a number of problems. Indeed, there may 
not have been any actual intention at all. The words of a statute may represent a compromise between 
contending positions, where the actual working out of the application of the statute is, in practice, left to 
courts precisely because those responsible for the legislation are not able to agree on what the position 
should be. 
 
Therefore, two basic problems with focusing on legislative intention in statutory interpretation are 
that there may be no single intention or there may be no actual intention at all. Similar problems 
also apply to other legal documents. There may be no identifiable intention, no actual intention 
related to the matter at issue, or more than one intention.331 
 
These problems can be avoided when interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation. Rather 
than merely viewing interpretation as ascertaining an intention which may not exist, it can be 
viewed as categorisation based on relevant considerations. It still may be convenient to view some 
of these considerations in relation to intention, but this is just a way of saying that they relate to the 
purpose of the category, and does not need to be taken to imply that there is an actual intention. 
Furthermore, as will be seen in the fallacy analysis, a focus on categorisation often provides a better 
way to elicit relevant considerations and avoid irrelevant considerations than a focus on intention. 
Lastly, as will be seen, viewing legal interpretation as categorisation provides a better way to detect 
and avoid fallacies than viewing it either as the discovery of meaning or intention.332 
 
Diagram 4.4 is helpful because it shows that in the law words are connected to referents by judicial 
interpretation. This interpretation involves the assignment of items to legal categories. For such an 
assignment to be legally justified, it needs to be based on various relevant legal considerations.  
 
                                               
331 Legal documents are sometimes drafted in a deliberately ambiguous way, with the ambiguity left to be resolved by 
judicial interpretation. In relation to statutory interpretation Philip A Joseph has noted that the courts need to 
“resolve linguistic ambiguities in legislation, adapt existing legislation to cover new circumstances, build legislative 
meaning around undefined terms and concepts, and exercise judicial discretions in legislation.” “Parliament, the 
Courts and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ 321 at 338. Thus, the introduction of ambiguities in 
statutory drafting may be a method of delegating the decision-making power to the judiciary. For discussions of the 
deliberate use of ambiguity in drafting other legal documents, see Philip Thomas “Legal Skills and the Use of 
Ambiguity” (1991) 42 N Ir Legal Q 14 and William T Allen and Galya Levy “The Uses of Ambiguity in 
Commercial Contracts: On Facilitating Re-Bargaining” in Sarah Worthington (ed) Commercial Law and 
Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 163. 
332 See Chapter Four C.3 and C.4. 
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(a) Legal meaninglessness 
 
A legal category may exist, but the reason for this category may be unclear to an interpreter. This is 
illustrated by Diagram 4.5, below, which is based on Diagram 3.5 (Meaninglessness). 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.5 depicts legal meaninglessness. In some cases, it may be unclear to an interpreter which 
situations prompted the creation of the legal category designated by the word being interpreted or 
the reason for the existence of the category. In such cases, there is a legal word but no clear legal 
thought or legal referent to which the word can be seen to apply. Thus, this word can be viewed as 
legally meaningless to the interpreter.  
 
In Diagram 3.5, which depicted meaninglessness in ordinary interpretation, there was no thought at 
all. In Diagram 4.5 there is no ‘legal’ thought. There may be a thought generated by the 
conventional meaning of the word, but this word is legally meaningless in the sense that the legal 
reason for the existence of the legal category designated by this word and the kind of items which 
should be included within this category are unclear. 
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Legal meaningless can occur when there has been a mistake in drafting.333 It can also occur in a 
number of other situations in relation to statutory interpretation. For instance, there may have been a 
political compromise in which the legislators decided to delegate decision-making power to the 
judiciary and therefore left a provision deliberately vague or ambiguous. This could cause legal 
meaninglessness if the interpreter was not aware of this compromise and was therefore unclear 
regarding the reason for the provision. Legal meaninglessness can also be caused when the factual 
situation that gave rise to a certain provision does not exist any longer but the provision is still in 
force and requires interpretation.334 Furthermore, when an Act is imported from one jurisdiction to 
another, a difference in the physical or political circumstances in the new jurisdiction may mean that 
certain provisions are not relevant to that jurisdiction. In this situation, the original intention behind 
the provision may not have any relevance for the situation before the court. 
 
Just as meaninglessness in ordinary interpretation can occur when speakers attempt to describe 
something that is ineffable for them, meaninglessness in legal interpretation can occur when legal 
speakers attempt to create a legal category with a certain legal consequence that is legally ineffable 
for them. If a speaker does not know the correct way to create a certain legal category with a 
specific legal consequence, but still drafts a document with the intention of creating such a category, 
a judge may be unclear regarding what the category is intended to capture. If a legally meaningless 
word is being interpreted by a judge, the judge still needs to make a decision regarding the meaning 
of the word. In such a situation, the judge may be justified in interpreting the word literally. 
 
4 Legal communication 
 
To have a complete view of the nature of legal communication, it is useful to combine Diagram 4.2 
(Legal Speaking) and Diagram 4.4 (Legal Interpretation) to form Diagram 4.6, below, which is 
comparable to Diagram 3.6 (Communication): 
 
 
 
 
                                               
333  In some situations, rectification may be possible if the courts are clear that a mistake has been committed and are 
clear about the intention of the legal speaker. Meaninglessness occurs when this intention is not clear. 
334 J F Burrows notes: “In theory statute law knows no doctrine of frustration or desuetude, and the mere fact that the 
very subject-matter of a statutory provision no longer exists does not mean that the provision itself ceases to exist as 
law.” JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 386. 
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Diagram 4.6335 depicts the relationship between legal speaking and legal interpretation, which can 
be called ‘legal communication’. The legal speaker’s referent on the left-hand side includes any 
item or items that legal speakers have assigned to the legal category. These items generate the legal 
speaker’s thought. This thought is a thought regarding these items and the reason they have been 
assigned to this category. Therefore, this thought includes the reason for the creation of the 
category. This thought is encapsulated by the legal word, which is the word chosen to designate the 
legal category. The legal interpreter’s thought is generated by this word. It is also governed by 
similar considerations to the ones relevant to the speaker’s thought. The interpreter’s thought is then 
applied to the interpreter’s referent on the right-hand side. This referent is the item that the 
interpreter assigns to the legal category. 
 
There are some important differences between Diagram 4.6 and Diagram 3.6 (Communication). 
First, whereas in ordinary communication the interpreter’s referent should be the same as the 
speaker’s referent, Diagram 4.6 states that the legal interpreter’s referent should be the same as or 
analogous to the legal speaker’s referent. The legal interpreter is not limited to assigning the same 
item to the legal category as the item that the speaker has assigned to this category. There may be a 
number of specific items included in the legal speaker’s referent, and an interpreter may need to 
assign an item to the category that is analogous to these items.336  
 
Second, the goal of legal interpretation is not merely that the legal interpreter’s thought be as 
similar as possible to the legal speaker’s thought. There may be considerations relevant to the 
interpreter’s thought that were not relevant to the speaker’s thought. The legal interpreter’s thought 
and the legal speaker’s thought, however, are governed by similar kinds of considerations. That is, 
considerations related to the legal category and the items that should be in that category. For this 
reason, Diagram 4.6 states that the considerations relevant to the legal interpreter’s thought are 
similar to the considerations relevant to the legal speaker’s thought. 
 
Therefore, in legal communication, a legal interpreter’s thought is not restricted to the specific 
considerations relevant to the legal speaker and the legal interpreter’s referent is not restricted to the 
specific referent identified by the legal speaker.  
 
                                               
335  This diagram can be seen as a more sophisticated depiction of the two processes depicted in Diagram 2.1. 
336 In ordinary interpretation there may also be situations where an interpreter needs to identify a referent that is not 
exactly the same as the referent identified by the speaker. For an example of this, see n 316. 
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In ordinary interpretation, problems occur when the interpreter does not take into account all the 
considerations which indicate the speaker’s meaning or when the interpreter takes into account 
considerations which are not relevant to the speaker’s meaning. In legal interpretation which 
involves categorisation, problems occur when the legal interpreter does not take into account all the 
considerations which are relevant to the decision regarding whether to include the item at issue in 
the legal category or when the interpreter takes into account considerations that are not relevant to 
this decision. For this reason, it is useful to view these instances of legal interpretation as legal 
categorisation, rather than merely as the discovery of meaning. 
 
The result of legal interpretation is that an item is either included within the legal category or 
excluded from this category. If it is included within this category, it becomes the legal interpreter’s 
referent, and when these same words are interpreted at a later date, this item will become one of the 
items that comprise the legal speaker’s referent. Thus, on the definition given in this thesis, an act of 
legal interpretation can become part of the act of legal speaking in relation to a subsequent 
interpretation of the same word. 
 
It is useful now to return to the three differences between legal interpretation and ordinary 
interpretation mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The three differences were: first, whereas 
the result of ordinary interpretation is the interpreter objectively ascertaining the speaker’s meaning, 
the result of legal interpretation is often the application of the law to situations; second, whereas the 
goal of ordinary interpretation is the discovery of meaning, the goal of legal interpretation is often 
the implementation of the law; and third, whereas ordinary interpretation is governed by language 
conventions, legal interpretation needs to be governed by legal considerations.337 
 
These three differences can be seen clearly when legal interpretation is viewed in relation to 
categorisation. Legal interpretation often involves the assignment of items to legal categories. This 
assignment gives these items a legal status with attendant legal consequences. Thus, the law is 
implemented by being applied to these items and such implementation needs to be based on legal 
considerations.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter the question was raised was whether these three differences meant 
that the process of legal interpretation is fundamentally different from ordinary interpretation. The 
                                               
337  At Chapter Four B. 
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analysis in this chapter has shown that the process of legal interpretation is fundamentally similar to 
ordinary interpretation. There may be differences in the considerations that legal interpreters need to 
bear in mind, but the act of legal interpretation involves the same basic process as ordinary 
interpretation. This can be seen when both kinds of interpretation are viewed in relation to 
categorisation. Both kinds of interpretation can involve the assignment of an item to a category 
based on relevant considerations. 
 
In addition to these three differences, it is possible to note various other differences between legal 
interpretation and ordinary interpretation. These include: that judges are the authoritative 
interpreters and that interpretation takes place in the context of a legal decision, that intention may 
need to be presumed where it is not discoverable or did not exist, that there may be a delay in 
interpretation and the act of interpretation may occur in the context of a different factual situation 
from the act of speaking, and that speakers do not usually give direct evidence of their intentions. 
Again, these differences do not mean that the actual process of legal interpretation is fundamentally 
different from ordinary interpretation, but may mean different considerations need to be taken into 
account in legal interpretation. The way to ensure that all the relevant considerations are taken into 
account is to view legal interpretation as categorisation based on relevant considerations.  
 
It is important to address here a distinction that is sometimes drawn between ordinary interpretation 
and legal interpretation. It is sometimes claimed that legal interpretation is objective whereas 
ordinary interpretation is concerned with subjective intentions. This view was outlined by Lord 
Hoffmann writing extra-judicially: 338  
 
It is said that in ordinary life we are concerned to discover, as best we can, what is going on in the mind 
of the person whose words have to be interpreted. What matters is his or her subjective intent, what he 
or she really meant. In the law, on the other hand … subjective intention is irrelevant. 
 
Thus, whereas in ordinary interpretation the goal is to ascertain the subjective intentions of the 
speakers, in legal interpretation this is not the case and the goal is to ascertain the meaning of 
speakers objectively.339 
                                               
338  Leonard Hoffmann “The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings” (1997) 56 S African LJ 656 at 660. 
339  This view was expressed by Lord Nicholls writing extra-judicially in this way: “In everyday life we seek to identify 
what a speaker or writer actually intended by the words he has used. As we all know, the law proceeds on a different 
footing: words are taken as intended to convey the meaning, that is, the idea, they would reasonably convey to the 
hearer or reader.” Donald Nicholls “My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words” (2005) 121 LQR 577 at 579 
(italics in original).  
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This, however, can be a confusing distinction. Lord Hoffmann stated that he believed that this view 
of interpretation was fallacious,340 and noted: 341  
 
[F]or the purposes of interpreting what other people say, we have no direct access to their subjective 
mental states … our interpretation is bound to be objective in the sense that it will be our best effort to 
construe what such a person, using those words against that background, would have meant. 
 
Interpreters cannot directly ascertain the subjective intentions of speakers in either legal 
interpretation or ordinary interpretation. Both kinds of interpretation are necessarily objective. The 
fact that speakers may attribute a certain uncommunicated meaning to their words does not change 
the meaning that should be legitimately ascribed to those words in either kind of interpretation. 
Both in ordinary interpretation and in judicial interpretation, interpreters have to ascertain meaning 
based on objective information. Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that ordinary interpretation is 
concerned with subjective intentions. 
 
Furthermore, to claim that legal interpretation does not aim at discovering subjective intentions, 
although correct, can be misleading. It can lead to the view that actual intentions, even when 
discoverable, are irrelevant.342 Such a view can defeat the whole purpose of interpretation, which 
may be to give effect to speakers’ actual intentions.343 Therefore, the claim that legal interpretation 
is objective and ordinary interpretation is subjective is misleading in two ways: first, ordinary 
interpretation is also objective, and second, this claim can lead to the wrong view that legal 
interpretation is never concerned with actual intentions. The objective test in legal interpretation, 
therefore, should not be taken to imply that actual intention is irrelevant. Rather, it should mean that 
for an intention to be recognised by the courts, it needs to be communicated.  
 
A valid distinction between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation is that the evidence 
admissible in legal interpretation may be more restricted than the evidence available in ordinary 
                                               
340  Hoffman, above n 338, at 660. 
341  Ibid, at 661. See also David Goddard “The Myth of Subjectivity” (1987) 7 Legal Stud 263 and DW McLauchlan 
“Objectivity in Contract” (2005) 24 U QLJ 479 [“Objectivity”]. 
342  For instance, in relation to contract interpretation David McLauchlan notes: “Courts routinely say that the search is 
always for the parties’ presumed intention and that they are unconcerned with their actual intention.” DW 
McLauchlan “Common Intention and Contract Interpretation” [2011] LMCLQ 30 at 31 (italics in original).  
343  Again, in relation to contract interpretation, David McLauchlan notes “an objective approach, at least as properly 
understood, requires implementation of a proven actual mutual intention. That intention is the objective intention, 
although surely it would be better to say that the objective principle has not application where actual mutual 
intention is established.” McLauchlan “Objectivity”, above n 341, at 480 (italics in original).  
136 
 
interpretation.344 If this is what is meant by saying that legal interpretation is objective, then such a 
claim is correct.345 It is misleading, however, to use the word ‘objective’ in this way.  
 
This thesis, however, is not making the claim that uncommunicated subjective intentions are 
relevant in legal interpretation. If, for instance, people sign standard form contracts and do not turn 
their mind to a certain provision, and thus does not have any intention regarding this provision, in 
most situations they should be taken to have intended this provision. In this sense, it is their 
objective intention that is relevant, not their uncommunicated subjective intention, even if this is 
their actual intention. Lord Hoffmann’s definition of interpretation makes this clear:346 
 
Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable 
person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties 
in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. 
 
(a) Legal thought transmission 
 
The central part of Diagram 4.6 (Legal Communication) can be extracted to form Diagram 4.7, 
below, which is comparable to Diagram 3.7 (Thought Transmission). 
 
                                               
344  For instance, legal speakers usually cannot give evidence of their subjective intentions. For a discussion of the 
reasons for this in relation to contract interpretation, see Christopher Staughton “How Do the Courts Interpret 
Commercial Contracts?” (1999) 58 CLJ 303 at 305-306.  
345  Writing extra-judicially, Lord Hoffmann states: “When the law speaks of objective interpretation, what it really 
means is that it is artificially restricting the amount of background which can be used in aid of construction.” 
Hoffmann, above n 338, at 661. 
346  Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998], above n 243, at 912. 
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Diagram 4.7 shows the relationship between the legal speaker’s thought and the legal interpreter’s 
thought. The legal speaker’s thought is encapsulated by the legal word. The legal interpreter’s 
thought is generated by this word. Difficulties can occur when a legal speaker wrongly encapsulates 
a thought. This may happen because a legal thought is ineffable for the speaker. Difficulties can also 
occur when the word does not generate the right thought in the mind of a legal interpreter. This may 
happen because the word is legally meaningless to the interpreter. 
 
In ordinary interpretation, the similarity between the speaker’s thought and the interpreter’s thought 
determines the correctness of the interpretation. In the law, an interpretation is correct if takes into 
account the relevant legal considerations. These can include considerations relevant to the act of 
legal speaking, but may include other considerations. 
 
A distinction between construction347 and application was drawn in a New Zealand Supreme Court 
case dealing with the interpretation of a provision in the Employment Relations Act 2000. Justice 
Anderson stated:348 
                                               
347  As used here, ‘construction’ is a synonym for ‘interpretation’. Compare the discussion of the distinction between 
interpretation and construction in the paragraph accompanying n 516. 
348  Air Nelson Ltd v The New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union Incorporated 
[2010] NZSC 53, [2010] 3 NZLR 433 at [19]. The distinction drawn in this quotation is discussed in Christopher 
Walshaw “Judicial process: construction or application?” [2010] NZLJ 357. 
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The judgements in the Courts below illustrate the difficulty of trying to find a definition for what is 
really a contextual judgment. The essential question is not concerned with the meaning of ‘work’ but 
with recognising the nature and scope of particular work in particular cases. That is, the issue is not one 
of construction but of application. 
 
This distinction between ‘construction’ and ‘application’ is a distinction between giving a meaning 
to a word and making a decision concerning the application of the provision being interpreted in a 
particular situation.349 In many situations, courts are not merely concerned with the meaning that 
the speaker gave to a word, but are concerned with the application of the law in a particular 
situation. Therefore, legal interpreters cannot merely focus on ascertaining the legal speaker’s 
thought, but may need to focus on applying the law to the situation at issue. Having said this, the 
considerations relevant to the legal interpreter’s thought are similar to the considerations relevant to 
the legal speaker’s thought. 
 
(b) Simplified view of legal communication 
 
The bottom line of the Diagram 4.6 (Legal Communication) provides Diagram 4.8, below, which is 
comparable to Diagram 3.8 (Simplified View of Communication). 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.8 presents a simplified view of legal communication. On this view, it is clear that the 
legal speaker’s referent and the legal interpreter’s referent are connected by the word being 
interpreted. In Diagram 4.8 everything is objective. It is the subjective aspect of legal interpretation, 
however, that creates problems. This does not mean that legal interpretation can take account of 
                                               
349  Compare the famous statement by Oliver Wendell Holmes: “General proposition do not decide concrete cases.” 
Lochner v New York (1905) 198 US 45 (SC) at 76. 
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uncommunicated subjective thoughts, but that relevant legal considerations that provide indications 
of such thoughts need to be borne in mind. Diagram 4.8, therefore, presents a naïve view of legal 
communication in which there is no need to pay attention to any indications of subjective thoughts.  
 
As has been pointed out, a legal interpreter is not limited to identifying referents specifically 
indicated by speakers. That is, the items a legal interpreter should assign to a legal category are not 
limited to items legal speakers have assigned to the category. It is important to see, however, the 
items legal interpreters assign to a category should be analogous to the items that legal speakers 
have assigned to the category. This is because the items that legal speakers have assigned to a legal 
category indicate the reason for this category. Furthermore, all the items officially assigned to a 
certain legal category by judicial interpretation350 have the same legal status and are treated the 
same way in the law. Because they are treated in the same way, they should be analogous in a 
certain relevant respect.  
 
Diagram 4.8 shows that legal interpretation connects the legal word to the legal interpreter’s 
referent. Although this is true, in the legal interpretation section it was stressed that the focus of 
legal interpretation is different from the focus of ordinary interpretation. In legal interpretation 
which involves categorisation, the legal interpreter’s task is not primarily focused on discovering 
the item that should be assigned to a legal category, but on deciding whether or not to assign the 
specific item before the court to this category. Whereas ordinary interpretation begins with the 
category and the task is to discover the item that should be assigned to this category, legal 
interpretation often begins with an item and the task is to decide whether this item should be 
assigned to the legal category. It has been said that the process of judicial interpretation is 
fundamentally similar to the process of ordinary interpretation. It is important to note that this 
difference of focus in legal interpretation does not make a significant difference to the process of 
interpretation. The essential process of both types of interpretation is the same – it is the assignment 
of an item to a category.  
 
So far this chapter has compared legal speaking and interpretation with ordinary speaking and 
interpretation. There are two reasons why such a comparison is useful. First, since the process of 
ordinary interpretation is fundamentally similar to legal interpretation, viewing legal interpretation 
                                               
350  As has been mentioned, the judicial assignment of items to the legal category designated by a word becomes part of 
the act of legal speaking in relation to subsequent interpretations of that word. Therefore, such items would be part 
of the legal speaker’s referent in Diagram 4.8. 
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in terms of ordinary interpretation makes it clear what legal interpretation involves. Second, there 
are fallacies that can be committed in legal interpretation which are similar to the fallacies that can 
be committed in ordinary interpretation. The remainder of this chapter will, therefore, focus on 
identifying fallacies in judicial interpretation on the basis of the fallacies that can be committed in 
ordinary interpretation identified in Chapter Three.  
 
C Judicial Fallacies 
 
Even though judging involves the interpretation of language, and how judges interpret language has 
far-reaching consequences, judges are not required to have formal training in any of the language 
disciplines.351 One consequence of this is that judges may be just as susceptible to language 
fallacies as the general public. 
 
Judicial interpretation often involves the assignment of items to legal categories. In Chapter Three it 
was noted that there is no natural or necessary connection between words and their meanings. For 
this reason, words do not necessarily have specific meanings associated with them. Similarly, there 
is no necessary connection between the word by which an item can be described and the legal 
category to which it should be assigned. Rather, items should be assigned to legal categories on the 
basis of relevant legal considerations. Judges can commit fallacies when they assume that the word 
by which a certain item can be described determines the legal category to which it should be 
assigned.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a way to detect fallacies in judicial interpretation. The 
remainder of this chapter will identify some specific fallacies that judges can commit and provide a 
method by which these fallacies can be detected and by which alternative, non-fallacious 
interpretations can be reached. These legal interpretation fallacies will be referred to as ‘judicial 
fallacies’.  
 
 
                                               
351 Steven Wisotsky noted: “Judges are not linguists or grammarians, although they are of necessity arbiters of 
language” “How to interpret statutes - or not: the phantom of plain meaning” (2009) 83 Florida Bar Journal 43 at 44. 
As the interpretation section of this thesis has shown, however, judges should not make interpretive decisions 
merely on the basis of linguistic meaning. Therefore, training in the language disciplines by itself would not be 
sufficient as a qualification for a judge. 
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1 Definition of a judicial fallacy 
 
It is important to define for the purposes of this thesis what makes an instance of judicial 
interpretation fallacious. This chapter has shown that judicial interpretation often involves the 
assignment of items to legal categories based on various relevant legal considerations. An instance 
of judicial interpretation is justified when the judge takes into account these relevant legal 
considerations. These relevant legal considerations are considerations related to the specific act of 
legal categorisation at issue. They are reasons for this act of categorisation. If a certain 
consideration does not relate to the specific act of categorisation at issue, judges should not take it 
into account. Such considerations will be referred to as ‘irrelevant considerations’.352 
 
Chapter Three discussed how speakers can mislead interpreters. In such a situation, an interpreter 
may reach a different meaning from a speaker, but this would not be a fallacious interpretation. That 
chapter also discussed situations in which speakers did not deliberately mislead interpreters, but an 
interpretation which reached a different meaning from the speaker was not fallacious because it was 
reasonable given the information available to the interpreter.  
 
Judges are responsible for reaching decisions that take into account the relevant legal considerations 
that are available to them. Even if a speaker uses language in a misleading way, the judge is 
required to look beyond the language used to the legal issue. Therefore, the fact that a judicial 
decision seems reasonable based on the apparent meaning of the language being interpreted may not 
necessarily mean the decision is not fallacious. In some situations, however, a speaker may 
deliberately hide certain facts, and a judge may not be aware of this. An instance of judicial 
interpretation which omitted these facts would not be fallacious because the judge could not be 
expected to know he or she needed to take them into account. Such concealed facts should not be 
viewed as ‘relevant legal considerations’ and judges cannot be expected to take them into account. 
This sort of situation corresponds to speaker’s misleading interpreters in ordinary interpretation.  
 
An instance of judicial interpretation is fallacious in two situations: first, when it takes into account 
an irrelevant consideration and it is most likely that a different result would have been reached if 
that consideration had been omitted; second, when it omits a relevant legal consideration and it is 
                                               
352  These irrelevant considerations have not been called ‘irrelevant legal considerations’, because they may not be 
related to the legal issue at all, but may merely relate to the meaning a word can have in the abstract. Sometimes, 
however, these irrelevant considerations are misapplied legal considerations. 
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most likely that a different result would have been reached if that consideration had been taken into 
account. Fallacious interpretations may involve the introduction of more than one irrelevant 
consideration or the omission of more than one relevant consideration. Furthermore, fallacies often 
involve both the introduction of irrelevant considerations and the omission of relevant legal 
considerations.  
 
This definition of fallacious interpretation has referred to a ‘different result’ rather than a ‘different 
meaning’ because this chapter is viewing judicial interpretation which involves categorisation as the 
assignment of items to categories, not as the discovery of meaning. This assignment results in an 
item either being included within a legal category or excluded from the legal category. Thus, to say 
a different result would have been reached means that the item before the court would have been 
categorised in a different way. The fact that a different result would have been reached, however, 
means that a different meaning would have been given to the word being interpreted.  
 
The consequence of such a fallacious interpretation is that items are either unjustifiably included in 
or unjustifiably excluded from a legal category. Therefore, a judicial fallacy results in a wrong 
categorisation. For this reason, it can be said that a judicial fallacy reaches the wrong result.353 The 
result is wrong because if any irrelevant considerations had been omitted and the relevant 
considerations had been introduced, it is most likely that a different result would have been reached.  
 
The mere fact that a certain irrelevant consideration has been introduced in an interpretive decision 
does not make that decision fallacious. If this consideration was not determinative, it may not affect 
the decision regarding whether to assign the item at issue to the legal category. Although an instance 
of interpretation is unjustified to the extent that it is based on an irrelevant consideration, if this 
irrelevant consideration does not affect the categorisation of the item at issue, it is not fallacious. 
Furthermore, the mere fact that judges omit a certain relevant considerations does not make an 
interpretive decision fallacious. Judges cannot be expected to take into account every possible 
relevant consideration when interpreting language. A decision is only fallacious when it is most 
likely that a different result would have been reached if that relevant consideration had been 
introduced. 
 
                                               
353  The use of the word ‘wrong’ here should not be understood to mean that the court did not have the power to make 
this decision or that the decision does not have any legal standing. See the paragraph accompanying n 47 and the 
two following paragraphs.  
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It is impossible to say definitively that an interpretive decision would have been made differently if 
a certain prima facie relevant consideration had been introduced because judges have the discretion 
to either introduce such a consideration and decide that it is irrelevant for this act of interpretation, 
or to decide that it is relevant, but is not important enough to change the result of this act of 
interpretation. It is possible, however, to say that it is most likely that the introduction of a certain 
relevant consideration would change the result of an act of interpretation. Similarly, it is impossible 
to say definitively that an interpretive decision would have been made differently if a certain 
irrelevant consideration had been omitted, because judges have the discretion to reach any result 
and may have reached the same result without introducing this irrelevant consideration. It can be 
said, however, that that it is most likely that the omission of a certain irrelevant consideration would 
change the result of an act of interpretation. Therefore, it can be said that a certain interpretive 
decision is fallacious given the fact that it is most likely that a different decision would have been 
reached if any irrelevant considerations had been omitted and any relevant considerations had been 
introduced.  
 
2 Verbal categories and legal categories 
 
Viewed in relation to categorisation, the two fallacies identified in Chapter Three were ‘same 
category, therefore, same item’, and ‘different category, therefore, different item’. In legal 
interpretation which involves categorisation, judges are focused on whether to assign a specific item 
to a legal category rather than merely discovering the item that a speaker has assigned to a 
category.354 This difference in focus means that the fallacies in judicial interpretation need to be 
viewed in a different way from the fallacies in ordinary interpretation, even when both are viewed 
in relation to categorisation.  
 
Words are usually the names of categories. For instance, the word ‘vehicle’ is the name of a 
category of items which includes all vehicles. Describing an item by a word involves assigning it to 
the category designated by that word. To call a certain item a vehicle is to assign it to the category 
‘vehicle’. In this chapter, it will be useful to use the term ‘verbal category’ to refer to the word that 
has been used to describe an item. Therefore, to describe an item by a word is to assign it to the 
                                               
354  Legal interpretation may involve the discovery of the item that a legal speaker has assigned to a category, but it does 
not always involve this, and even if it does, the legal speaker’s assignment is not determinative. Furthermore, even 
in situations where legal interpretation involves the discovery of an item that a legal speaker has assigned to a legal 
category, it is still useful to view this act of interpretation as a decision regarding whether a certain item should be 
assigned to a category. See the paragraph accompanying n 500. 
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verbal category designated by that word. To call an item a vehicle is to assign it to the verbal 
category ‘vehicle’.  
 
The goal of legal interpretation is to assign items to the correct legal category. This legal category 
has been designated by a certain word. For instance, the word ‘vehicle’ was used to designate the 
legal category in Garner v Burr.355 This means that the legal category has been designated by a 
certain verbal category.356 For instance, in Garner v Burr the legal category at issue was designated 
by the verbal category ‘vehicle’.  
 
An item may not normally be within a certain verbal category according to common usage, but may 
be the kind of item that should be within a legal category which is designated by that verbal 
category. For instance, an item may not be commonly called a ‘vehicle’, but may be the kind of 
item which should be within the legal category designated by the word ‘vehicle’ in a certain statute. 
Similarly, an item may be within a certain verbal category according to common usage, but may not 
be the kind of item that should be within a legal category which has been designated by that verbal 
category. For instance, an item may be commonly called a ‘vehicle’, but may not be the kind of 
item which should be within a legal category designated by the word ‘vehicle’ in a certain statute. 
Therefore, an important basic principle is that the legal category to which an item should be 
assigned is not necessarily determined by the verbal category to which it can be assigned. Rather, 
the legal category to which an item should be assigned should be determined by relevant legal 
considerations.  
 
Because this chapter is viewing judicial interpretation as categorisation, the discussion of the 
fallacies in this chapter will be in terms of verbal categories and legal categories. When interpreting, 
judges often have to decide whether a certain situation should be within the scope of the word being 
interpreted. They can be distracted by the fact that this situation can be described by this word in 
common usage. Viewed in relation to categorisation, when interpreting, judges often have to decide 
whether a certain item should be assigned to a certain legal category. They can be distracted by the 
fact that this item can be assigned to the verbal category that has been used to designate this legal 
category.  
 
                                               
355  Above n 269. 
356  This verbal category may be a single word or may be a phrase. It is the language that has been used to designate the 
legal category, that is, language that is being interpreted by the court. 
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The following sections of this chapter will discuss two specific judicial fallacies. The first fallacy is 
caused by the assumption that because an item can be put within the verbal category which has 
been used to designate the legal category, it should be put within this legal category. The second 
fallacy is caused by the assumption that because an item can be put within a different verbal 
category from the verbal category which has been used to designate the legal category, it should be 
put outside this legal category.  
 
These assumptions can result in judicial fallacies. The verbal category to which an item can be 
assigned may be an irrelevant consideration in relation to the specific act of categorisation before 
the court. If the introduction of this irrelevant consideration results in an interpretive decision being 
reached that would most likely not have been reached if this consideration had not been introduced, 
the interpretation is fallacious. Furthermore, the introduction of such an irrelevant consideration 
often results in the neglect of relevant considerations. Therefore, a fallacy caused by these 
assumptions always involves the introduction of at least one irrelevant consideration (the verbal 
category to which an item can be assigned) and usually also involves in the neglect of relevant 
considerations. Such a fallacy can be viewed as an instance of the general judicial fallacy defined in 
the previous section of this chapter.  
 
The first fallacy discussed in this chapter involves the assumption ‘same verbal category, therefore, 
within legal category’. This can be called the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy. The second fallacy 
discussed in this chapter involves the assumption ‘different verbal category, therefore, outside legal 
category’. This can be called the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy.357  
 
These two fallacies correspond to the ‘same category’ fallacy and the ‘different category’ fallacy 
identified in Chapter Three. They have been described differently from these ordinary language 
fallacies, however, because legal interpretation that involves categorisation focuses on assigning an 
item to a legal category rather than discovering the item which has been assigned to a category. If 
the goal of an interpreter is to discover an item, a categorisation fallacy is caused by the assumption 
‘same category, therefore, same item’. If the goal of an interpreter is to assign an item to the correct 
legal category, a categorisation fallacy is caused by the assumption ‘same verbal category, 
therefore, within legal category’. Therefore, the focus of legal interpretation means that judicial 
fallacies need to be described differently from the ordinary language fallacies identified in Chapter 
                                               
357  When these fallacies are named, single quotation marks are used around the words ‘same verbal category’ and 
‘different verbal category’ because this is clearer when this name appears in a sentence. 
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Three, although they both involve the same basic categorisation error.358  
 
The following two sections of this chapter will discuss these two interpretation fallacies. In order to 
explain the nature of these fallacies clearly, these sections will each primarily focus on one instance 
of judicial interpretation and will go into some detail to demonstrate why the interpretations were 
fallacious. These decisions have been chosen because they provide clear, prototypical examples of 
fallacies. A detailed discussion of these decisions, therefore, shows clearly what these fallacies 
involve and how they can be detected.  
 
3 Same verbal category, therefore, within legal category 
 
In ordinary interpretation, the task of interpreters is to correctly ascertain a speaker’s meaning. In 
legal interpretation that involves categorisation, the task of interpreters is to assign the item at issue 
to the correct legal category. In both situations, interpretation is objective. This means that both 
kinds of interpretation need to be based on objective relevant considerations. 
 
The first interpretation fallacy in Chapter Three was the ‘same word’ fallacy. This fallacy involves 
the interpreter making an assumption that because a speaker uses a word that the interpreter 
associates with a certain meaning, the speaker is expressing that meaning. The goal of an 
interpreter, however, should be to ascertain a speaker’s meaning based on relevant considerations. 
This assumption causes interpreters to overlook the relevant considerations that indicate the 
speaker’s meaning.  
 
A corresponding judicial fallacy involves the assumption: ‘same verbal category, therefore, within 
legal category’. It involves a judge making an assumption that because the item under consideration 
can be assigned to a certain verbal category, it should be included within a legal category which has 
been designated by the same verbal category. The goal of judicial interpretation which involves 
categorisation, however, is to assign items to legal categories based on relevant legal considerations. 
This assumption causes the judge to overlook these relevant legal considerations.  
 
The fact that an item can be assigned to the verbal category that has been used to designate the legal 
                                               
358  The fact that these judicial fallacies and the ordinary language fallacies discussed in Chapter Three both involve the 
same categorisation error is shown in Chapter Four C.6. 
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category does not mean that it should necessarily be included within this legal category. Whether or 
not an item should be assigned to a legal category depends on relevant legal considerations, not 
merely the verbal category to which it can be assigned. 
 
The area in which the courts engage in interpretation the most is statutory interpretation.359 This 
section will analyse an American decision interpreting a provision of the United States Code dealing 
with the involvement of firearms in a drug trafficking offence. This section will do four things. 
First, it will introduce this decision and discuss the act of interpretation that occurred, that is, the act 
of categorisation that occurred, and will compare this decision to an analogous decision. Second, it 
will discuss whether this act of interpretation reached the correct linguistic meaning of the word 
being interpreted. Third, it will elicit various relevant legal considerations related to this act of 
categorisation and will also determine whether the considerations that the Court introduced were 
relevant. Fourth, it will determine whether the instance of judicial interpretation in this decision was 
fallacious.  
 
The United States Supreme Court decision Smith v United States360 concerned the interpretation of 
18 USC § 924(c)(1), which referred to “any person who, during and in relation to any … drug 
trafficking crime … uses or carries a firearm”. The defendant361 attempted to trade a MAC-10 
firearm for two ounces of cocaine and was charged with two drug trafficking offences.362 
Importantly, “the indictment alleged that the [defendant] knowingly used the MAC-10 and its 
silencer in relation to a drug trafficking crime.”363 Under § 924(c)(1), a person who uses a firearm is 
subject to a mandatory prison sentence of five years,364 and, if, as in this situation, the firearm is a 
“machinegun … or is equipped with a firearm silencer”,365 the mandatory prison term is 30 years.366 
 
                                               
359 “[P]robably as many as nine out of ten cases heard on appeal by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords turn 
upon or involve the meaning of words contained in statutes or secondary legislation.” Zander, above n 241, at 128; 
“The vast majority of cases decided in [New Zealand] courts involve the application of statutes.” Burrows and 
Carter, above n 334, at v. 
360 Smith v United States (1993) 113 SCt 2050 [Smith]. 
361 The decision refers to the defendant as ‘the petitioner’. For convenience, this discussion will use the term 
‘defendant’. 
362 Smith, above n 360, at 2053. 
363 Ibid. 
364 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
365 The MAC-10, a machine pistol, came within the definition of ‘machinegun’ in this Statute (26 USC § 5845(b)), 
especially since it “had been modified to operate as an automatic” (Smith, above n 360, at 2052). 
366 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
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The issue for the Court367 was whether the defendant’s actions constituted use of a firearm within 
the meaning of this provision.368 Therefore, the case involved the interpretation of the word ‘use’. 
Viewing this interpretive decision in relation to categorisation, the issue was whether the item 
before the Court (the defendant’s actions) should be assigned to the legal category designated by the 
word ‘use’ in this provision.  
 
Justice O’Connor, delivering the majority opinion, stated: “When a word is not defined by statute, 
we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”369 She consulted 
definitions of ‘use’ in Webster’s New International Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary and 
concluded that the defendant’s actions fell “squarely” within those definitions.370 She stated that the 
defendant’s actions:371 
 
can be described as ‘use’ within the everyday meaning of that term. [The defendant] ‘used’ his MAC-10 
in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering to trade it for cocaine. 
 
She concluded that “using a firearm in a guns-for-drugs trade may constitute ‘us[ing] a firearm’ 
with the meaning of § 924(c)(1).”372 Furthermore, she held that there was no need to precisely 
determine the meaning of the phrase ‘in relation to’ because the defendant’s use of the gun “meets 
any reasonable construction” of this phrase.373 Therefore, the defendant’s actions were held to be 
within the meaning of this provision, that is, the item at issue was held to be within this legal 
category,374 and the defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum 30-year sentence.375  
 
In her decision, Justice O’Connor approvingly quoted a Court of Appeals decision376 discussing this 
provision in relation to the trading of guns:377  
 
It may well be that Congress, when it drafted the language of [§] 924(c), had in mind a more obvious use 
                                               
367  In this thesis, the word ‘court’ is capitalised when it is referring to a specific court. Therefore, in the discussion of 
interpretation fallacies, this word is often deliberately capitalised. 
368 Smith, above n 360, at 2052.  
369 Ibid, at 2054.  
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid.  
372 Ibid, at 2058. 
373 Ibid, at 2059. 
374  The legal category can either be viewed as being designated by the verbal category ‘use’ or by the verbal category 
‘uses a firearm’. As long as the verbal context is borne in mind, it is convenient to view the legal category as being 
designated by the verbal category ‘use’. 
375  Smith, above n 360, at 2060. 
376 United States v Harris (1992) 294 US AppDC 300 (SC).  
377 Smith, above n 360, at 2059 (insertions in original). 
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of guns in connection with a drug crime, but the language [of the statute] is not so limited [;] nor can we 
imagine any reason why Congress would not have wished its language to cover this situation. 
 
The basic reason for Justice O’Connor’s interpretation was that the defendant’s actions could fit 
within the meaning of the word ‘use’. This instance of interpretation, therefore, involved the 
assumption that because the item before the Court (the defendant’s actions) could be assigned to the 
verbal category which was used to designate the legal category (that is, the verbal category ‘use’), 
this item should be within this legal category. Whether or not the defendant’s actions should be 
within this legal category, however, should be determined by the relevant legal considerations, and 
not merely the verbal category to which they could be assigned. Justice O’Connor could not 
imagine any reason why the legislature would not have wished this item to be within this legal 
category. To determine whether there are any reasons why this item should not be within this 
category, it is necessary to take into account the legal considerations relevant to this act of 
categorisation. Once these legal considerations are clear, it will be possible to determine whether 
Justice O’Connor’s interpretation was fallacious.  
 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated: “To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it 
for its intended purpose”378 and “to speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to speak of using it for its 
distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.”379 He stated that the majority “does not appear to grasp the 
distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”380 He concluded that the 
provision should not apply to the trading of a gun. Therefore, on his decision, the item (the 
defendant’s actions) should have been outside this legal category.  
 
Before critiquing this decision, it is useful to compare it to an analogous decision, Muscarello v 
United States,381 where the same provision was being interpreted (18 USC § 924(c)(1)) but the 
word at issue was ‘carries’. The defendant, Frank Muscarello,382 had a firearm locked in the glove 
compartment of a truck which he used to drive to a location where he was selling drugs.383 The 
issue in this decision was whether he ‘carried’ the firearm or, more specifically, as stated by the 
Court, “whether the phrase ‘carries a firearm’ is limited to the carrying of firearms on the 
                                               
378 Ibid, at 2061. 
379 Ibid (italics in original). 
380 Ibid (italics in original). 
381 Muscarello v United States (1998) 118 SCt 1911 [Muscarello].  
382 There were three defendants, but for simplicity this analysis will just focus on Frank Muscarello. The other 
defendants had guns in the trunk of their car.  
383  Muscarello, above n 381, at 1914. 
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person.”384 Viewing this interpretive decision in relation to categorisation, the issue was whether the 
item before the Court (the defendant’s actions) should be assigned to the legal category designated 
by the word ‘carries’ in this provision. 
 
Delivering the majority decision, Justice Breyer consulted the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary and Random House Dictionary of the English Language to 
ascertain the primary meaning of the word ‘carry’.385 He also considered the etymological origin of 
the word,386 and considered examples of how the word had been used in literature and 
newspapers.387 He stated that: “The relevant linguistic facts are that the word ‘carry’ in its ordinary 
sense includes carrying in a car”388 and that “neither the statute’s basic purpose nor its legislative 
history support circumscribing the scope of the word ‘carry’ by applying an ‘on the person’ 
limitation.”389 Therefore, the defendant’s actions were held to be within the scope of the phrase 
‘carries a firearm’,390 that is, within the legal category designated by this phrase,391 and he was 
convicted of this offence.  
 
In a perceptive dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg concluded that ‘carries a firearm’ indicates “not 
merely keeping arms on one’s premises or in one’s vehicle, but bearing them in such manner as to 
be ready for use as a weapon.”392 She focused not on the meaning of ‘carries’ but on the meaning of 
‘carries a firearm’ and conducted a computer search of newspapers using this phrase.393 She also 
looked at the definition of the phrase in Black’s Law Dictionary.394  
 
More importantly, in coming to her conclusion, Justice Ginsburg took into account what was at 
stake for the defendant. She took into account the fact that the majority’s interpretation would result 
in a five-year minimum prison term.395 She noted that if there had not been any gun present during 
the criminal activity, the sentencing range for the offence under the United States Sentencing 
                                               
384 Ibid, at 1913. 
385 Ibid, at 1914. 
386 Ibid. He consulted the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology and the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. 
387 Ibid, at 1914-1915. 
388 Ibid, at 1916. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid, at 1919-1920. 
391  This legal category can either be viewed as being designated by the verbal category ‘carries’ or by the verbal 
category ‘carries a firearm’.  
392 Muscarello, above n 381, at 1920. 
393 Ibid, at 1921. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid, at 1920-1921. 
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Commission Guidelines Manual would have been between six to twelve months.396 The fact that a 
firearm was ‘possessed’ during the offence would have increased this range to between ten to 
sixteen months.397 Furthermore, she stated that “it is not apparent why possession of a gun in a drug 
dealer’s moving vehicle would be thought more dangerous than gun possession on premises where 
drugs are sold.”398 She concluded that the defendant should not be convicted under this provision. 
Therefore, on her decision, the item (the defendant’s actions) was excluded from this legal category. 
 
For simplicity, this analysis will focus on Smith,399 but many of the points discussed will also apply 
to Muscarello. This analysis will elicit a number of important legal considerations relevant to the act 
of interpretation in Smith. Some of these considerations relate to the specific provision being 
interpreted, others to criminal law, and others relate to the law generally. They are all legal 
considerations relevant to this act of legal categorisation. This discussion will also consider the 
considerations that were taken into account by the Court400 in Smith and determine whether they 
were relevant.  
 
The relevant legal considerations can be viewed as indicators of legislative intention. Legislative 
intention is really a fiction, and is a way of referring to the reasons for the law and the goals of the 
law in statutory interpretation. Viewed in relation to categorisation, it is a way of referring to the 
reasons for the legal category and the goals of the category. It is convenient to view some of the 
relevant legal considerations as indicators of legislative intention.401 For this reason, this analysis 
will sometimes view these considerations as indicators of legislative intention, but it will primarily 
view them in relation to categorisation.  
 
In statutory interpretation, an important consideration is the meaning of the words being 
                                               
396 Ibid, at 1920 
397 Ibid, at 1921. 
398 Ibid, at 1922. 
399 In Watson v United States (2007) 552 US 74 (SC) the United States Supreme Court in a unanimous decision 
interpreting the same provision (18 USC § 924(c)(1)) held that a transaction going the other way, that is, the trading 
of drugs for a firearm, did not constitute ‘using’ a firearm. The Court did not, however, overrule Smith. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would overrule Smith to “render our precedent both coherent 
and consistent with normal usage.” (at 84).  
400  In this analysis, the word ‘Court’ will be used to refer to the majority decision in Smith. 
401  Writing extra-judicially, Lord Hoffmann stated that in relation to the interpretation of legislation or a Constitution 
“there is obviously no question of ascertaining the meaning of a real person. Instead, the court is concerned with 
what it calls the intention of Parliament or the framers of the Constitution. These are legal constructs … but they are 
none the less useful shorthand to identify the imaginary speaker whose utterances the courts are concerned to 
interpret.” Hoffmann, above n 338, at 663.  
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interpreted.402 This meaning is important because the words have been specifically chosen to 
designate the legal category and, therefore, their correct linguistic meaning often indicates the 
reason for this category. In Smith, the Court primarily focused on the meaning of the words being 
interpreted. This determination of meaning, however, was influenced by certain legal 
considerations. The most notable legal consideration the Court focused on in Smith was that words 
should be given their “ordinary or natural meaning”.403 One reason for this legal consideration is 
that the legislature uses words with their ordinary meaning, therefore ascertaining the ordinary 
meaning of the words being interpreted shows the intention of the legislature. Therefore, it shows 
the reason for the legal category.404 Another reason for this consideration is that the public are 
regulated by statutes, so statutory words should be given a meaning with which the public are 
familiar.405 This is a consideration in relation to a goal of the law generally: to be intelligible to the 
public.406  
 
The provision being interpreted was “any person who, during and in relation to any … drug 
trafficking crime … uses or carries a firearm”.407 The Court, however, did not look at the meaning 
that should be given to ‘use’ in this context, that is, the meaning the word did have, but the ordinary 
meaning of ‘use’, the meaning the word can have.408 The meaning a word can have is the thought 
generally associated with this word.409 This general meaning, however, does not conclusively 
determine the meaning of the word in a specific context. The fact that the defendant’s behaviour can 
fit within an ordinary meaning of the word ‘use’ does not mean that it necessarily fits within the 
meaning of the word in this specific instance.  
 
The dissent’s approach to meaning seems more correct. Justice Scalia drew a distinction between 
                                               
402  This corresponds to consideration 1.1 in Chart 4.1. 
403 Smith, above n 360, at 2054. 
404 This corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. Because the ordinary meaning of the words being interpreted 
shows the reason for the legal category, a consideration of this meaning can either be viewed as corresponding to 
consideration 1.1 in Chart 4.1 or as corresponding to consideration 2.1.  
405  These two reasons were explained clearly by J F Burrows: “[I]n many cases, decisions are made simply on the basis 
of ‘ordinary meaning’, ‘primary meaning’, ‘dictionary meaning’ … It is important that this should be so, for people 
should be entitled to rely on what they regard as an indisputably obvious meaning. Moreover, any other view would 
make nonsense of the careful use of words by drafters, and would render difficult any sensible theory of 
communication.” Burrows, above n 334, at 293.  
406  This corresponds to consideration 4.3 in Chart 4.1. Therefore, another reason that consideration 1.1 is relevant in 
this instance is that it accords with this goal of the law. Compare n 404. 
407 18 USC § 924(c)(1). 
408 Justice O’Connor stated that defendant’s “treatment of his MAC-10 can be described as ‘use’ within the everyday 
meaning of that term.” (Smith, above n 360, at 2054 (emphasis added)). 
409  See the paragraph accompanying n 135. 
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“how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”410 At issue, however, is not the ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘use’, but the meaning in this specific instance. The fact that the word ‘use’ 
can mean to use as an item of barter should not be conclusive. Even if it could be proven that this 
word is ordinarily used with this meaning, this should still not settle the issue. Any considerations 
related to the meaning of the word which do not help to indicate the meaning the word has in this 
instance of use are irrelevant considerations.  
 
Justice Scalia noted that to use something ordinarily means “to use it for its intended purpose.”411 
Regardless of whether it ‘ordinarily’ means this, given the context of criminal activity and the 
requirement that the use be ‘in relation to’ this activity, it is likely that ‘use’ in this provision means 
to use as a weapon. Furthermore, the word ‘use’ should be considered in relation to the word 
‘carry’. Because the using and carrying are of a firearm, when these words are used together, ‘carry’ 
would seem to indicate to have on one’s person ready to use as a weapon, whereas ‘use’ would 
seem to indicate to use as a weapon, which would include brandishing, pistol whipping, or 
discharging. The phrase ‘uses or carries’, therefore, captures people who merely have a firearm with 
them, but do not use it, and those who both have it at hand and use it. Justice Scalia concluded that 
‘use’ refers to use as a weapon and ‘carry’ refers to having ready for use as a weapon.412 It is most 
likely that this is the correct linguistic meaning of these words in this context. 
 
Therefore, it is most likely that the correct linguistic meaning of the word ‘use’ in this context is use 
as a weapon, and not merely use as an item of trade. It is most probably incorrect on a purely 
linguistic basis to conclude that ‘use’ in this context should include using as an item of 
commerce.413 As has been mentioned, the correct linguistic meaning of the word being interpreted 
is a relevant legal consideration for two reasons: it shows the reason for the legal category and it 
accords with the general legal principle that statutes should be intelligible to the public.414 
Therefore, the Court should have taken into account the relevant legal consideration of the correct 
linguistic meaning of the word ‘use’ in this context. The meaning the word ‘use’ can have is an 
irrelevant consideration if it does not show the meaning the word does have. The result of the 
Court’s approach to meaning was that a meaning was given to the word ‘use’ that was most 
                                               
410 Smith, above n 360, at 2061 (italics in original). 
411 Ibid, at 2061. 
412 Ibid, at 2063. 
413  For an analysis of the approaches to linguistic meaning in both Smith and Muscarello, see Solan, above n 26, at 258-
259. 
414  Therefore, as mentioned in n 404 and n 406, a consideration in relation to ordinary meaning can either be viewed as 
corresponding to consideration 1.1 in Chart 4.1 or as corresponding to considerations 2.1 and 4.3.  
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probably neither the meaning the legislature would have intended nor the meaning that the public 
would have expected. Thus, the way the legal consideration of giving words their ordinary meaning 
was applied had the opposite of its intended effect. 
 
The Court had to decide whether the defendant’s actions fitted within this provision. This is to 
decide whether this item should be assigned to this legal category. In relation to this act of 
categorisation, a relevant consideration is the linguistic meaning of the word being interpreted. The 
meaning the word being interpreted can have is only relevant to this decision if indicates the 
meaning the word does have. In this instance, the meaning that the Court decided the word ‘use’ 
could have was not relevant to the meaning it did have. Thus, the relevant legal consideration that 
words should be given their ordinary meaning was misapplied and this caused the Court to 
introduce an irrelevant consideration. This shows clearly how legal considerations that a court 
introduces should be related to the specific act of categorisation at issue. If they are not related to 
this act of categorisation, they can be misapplied and this can result in the introduction of irrelevant 
considerations.  
 
Judicial interpretation, however, involves more than merely ascertaining the correct linguistic 
meaning of the words being interpreted. Even if the majority could be convinced that they gave an 
incorrect meaning to the word being interpreted, this fact by itself would not be sufficient to prove 
that the interpretive decision was wrong. The interpretation section of this chapter has shown that 
there are situations in which it is legally justifiable for judges to give unnatural meanings to words. 
To limit judicial discretion to assigning the correct linguistic meaning to words would defeat the 
whole purpose of having judges interpret language. If linguistic meaning is all that is at issue in 
legal decision-making, judges could be replaced by linguists or lexicographers.415 The issue, 
therefore, is not merely whether the Court arrived at the correct linguistic meaning of the word 
being interpreted, but whether the interpretation was justified by relevant legal considerations. This 
will determine whether the item at issue was assigned to the correct legal category. The correct 
linguistic meaning of the word is only one relevant legal consideration related to this act of 
categorisation. It is therefore necessary to elicit other legal considerations relevant to this act of 
categorisation. 
 
A rule in statutory interpretation is that words should be given a consistent meaning within a 
                                               
415  For an article addressing the issue of “why linguistics should have anything to offer those who would interpret legal 
texts” (at 1047), see Robert K Rasmussen “Why Linguistics” (1995) 73 Wash U L Q 1047.  
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statute.416 The reason for this rule is that the legislature uses words with consistent meanings 
throughout a statute. The Court in Smith noted that elsewhere in the statute the word ‘use’ referred 
to use of a firearm as an item of barter.417 Justice Scalia correctly dismissed this argument by noting 
that the word ‘use’ is not a technical term or a legal term, but a common word that is “inordinately 
sensitive to context.”418 With a word like ‘use’, it is erroneous to assume that because it includes 
bartering in one provision, it must have that meaning in all other provisions in the same statute. The 
aim of this rule of interpretation is to help judges discover the legislature’s intention in using words. 
The way it was applied in this case, however, resulted in a frustration of that intention. This rule 
should not have been applied rigidly, but should only have been applied if it was relevant to this 
specific legal category. If this rule had been considered in the light of this specific act of legal 
categorisation, it would have been very clear that this rule was inapplicable in this instance of 
interpretation. 
 
A rule of statutory interpretation in relation to criminal law is the rule of lenity. This is the rule that 
ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted in favour of defendants.419 The reason for this 
rule was given in a statement quoted by Justice Ginsburg in Muscarello:420  
 
[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents 
the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. 
This policy embodies the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has 
clearly said they should. 
 
Justice O’Connor in Smith stated that the “mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction 
… does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable.”421 She held that the provision was not 
sufficiently ambiguous for the rule to apply.  
 
The rule of lenity is a relevant legal consideration because it is a general legal rule related to this 
kind of categorisation (categorisation in criminal law). The fact that a dissenting opinion was filed 
(with which two other judges joined) holding that the word had a different meaning from the 
                                               
416 A United States Supreme Court authority on this point is Texas Department of Transportation v Needham (2002) 82 
SW3d 314 (SC): “Statutory terms should be interpreted consistently in every part of an act.” (at 318). This 
corresponds to consideration 4.1 in Chart 4.1. 
417 Smith, above n 360, at 2057. 
418 Ibid, at 2062. 
419 Ibid, at 2063. This corresponds to consideration 4.1 in Chart 4.1.  
420 Muscarello, above n 381, at 1925. Justice Ginsburg is quoting from United States v Bass (1971) 404 UC 336 (SC) at 
348. 
421 Smith, above n 360, at 2059. 
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meaning at which the Court arrived should have been an indication that there was sufficient 
ambiguity for this rule to apply. Furthermore, whether or not a rule is applicable should be 
determined by the reason for the rule. Since the reason for this rule is distaste against people 
languishing in prison, the length of the prison sentence (a 30-year mandatory prison term) should be 
a relevant factor in applying this rule. Therefore, this rule should have been applicable in this 
decision. 
 
It can be seen in an even clearer way that this rule should have been applicable when this decision is 
viewed in relation to categorisation. A decision regarding whether the rule of lenity was applicable 
in this instance of interpretation should have been made in light of this specific act of 
categorisation. This means that the consequence of this act of categorisation (the length of the 
prison sentence) is relevant to the decision regarding whether this rule is applicable. Taking this 
consequence into account, it is clear that this rule should have been applicable and the word ‘use’ 
should have been held to be ambiguous and this ambiguity should have been resolved in the 
defendant’s favour. Therefore, the rule of lenity was a relevant legal consideration that was 
misapplied in this decision because it was not applied in light of the act of categorisation at issue.  
 
An important legal consideration is the purpose of the provision under consideration.422 This 
purpose shows the reason the category was established. In relation to the purpose of this provision, 
the Court in Smith noted that “drugs and guns are a dangerous combination.”423 The problem with 
describing the purpose of the provision at this level of generality is that it covers any situation 
where a weapon is present in a drug crime. The provision, however, refers to when firearms are 
used in relation to a drug crime. The provision is aimed at situations in which the use of a firearm is 
a factor in the crime,424 not merely at the general combination of drugs and guns. The Court also 
noted that “an item of commerce … can be converted instantaneously from currency to cannon.”425 
Although this is true, again this is not what this provision is aimed at. It is aimed at situations where 
the gun is actually used, not merely where there is a potential for it to be used. If the legislature 
merely intended to catch any situation where drugs and guns were combined, where a weapon was 
                                               
422  This corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
423 Smith, above n 360, at 2060. 
424 This corresponds to consideration 3.1 in Chart 4.1. 
425 Smith, above n 360, at 2060. 
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present in a drug crime, a better word would have been ‘possessed’.426 If the meaning of the word 
‘use’ in this provision is to be extended to cover trading, there needs to be a strong legal 
justification based on the specific purpose of this provision. The purpose of a provision considered 
at a high level of generality is an irrelevant consideration. It is not the specific purpose behind this 
category. Therefore, the legal consideration of the purpose of the provision was misapplied because 
it was not viewed in relation to this specific category. This misapplication resulted in the 
introduction of an irrelevant consideration. The specific purpose of the provision is shown by the 
correct linguistic meaning of the word. This specific purpose is to catch situations in which a gun is 
used as a weapon in a drug crime. 
 
Another relevant legal consideration is the consequence of an interpretive decision. This is the 
consequence of putting the item at issue in the legal category.427 It is useful to estimate the sentence 
the defendant in Smith would have received for his drug offences428 under the United States 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual if he had not been convicted of using a gun in the 
course of this offence under § 924(c)(1).429 Under the Guidelines, the defendant’s base offence level 
for conspiracy to possess two ounces of cocaine (57 grams) with intent to distribute would be 16.430 
A two-level enhancement for possessing a firearm brings this level up to 18,431 which would give 
him a sentence range of 27-33 months.432 This sentence could be increased based on his criminal 
history433 or reduced due to his acceptance of responsibility.434 Because the defendant was 
convicted of using a firearm in the course of his offending, he was subject to a 30-year mandatory 
minimum sentence, regardless of any previous offending or acceptance of responsibility. This 
significant discrepancy in prison time between a conviction for using a weapon during a drug crime 
                                               
426 This provision was amended in 1998 to include a reference to a person who “in furtherance of any such crime, 
possesses a firearm” (18 USC § 924(c)(1)). Although this is not relevant to the decision in Smith, it is consistent 
with the argument that the legislature was not concerned with the danger that mere possession of a firearm posed, 
but with possession in furtherance of a crime. In 2002 it was amended again and now gives a longer sentence when 
the firearm is ‘brandished’ and even longer one when it is ‘discharged’. Again, this is not relevant to the decision in 
Smith, but shows the meaning of ‘use’ in an even clearer way. Since both brandishing and discharging are to use a 
firearm as a weapon, it is likely that use which is not brandishing nor discharging would still be use as a weapon, 
perhaps using the firearm to intimidate without brandishing it.  
427  This corresponds to consideration 2.2 in Chart 4.1. 
428 He was also convicted of other offences which are not relevant to this analysis (Smith, above n 360, at 2053). 
429 Although the Sentencing Guidelines were not discussed in Smith, Justice Ginsburg discussed the sentencing of the 
defendant in Muscarello in detail (above n 381, at 1920-1921), and this calculation of the probable sentence in Smith 
is based on her discussion. 
430 United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c). 
431 Ibid, § 2D1.1(b)(1). 
432 Ibid, § 5A Sentencing Table. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid, § 3E1.1(a).  
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and a conviction for merely possessing a weapon during such a crime435 needs to be borne in mind, 
and indicates that ‘use’ refers to something much more significant than mere possession. The 
consequence of assigning the item to this category is a relevant legal consideration that the Court 
did not take into account.  
 
A related legal consideration is that if the defendant had not been convicted under § 924(c)(1), the 
fact that the defendant possessed a firearm during transaction would still be taken into account in 
his sentencing. Therefore, the defendant’s action was already captured by a different legal 
category.436 The dangerous combination of drugs and guns and the potential for an item of 
commerce to be converted into a cannon would thus be taken into account by the longer sentence 
which would be given for possessing this firearm. Indeed, these factors are most probably the 
reason for the sentence enhancement for possession of a firearm. The fact that the defendant’s 
actions were already captured by a different provision indicates that § 924(c)(1) was not intended to 
capture these actions. This fact is a relevant legal consideration that the Court omitted.  
 
A further relevant legal consideration is how the law would treat analogous situations, that is, how 
the law would treat analogous items to the item at issue.437 This legal consideration relates to the 
law generally. Since the law treats like situations alike,438 (shown, for instance, by the doctrine of 
precedent) how the law would deal with analogous situations is relevant. An analogous situation 
would be trading jewellery for drugs. Since the firearm was not used as a weapon but an item of 
barter, the only legally relevant distinction between these actions is that there was a potential for the 
firearm to be used. This distinction would be taken into account by the increased sentence for 
possessing a firearm. This distinction, however, does not justify the much harsher penalty given 
under § 924(c)(1). There needs to be a legal reason for distinguishing between these situations and 
giving a much harsher penalty when a firearm is traded. This fact that an analogous situation would 
be in a different legal category is a relevant legal consideration that the Court did not take into 
account.439  
 
An even stronger analogy, however, can be drawn. If the defendant had used the firearm as a 
weapon, he would definitely have been caught under this provision. Under Court’s decision, 
                                               
435  This corresponds to consideration 3.3 in Chart 4.1. 
436  This corresponds to consideration 2.3 in Chart 4.1. 
437  This corresponds to consideration 3.4 in Chart 4.1. 
438 For a brief discussion of this aspect of the law, see John Farrar Introduction to Legal Method (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1977) at 63-76. 
439  This corresponds to consideration 3.3 in Chart 4.1. 
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therefore, the law treats the use of a firearm as a weapon in the same way as its use as an item of 
barter. This means that these two actions are legally indistinguishable and punishable by the same 
penalty. The Court’s decision resulted in two fundamentally different actions being in the same legal 
category.440 A strong argument can be made that the legislature would have intended there to have 
been a distinction between these two actions. This is a relevant legal consideration that the Court 
did not introduce. 
 
It is now necessary to determine whether the Court’s decision in Smith was fallacious. The issue in 
Smith was whether the defendant’s actions should be within the meaning of the phrase ‘use a 
firearm’, that is, whether they should be assigned to this legal category. In order to make this 
decision the Court should have taken into account the relevant legal considerations related to this 
act of categorisation. These include considerations related to the word being interpreted, the legal 
category, items that are relevant to the category, and general legal considerations. 
 
The specific relevant legal considerations that the Court should have taken into account in Smith 
include: the correct linguistic meaning of the word ‘use’ in this context (which relates to the reason 
for this category and the general legal principle that the law should be intelligible), the specific 
purpose behind this category, the consequence of putting an item in this category, the fact that 
possession of the firearm during a drug offence was captured by another category, how the law 
would treat analogous items, the fact that fundamentally different items would be captured by this 
category, and the rule of lenity. The Court did not introduce any of these relevant legal 
considerations.441 
 
The Court should not have taken into account any considerations that were irrelevant to this act of 
categorisation. The Court focused on the fact that the defendant’s actions could be described by the 
word ‘use’. Therefore, the basic assumption behind the Court’s decision was that because the 
defendant’s action could be put in the verbal category used to designate the legal category, it should 
be put within this legal category. This consideration was irrelevant because even though it is 
possible to describe the defendant’s actions by the word ‘use’, this was not the correct linguistic 
meaning of ‘use’ in this provision. The primary irrelevant consideration that the court took into 
                                               
440  This corresponds to considerations 3.2 in Chart 4.1. 
441  In Chart 4.1 there are eleven groups of legal considerations that are potentially relevant to judicial interpretation. 
There were considerations in ten of these groups which were relevant to the decision in Smith (the only 
consideration not relevant was consideration 4.2 which is policy considerations). The Court either ignored these 
considerations or misapplied them.  
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account, therefore, was the fact that the item could be put within the verbal category ‘use’. Other 
irrelevant considerations included an inapplicable general formulation of the purpose behind the 
category and the application of a rule of interpretation (the intra-statutory consistency of meaning) 
without regard to whether it was relevant to this act of categorisation.  
 
This interpretive decision was fallacious because it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if the relevant legal considerations had been taken into account and irrelevant 
considerations had been omitted. This can be shown by the fact that the dissenting opinion, which 
omitted the main irrelevant consideration and introduced a more relevant consideration (how a word 
is ordinarily used, rather than how it can be used), reached a different result.  
 
Although the decision in Muscarello has not been analysed in detail, the relevant legal 
considerations are similar. Furthermore, the interpretive decision was based on a similar irrelevant 
consideration (how the word ‘carry’ can be used). This interpretive decision was also fallacious 
because it is most likely that a different result would have been reached if this irrelevant 
consideration had been omitted and the relevant legal considerations had been introduced. This can 
be shown by the fact that the dissention opinion, which omitted the irrelevant consideration and 
introduced a relevant consideration (the consequence of the decision), reached a different result.  
 
Alternative, non-fallacious interpretations for both Smith and Muscarello can be reached by making 
these interpretive decisions on the basis of the relevant legal considerations rather than irrelevant 
considerations. Therefore, a non-fallacious interpretation in Smith would result in the defendant’s 
actions being outside the scope of the word ‘use’, and in Muscarello it would result in the 
defendant’s actions being outside the scope of the word ‘carries’. If the Courts had arrived at these 
non-fallacious interpretations, the decisions would have achieved the desired goals of the provisions 
being interpreted and would have done so for the correct reasons. Therefore, the decisions would 
have correctly implemented the law and would have been legally justifiable decisions.  
 
This analysis has shown that it is possible to detect fallacies when judicial interpretation is viewed 
as categorisation based on relevant considerations. It has also shown that it is possible to provide 
alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when such fallacies have been committed.  
 
To conclude it is useful to briefly consider why this fallacy was committed in Smith, and how such a 
fallacy can be avoided. First, the Court in Smith focused on the meaning of the word ‘use’. This 
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focus on meaning introduced the possibility of the irrelevant consideration of the meanings this 
word can have in the abstract. Furthermore, viewing judicial interpretation as the discovery of 
meaning limited the Court’s view. Justice O’Connor could not “imagine any reason why Congress 
would not have wished its language to cover this situation”.442 These reasons are seen clearly when 
legal interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation, and not merely in relation to ascertaining 
the meaning of the word being interpreted. Even an approach to interpretation focused on legislative 
intention does not elicit all the relevant considerations as clearly as an approach based on 
categorisation.443 
 
Second, the Court’s approach was primarily focused on the word ‘use’ and the meaning it could 
have and not the defendant’s actions and whether they should fit within this legal category. This 
means the Court focused on the category and the items that should be within it, rather than the item 
at issue and whether it should be within the category. If the focus had been on how to categorise the 
defendant’s actions, it would have been clear that a possible meaning that the word ‘use’ can have in 
the abstract is not relevant to how the defendant’s actions should be categorised unless it indicates 
the meaning the word does have. Furthermore, if the focus had been on the item at issue and how it 
should be categorised, the Court would have seen that the legal considerations that were introduced 
needed to be related to this act of categorisation, and these legal considerations would not have been 
misapplied.  
 
Therefore, viewing interpretation in relation to categorisation is not only a useful way to detect 
fallacies, but also provides a way for judges to avoid them.  
 
4 Different verbal category, therefore, outside legal category 
 
The second interpretation fallacy in Chapter Three was the ‘different word’ fallacy. This fallacy 
involves the interpreter making an assumption that because a speaker does not use the word that the 
interpreter associates with a certain meaning, the speaker is not expressing that meaning. This 
assumption causes interpreters to overlook the relevant considerations which indicate the speaker’s 
meaning. 
                                               
442  See text accompanying n 337. 
443  Although considerations related to the consequence of the decision, whether the item under consideration is captured 
by a different provision, and how other items would be treated by the law can be linked to intention, they may be 
overlooked by a focus on intention. The relevance of such considerations is much clearer when the decision is 
viewed in relation to categorisation. 
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A corresponding judicial fallacy involves the assumption: ‘different verbal category, therefore, 
outside legal category’. It involves a judge making an assumption that because the item under 
consideration can be assigned to a different verbal category from the verbal category by which the 
legal category has been designated, it should be excluded from the legal category. This assumption 
causes the judge to overlook the relevant legal considerations. 
 
A judge may realise that the item at issue can be assigned to a different verbal category from the 
one used to designated the legal category. This, however, may not be sufficient for the ‘different 
verbal category’ fallacy to be committed. This fallacy often involves a judge believing that the item 
under consideration should be assigned to a different verbal category from the verbal category by 
which the legal category has been designated. This does mean that the judge always identifies a 
specific different verbal category to which the item should be assigned. The emphasis is usually on 
the fact that the item should be in a different verbal category from the one used to designate the 
legal category, and not necessarily on which different verbal category the item should be in.  
 
The fact that an item can be assigned to a different verbal category from the one which has been 
used to designate the legal category does not mean that it should necessarily be excluded from this 
legal category. Even the fact that it would normally be assigned to a different verbal category does 
not mean that it should be excluded from the legal category. Whether or not an item should be 
excluded from a legal category depends on relevant legal considerations, not merely the verbal 
category to which it can be assigned.  
 
The previous section discussed an American decision dealing with statutory interpretation. This 
section will discuss a United Kingdom decision dealing with the interpretation of a will. This 
section will do four things. First, it will introduce this decision and discuss the act of interpretation 
that occurred, that is, the act of categorisation that occurred. Second, it will discuss whether this act 
of interpretation reached the correct linguistic meaning of the words being interpreted. Third, it will 
compare this decision to an analogous decision to elicit the primary relevant legal consideration 
related to this act of categorisation and will also determine whether the considerations that the Court 
introduced were relevant. Fourth, it will determine whether the instance of judicial interpretation in 
this decision was fallacious.  
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The House of Lords’ decision National Society v Scottish National Society444 concerned the 
interpretation of a will. The testator, who had lived in Scotland his entire life,445 bequeathed £500 to 
‘the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’.446 This was the exact name of a 
London society, with which he had no known connection.447 Near his home, however, was the 
office of the Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, with whose 
activities he was familiar.448 The bequest was included in a series of bequests to Scottish 
charities.449 Furthermore, the testator’s brother had become a director of the Scottish society before 
the will was drafted.450 The Scottish Courts gave the money to the Scottish society, as this seemed 
to be the testator’s intention.451 The Law Lords, however, unanimously reversed this decision and 
the bequest went to the London society.  
 
The Court’s assignment of the bequest to the London society can be viewed as the assignment of the 
London society to the legal category created by the words ‘the National Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children’452 and the exclusion of the Scottish society from this category. The main 
reason the Law Lords refused to assign the Scottish society to this legal category was that its 
official name was slightly different from the words used to describe the legal category and the name 
of the London society was exactly the same as these words. The Scottish society could be assigned 
to a different verbal category (that is, ‘the Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children’) from the verbal category by which the legal category was designated (that is, ‘the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’). Therefore, in relation to the Scottish 
society, this decision can be viewed as involving the assumption ‘different verbal category, 
therefore, outside legal category’.453  
                                               
444 National Society v Scottish National Society [1915] AC 207 (HL) [National Society]. 
445  Ibid, at 209. 
446  Ibid, at 211. 
447  Ibid, at 209. 
448  Ibid. 
449  Ibid, at 208. 
450 It could not be proven that he was aware of this, but he was “on intimate terms” with his brother (ibid, at 209).  
451 “The Courts in Scotland [examined] the circumstances of the testator, and the evidence in regard to his presumed 
intention, and they came to the conclusion that the testator did really intend to benefit [the Scottish society].” 
(National Society, above n 444, at 212). 
452  These words can be considered a name, and thus function as a proper noun. Proper nouns are not usually considered 
to designate categories, but rather to designate specific items (see n 203). These words, however, can still be viewed 
as a verbal category because the Court had to make a decision whether to assign a certain item to the category 
designated by these words. Furthermore, even though it is a little inaccurate to refer to proper nouns having 
‘meaning’ (see n 161), in this decision the Court still referred to the ‘meaning’ of these words (see text 
accompanying n 454). For convenience, this analysis will also refer to the ‘meaning’ of these words.  
453  As will be noted later (see Chapter Four C.6), in relation to the London society this decision can be viewed as an 
instance of the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy. Thus, these two fallacies are very closely related and whether a 
specific instance of fallacious interpretation is viewed as involving the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy or the 
‘different verbal category’ fallacy may depend on the way the act of interpretation is viewed. 
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The Court focused on the meaning of the words being interpreted. Lord Dunedin stated that:454 
 
[T]his money is probably going to the society to which, if we could have asked him, the testator would 
not have sent it. But that is not the question for a Court of law; the question for a Court of law is, taking 
the will as it stands, who is the beneficiary – what is the meaning of the words used? 
 
In making this decision, a number of the Law Lords stated that there was no ambiguity in the words 
used.455 Therefore, evidence regarding the background facts was held to be inadmissible.456 The 
Law Lords claimed that the terminology was “clear”457 and the language was “precise and 
accurate”.458 They held the words being interpreted “should receive their ordinary meaning”.459 
Furthermore, the language “should be given its natural meaning”.460 On this basis, the words were 
interpreted literally, and the bequest went to the society to which the testator probably did not intend 
to send it.461  
 
In this decision, the Court focused on the meaning of the testator’s words, rather than the intentions 
of the testator in using those words. Because the Scottish society could be assigned to a different 
verbal category from the verbal category that was used to designate the legal category,462 this 
society was held to be outside the legal category, regardless of the testator’s intention. This 
interpretation involved the assumption that because the item before the Court could be assigned to a 
different verbal category from the one used to designate the legal category, this item should be 
outside this legal category. Alternatively, it may be said that the Court made the assumption that 
because this item would normally be assigned to this different verbal category, it should be outside 
this legal category.463 Whether or not this item should be assigned to the legal category, however, 
                                               
454 National Society, above n 444, at 214. This view was not shared by the other Law Lords who were less convinced 
about the testator’s presumed intentions. 
455 Ibid, at 213 per Earl Loreburn, at 215 per Lord Atkinson, and at 215 per Lord Parmoor. See n 489. 
456  Lord Dunedin stated: “The effect of a question of ambiguity arising is this: that it allows of an inquiry not into 
intention, but into any such facts and circumstances as may help to give you a key to the meaning of the words 
which the testator used.” Ibid, at 214. 
457 Ibid, at 215 per Lord Atkinson. 
458 Ibid, at 216 per Lord Parmoor. 
459 Ibid, at 215 per Lord Atkinson. 
460 Ibid, at 216 per Lord Parmoor. 
461 Furthermore, the Scottish society was ordered to pay the costs of both the action in the Court of Session in Scotland 
and the costs of the appeal to the House of Lords (National Society, above n 444, at 216). Thus, the bequest had the 
ultimate effect of depriving this society of money. 
462  The different verbal category was the ‘Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’. 
463  Even if the item would normally be assigned to a different verbal category, this still should not determine the legal 
category to which it should be assigned. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that verbal categories are 
arbitrary. Within Scotland, this society could very well be referred to by the name the ‘National Society for the 
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depends on the relevant legal considerations related to this act of categorisation, and not merely the 
verbal category to which it can be assigned.  
 
Because the act of interpretation was focused on the meaning of the words being interpreted, it is 
useful to initially analyse this decision purely on the basis of linguistic meaning.464 Based on the 
background information of the testator’s life and connections, the other bequests in his will, and his 
knowledge of the Scottish society, it seems clear that he intended to bequeath the legacy to this 
Society. The fact that the name used in his will was the exact name of the London society seems 
coincidental. An argument in favour of the Law Lords’ decision that was not mentioned by the Law 
Lords is that the will referred to “the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals”,465 
and all the other bequests to charities made it clear that the charities were in Scotland.466 Still, if the 
testator had intended the bequest to go to the London society he would probably have listed this 
bequest separately from the bequests to Scottish charities and would most probably have indicated 
that he was referring to a society in London since all his other bequests indicated that the charities 
were in Scotland. Furthermore, given the fact of the testator’s connections with the Scottish society, 
and especially the fact that his brother was a director of this society (which none of the Law Lords 
mentioned either), it is most likely that there was mistake in drafting in the words under 
consideration, rather than a deliberate omission.467  
 
Because it is likely that the testator intended these words to designate the Scottish society, on a 
purely linguistic basis these words should be taken to refer to this society. This correct linguistic 
meaning is a relevant legal consideration that the Court omitted. Still, it is possible that the decision 
the Court reached was legally justifiable due to other relevant legal considerations.  
 
In order to elicit the legal considerations relevant to this act of categorisation it is helpful to 
consider the English Court of Appeal case Re Rowland468 which concerned the interpretation of a 
home-made will.469 The testator and his wife drowned when the ship they were on sank.470 The will 
provided that the estate would go to the testator’s wife, unless the wife’s decease “preced[ed] or 
                                                                                                                                                            
Prevention of Cruelty to Children’, even if this was not its official name. 
464  This corresponds to consideration 1.1 in Chart 4.1. 
465 National Society, above n 444, at 208 (emphasis added). 
466 Ibid, at 208. 
467  Chafee, above n 22, viewed this decision as illustrating the fallacious “tendency to believe that a word points to this 
object and only this, and that no other word can point to it.” (at 385).  
468 Re Rowland [1963] Ch 1 (CA). 
469 Ibid, at 3. 
470 Ibid, at 3-4. 
166 
 
coincid[ed] with” the testator’s decease, in which case it would go to the testator’s brother and 
nephew.471 The case turned on the interpretation of the word ‘coinciding’ and the issue, as stated by 
Russell LJ, was “did the wife’s death on the facts of this case precede the testator’s death or 
coincide in point of time with it?”472  
 
His Lordship stated:473 
 
I see no room … for ‘coinciding,’ in its normal and natural meaning, to involve some broad conception of 
overlapping or of occurring within a particular period. In my judgment the normal and natural meaning of 
‘coinciding with’ in relation to deaths occurring is the same as ‘simultaneous’ …. 
 
He further noted:474 
 
It is an unsound approach to the construction of the will to ask oneself what the testator, if he had thought 
of an event not covered by the natural and normal meaning of his language, would have wished had he 
directed his mind to the event. The question is what events does his language cover? 
 
His Lordship held that there was “no sufficient evidence that the wife’s death either preceded or 
coincided with that of the testator”.475 Therefore, the estate went to the wife and under her will to 
her niece.  
 
Viewed in relation to categorisation, the word ‘coincide’ named the legal category, and the question 
for the Court was whether the item at issue (that is, the factual situation of the husband and wife 
being lost at sea) fitted within this category. The majority held that because this item did not seem to 
fit within the usual meaning of this word, that is, because it did not seem to fit within the verbal 
category ‘coincide’, it should not be put within this legal category. The majority did not focus on the 
specific different verbal category that the situation could fit within, but focused on the fact that it 
did not fit within the verbal category ‘coincide’. Russell LJ, however, indicated that the situation 
could fit within the words “on the same occasion and by the same cause.”476 This can be considered 
as an example of the kind of different verbal category which would capture this situation. The 
majority’s decision, therefore, can be summarised as ‘different verbal category, therefore, outside 
                                               
471 Ibid, at 3. 
472 Ibid, at 16. 
473 Ibid, at 15-16. 
474 Ibid, at 17. 
475 Ibid, at 19. 
476 Ibid, at 17. 
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legal category’.  
 
In a dissenting speech, Lord Denning noted: 477  
 
[I]n point of principle the whole object of construing a will is to find out the testator’s intentions … True 
it is that you must discover his intention from the words he used: but you must put upon his words the 
meaning they bore to him … you must put upon them the meaning which he intended them to convey, 
and not the meaning which a philologist would put upon them. 
 
He noted that is fallacious to proceed “on the assumption that, in construing a will, ‘It is not what 
the testator meant, but what is the meaning of his words.’”478 Lord Denning further stated:479 
 
I have myself known a judge to say: ‘I believe this to be contrary to the true intention of the testator but 
nevertheless it is the result of the words he has used.’ When a judge goes so far as to say that, the chances 
are that he has misconstrued the will. 
 
Russell LJ came close to making such a statement by stating: 480  
 
One may hazard the guess that if [the testator] could now be asked to whom in the event which happened 
he would wish his property to go, he would say that he would wish it to go to his selected alternates. But 
that would not mean that he has expressed that wish by his will …. 
 
Lord Denning held that when making the will the testator would have used the words ‘coinciding 
with’:481  
 
not in the narrow meaning of ‘simultaneous,’ but in the wider meaning of which they are equally capable, 
especially in this context, as denoting death on the same occasion by the same cause …. 
 
His Lordship held that the Court “should give his words the meaning which he plainly intended 
they should bear.”482 Thus, he held that the estate should have gone to the testator’s brother and 
nephew. The dissenting judgment, therefore, looked beyond the apparent meaning of the words to 
the underlying intention expressed by these words and on this basis held that the item at issue 
                                               
477 Ibid, at 10. 
478 Ibid, at 9. 
479 Ibid, at 9-10. 
480 Ibid, at 17.  
481 Ibid, at 11. 
482 Ibid, at 11. This corresponds to considerations 1.1, 1.2 and 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
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should be within the legal category.  
 
In coming to his decision, Lord Denning took into account the goal of interpreting a will – to 
discover the testator’s intention.483 The consideration of word meaning was secondary, and was in 
service of this goal.484 He thus identified the primary goal of the law in relation to the interpretation 
of wills. With this goal in mind, word meaning is relevant, but primarily because it is an indication 
of the testator’s intention.  
 
The remainder of this section will focus on the decision in National Society. It will discuss the legal 
considerations relevant to the act of interpretation in National Society and whether the 
considerations that the Court introduced were relevant. 
 
Lord Denning’s dissent in Rowland shows clearly the main goal of the interpretation of wills. The 
main reason the law enforces legally valid wills is that the law respects the intentions of testators as 
expressed in the language of their wills. The goal of the interpretation of wills, therefore, is to give 
effect to these intentions. 485 Therefore, the primary relevant consideration in National Society is the 
intention of the testator shown by the correct linguistic meaning of the words being interpreted. To 
consider the meaning of words without reference to the intention of the testator can introduce 
irrelevant considerations and result in a wrong interpretation.  
 
In National Society, Lord Parmoor observed, “The leading principle in all cases of this character is 
that the Court has not to make a will, but to interpret the words which the testator has used.”486 The 
reason for this principle487 is that the testator’s intention has been expressed in the words of the will 
and speculation regarding an unexpressed intention may result in the testator’s intention being 
frustrated. This principle thus reinforces the basic purpose behind the interpretation of wills, which 
is to give effect to testators’ intentions. Its application in this case, however, had the opposite of its 
intended effect. Based on this principle, the Court restricted its investigation to the literal meaning 
                                               
483 This view was echoed by Canadian Chief Justice Bayda in the decision Haidl v Sacher: “[A]scertaining the 
testator’s true intention is the real and only purpose of the whole exercise” ([1980] 1 WWR 293 (CA) at [24]). For a 
discussion of this decision commending this approach, see Doug Surtees “Procedure ‘B’ is for Bayda” (2007) 70 
Sack L Rev 259. This corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
484  Still, even from a purely linguistic perspective, the meaning at which the majority arrived was most probably wrong. 
E R Emmet used the majority’s decision in Rowland to illustrate the dubious distinction between what writers intend 
and what their words mean: Learning to Philosophize (Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, 1968) at 65. 
485  This corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
486 National Society, above n 444, at 215. 
487  This principle corresponds to consideration 4.1 in Chart 4.1. 
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of the words under consideration. This principle was applied in such a way that the words being 
interpreted were given a literal meaning regardless of the testator’s intention in using them. In this 
way, what was originally a relevant consideration was misapplied and this resulted in the 
introduction of an irrelevant consideration. This would not have happened if this this legal principle 
had been applied in light of the reason for the act of categorisation at issue: to give effect to the 
testator’s intentions.  
 
Another legal rule applied in National Society was the inadmissibility of evidence regarding the 
background facts when the words in a will are unambiguous.488 The aim of this rule is to prevent the 
actual intentions of testators being frustrated by dubious claims regarding their presumed intentions. 
A difficulty with this rule is that it is often necessary to consider the background facts to determine 
whether the words are ambiguous.489 Having regard to the background facts, not only were the 
words in the will ambiguous, but they most likely referred to the Scottish society. Thus, there is a 
problem not only with the way this rule was applied, but with the rule itself.490 This rule resulted in 
the judges relying on an apparent lack of ambiguity to reach a decision that neglected the most 
important legal consideration. This rule also resulted in the introduction of the irrelevant 
consideration of the literal meaning of the words being interpreted. Furthermore, this rule should 
have been applied in light of this act of categorisation, and since the main goal of this act of 
categorisation is to discover the testator’s intentions, it is clear that this rule should not be applied so 
as to frustrate these intentions when they are clear from the background facts.491  
 
It is now necessary to determine whether the decision in National Society was fallacious. The 
primary relevant legal consideration in relation to this act of categorisation is the intention of the 
testator. Thus, a correct legal categorisation would need to take into account indications of this 
intention. This intention is indicated by the meaning of the words being interpreted in light of the 
factual background.  
                                               
488  See text accompanying n 456.This corresponds to consideration 4.1 in Chart 4.1. 
489  Therefore, this rule of interpretation relies on a mistaken view about meaning under which the meaning given to 
words can be determined in isolation from the factual context in which they are used. 
490  Judges do not strictly adhere to this rule anymore. Writing extra-judicially, Lord Steyn stated: “The purpose of 
interpretation is sometimes mistakenly thought to be a search for the meaning of words. This in turn leads to the 
assumption that one must identify an ambiguity as a pre-condition to taking into account evidence of the setting of a 
legal text. … This is the wrong starting point. Language can never be understood divorced from its context. … The 
true purpose is to find the contextual meaning of the language of the text, ie, what the words would convey to the 
reasonable person circumstanced as the parties were.” Johan Steyn “The Intractable Problem of The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts” (2003) 25 Sydney L Rev 5 at 6. 
491  This is especially the case when judges are aware that they are probably sending the money “to the society to which, 
if we could have asked him, the testator would not have sent it.” (see text accompanying n 454). 
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There are two specific relevant legal considerations that the Court in National Society should have 
taken into account: first, the linguistic meaning of the words, and, second, the intention of the 
testator as indicated by these words and various background facts. These considerations are 
supported by the legal rule that the court should not ‘make’ a will which would frustrate testators’ 
intentions.492 The relevant background facts include the fact the testator had lived in Scotland his 
entire life, the fact that he was familiar with the activities of the Scottish society and his brother was 
a director of this society, the fact that he had no known connection with the London society, and the 
fact that the bequest was included in a series of bequests to Scottish charities. The two relevant legal 
considerations are really the same consideration viewed from two perspectives because the 
linguistic meaning of the words is determined by the background facts.493 The Court did not take 
these relevant considerations into account. 
 
The primary irrelevant consideration that the Court took into account in this decision was the fact 
that the item at issue (the Scottish society) could be put within a different verbal category from the 
verbal category used to designate the legal category. This consideration was irrelevant because it 
meant the words were given a meaning that was most likely not the meaning the testator intended 
them to have. Other irrelevant considerations included the fact that the London society fitted within 
the verbal category that designated the legal category, a misapplication of the principle that the 
Court should not make a will, and the fact that the words seemed unambiguous when taken literally 
and when the testator’s intention was omitted.  
 
This interpretive decision was fallacious because it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if the primary relevant legal consideration (the intention of the testator as expressed 
by the words being interpreted) had been taken into account and irrelevant considerations had been 
omitted. This can be shown by the fact that the Scottish Courts, which took the primary relevant 
consideration into account,494 reached a different result. 
 
It is possible, however, that the Court could have reached the same result without committing a 
fallacy. The decision would not have been fallacious if the Court had omitted the irrelevant 
considerations and had focused on the intention of the testator. If the Court did this, an argument 
                                               
492  See text accompanying n 486. 
493  These two perspectives mean that this consideration can be viewed in relation to two considerations in Chart 4.1: 
consideration 1.1 and consideration 2.1. 
494  See n 451. 
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could be made that the testator actually intended the London society to receive the money. Although 
it is unlikely that the testator intended this,495 it is possible that the Court could decide that the 
contextual factors were not sufficient to indicate an intention for the money to go to the Scottish 
society. In this situation, the decision would be not fallacious because the primary relevant 
consideration (the testator’s intention) would have been taken into account. The Court’s decision 
was fallacious, however, because this consideration was not taken into account, and it is most 
unlikely that the same result would have been reached if it had been. Rather, it is most likely that a 
different result would have been reached if the relevant consideration had been taken into account.  
 
This primary relevant legal consideration also applies to Rowland. The interpretive decision in 
Rowland was based on an irrelevant consideration (the literal meaning of the word ‘coincide’). 
Another irrelevant consideration in Rowland was the inadvisability of asking what a testator would 
have done if he had thought of the situation that occurred.496 This consideration was irrelevant 
because it is most likely that the testator did think of the situation that occurred.497 The Court in 
Rowland also omitted the primary relevant consideration: the intention of the testator. Furthermore, 
it most likely that the Court would have reached a different result if the irrelevant considerations 
had been omitted and the relevant consideration had been introduced. This can be shown by the fact 
that the dissent in Rowland, which took into account the primary relevant consideration and omitted 
the irrelevant considerations, reached a different result. Therefore, the interpretive decision in 
Rowland was also fallacious.  
 
Alternative, non-fallacious interpretations for both National Society and Rowland would involve the 
introduction of the primary relevant consideration and the omission of any irrelevant considerations. 
This would mean that a different result would have been reached in both decisions: the bequest 
would have gone to the Scottish society in National Society and estate would have gone to the 
testator’s brother and nephew in Rowland.498 
 
To conclude it is helpful to consider why the fallacy was committed in National Society and how 
such a fallacy can be avoided. First, the decision was focused on the meaning of the word being 
interpreted. This meant the primary legal consideration of the intention of the testator was not 
                                               
495  See the paragraph accompanying n 464. 
496  See text accompanying n 474. 
497  Lord Denning thought that the situation that occurred was exactly the sort of situation the testator would have had in 
mind when he drafted the will: Rowland, above n 468, at 11. 
498  See text accompanying n 471. 
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introduced and the irrelevant consideration of the literal meaning of the words divorced from their 
factual context was introduced. Earlier in this chapter the notion of ‘legal meaninglessness’ was 
discussed. This occurs when a judge is unclear regarding the reason for a legal category. Lord 
Dunedin thought that it was likely that the testator intended to benefit the Scottish society.499 
Nevertheless, he gave the bequest to the London society. If the words being interpreted had been 
legally meaningless, there might have been some justification for interpreting them literally. This, 
however, was not a case of legal meaninglessness, so there was no justification for interpreting the 
words literally. This analysis of National Society shows that even when the courts are interpreting 
language which involves a specific person encapsulating a thought in language it is helpful if this 
act of interpretation is viewed as an act of categorisation based on relevant legal considerations. 
 
Second, the Court did not focus on the items to be categorised (the Scottish society and the London 
society) and whether they should be assigned to the legal category, but on the legal category and 
what should be assigned to it. It did not focus on either the Scottish society or the London society 
and whether they fitted within this legal category, but on the apparent meaning of the words 
designating the legal category. A focus on the items would have shown that the essential issue was 
the intention of the testator, not the literal meaning of the words being interpreted, and also would 
have meant that the legal considerations that were introduced would have been related to this act of 
categorisation and would not have been misapplied.500 
 
It may be thought that an approach based purely on the intention of the testator would suffice to 
avoid the fallacy in this decision. There are a number of reasons why an approach based on 
categorisation would be preferable to an approach based on intention. First, an approach based on 
categorisation provides a useful way to detect irrelevant considerations and therefore provides a 
useful way to avoid them. Second, an approach based on intention can still slip into literalism 
because the court can view the discovery of intention as limited to the discovery of the meaning of 
the words being interpreted.501 Third, if interpretation is viewed in relation to intention, the court 
may consider that they have two tasks: to determine an intention and also to introduce legal 
considerations related to this act of interpretation. Following this, it may be easy for the court to 
apply these legal considerations without reference to the primary goal of this act of interpretation – 
                                               
499  See n 454. 
500  This shows that even when a court is focused on discovering the item that a legal speaker has assigned to a legal 
category, it is still useful for the court to approach the act of interpretation as a decision regarding whether the item 
at issue should be assigned to this category.  
501  For instance, in Rowland Russell LJ stated: “The question is what events does [the testator’s] language cover? To 
ask more is to desert from the source from which his intention is to be gathered, his will as proved.” (at 17). 
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giving effect to this intention. Fourth, viewing the decision merely in terms of intention can cause 
confusion because subjective intentions are never discoverable and this may cause the court to focus 
on the literal meaning of the words being interpreted. Under an approach based on categorisation it 
can be seen that although the subjective intention is not discoverable, making a decision based on 
the literal meaning of the words will not achieve the goal of the law in relation to this category. 
Lastly, there may be situations in which a court should not fulfil a testator’s intentions.502 These 
points do not mean that judges should not focus on intention when making this sort of decision. 
Indeed, the intention of the testator was the primary relevant consideration that the judges should 
have taken into account. To avoid fallacies, and especially to detect fallacies, however, it is useful to 
view this decision in relation to categorisation, rather than merely in relation to intention. 
 
Therefore, viewing interpretation in relation to categorisation is not only a useful way to detect 
fallacies, but also can provide a better way for judges to avoid them than an approach based either 
on the discovery of meaning or the discovery of intention.  
 
5 Discussion of ‘same verbal category’ fallacy and ‘different verbal category’ fallacy 
 
Smith and National Society have been examined in detail because they provide clear examples of 
judicial fallacies. It could be said that these decisions are not representative examples of the way 
judges usually interpret language. These decisions, however, have not been given to provide 
representative examples of interpretation, but rather have been given to provide clear examples of 
fallacies. The analysis of these decisions has provided many details concerning the way fallacies 
can be committed, the sort of relevant considerations that should be taken into account in judicial 
interpretation, and the sort of irrelevant considerations that can be taken into account.  
 
In Smith the legal category was designated by the word ‘use’. The Court held that because the item 
at issue (the defendant’s action) could fit within the verbal category ‘use’, it should be put within 
this legal category. In assigning this item to the legal category, the Court both introduced irrelevant 
considerations and omitted relevant considerations. It is unlikely that such a fallacy would have 
been committed if the act of interpretation had been viewed as categorisation based on relevant 
                                               
502  For instance, if the testator does not provide for certain family members a court may not give effect to his or her 
intention (for instance, in New Zealand if a testator does not provide for certain close relatives, claims against the 
testator’s estate can be made by such relatives under the Family Protection Act 1955 (NZ)). Although this does not 
relate to the interpretation of a will but is a more general consideration regarding the legal effect of a will, it shows 
that courts are not solely focused on giving effect to the intentions of testators.  
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legal considerations.  
 
In National Society the legal category was designated by the words ‘the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children’. These words were the verbal category designating the legal 
category. The Court held that because an item (the Scottish society) could be put within a different 
verbal category from this verbal category, it should be outside the legal category. In refusing to 
assign this item to this legal category, the Court both introduced irrelevant considerations and 
omitted relevant considerations. Again, it is unlikely that such a fallacy could be committed if the 
act of interpretation had been viewed in relation to categorisation. 
 
To detect a judicial fallacy there is the need to decide whether a consideration that a court 
introduces is relevant. This can be seen by determining whether this consideration relates to the 
specific act of categorisation at issue. The analysis of these decisions has shown what it means for a 
legal consideration to be related to the act of categorisation at issue. It means that this consideration 
is either relevant to the particular item at issue or relevant to the specific legal category. Put simply, 
it is relevant to the assignment of the particular item at issue to the specific legal category. Viewing 
interpretation as categorisation and determining whether the considerations introduced are relevant 
to the specific act of categorisation before the court, therefore, provides a clear way to determine 
whether a consideration is relevant. An approach to judicial interpretation focused either on the 
discovery of meaning or intention creates the possibility for irrelevant considerations to be 
introduced and does not provide such a clear test for determining when a consideration is relevant.  
 
The verbal category to which an item can be assigned should not automatically determine the legal 
category to which it should be assigned. With the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy, the judge is 
distracted by the irrelevant consideration of the fact that item at issue can be assigned to the verbal 
category designating the legal category. With the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy, the judge is 
distracted by the irrelevant consideration of the fact that the item at issue can be assigned to a 
different verbal category from the one used to designate the legal category.  
 
In Smith and National Society, the verbal category to which the item could be assigned was the 
basic irrelevant consideration that the Courts introduced. These decisions also both introduced other 
minor irrelevant considerations that supported the result the Courts reached. Some of these other 
irrelevant considerations may have been introduced due to the basic irrelevant consideration. For 
instance, it is unlikely that a judge would think that the rule that statutory words should be given a 
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consistent meaning throughout a statute would apply to the word ‘use’ in a statute unless the judge 
had already decided that this word captured the situation before the court. Furthermore, some of the 
irrelevant considerations that the Courts introduced in both Smith and National Society resulted 
from a relevant legal consideration being misapplied by the judge. This would be unlikely to occur 
if these relevant legal considerations had been applied in the light of the act of categorisation before 
the Courts.  
 
The introduction of the basic irrelevant consideration (the verbal category to which the item could 
be assigned) also resulted in the neglect of the relevant legal considerations. It is possible for a court 
to introduce an irrelevant consideration and still introduce the relevant considerations. In most 
situations, however, the introduction of an irrelevant consideration causes the relevant legal 
considerations to be neglected.  
 
The basic reason for these fallacies was the Courts’ approaches to interpretation. First, both Courts 
were focused on discovering the meaning of the word being interpreted. Although it is true by 
definition that legal interpretation results in the assignment of a meaning to a word, if it is viewed as 
the discovery of meaning an irrelevant consideration can be introduced: a meaning that the word 
can be given that is not relevant to the meaning it has been given. Second, the Courts focused on the 
legal category and which items could fit within it, rather than the item at issue and whether it should 
be assigned to this category. This meant that the considerations that were introduced were not 
related to the act of categorisation in which the Courts were engaged.  
 
It is useful now to explicitly return to the central contention of this thesis. This contention is that 
that judges commit certain fallacies when interpreting language and that it is possible to detect such 
fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretation when they occur. To prove this 
contention there needs to be a definition of fallacious interpretation. This definition is that an 
instance of judicial interpretation is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant consideration 
and it is most likely that a different result would have been reached if that consideration had been 
omitted, or when it omits a relevant consideration and it is most likely that a different result would 
have been reached if that relevant consideration had been taken into account. Alternative, non-
fallacious interpretations can be provided by taking into account relevant considerations and 
omitting irrelevant considerations. 
 
This chapter has identified two specific fallacies which result in the introduction of an irrelevant 
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consideration and usually the omission of relevant considerations: the ‘same verbal category’ 
fallacy and the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy.503 Both of these fallacies involve judges making 
the assumption that a decision should be made based on the verbal category to which an item can be 
assigned. When this assumption results in the introduction of an irrelevant consideration (the verbal 
category to which an item can be assigned) and the omission of relevant considerations, it can result 
in fallacies being committed. The analysis of Smith and National Society has shown that judges do 
commit these fallacies, that is it possible to detect these fallacies, and that it is possible to arrive at 
alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when they occur. 
 
It is helpful now to briefly return to the case of Sanger v Sanger discussed earlier.504 The legal 
category in this case can be viewed as the category created by the words being interpreted: “it is my 
wish that if any child of mine wishes to reside in such home he or she shall be allowed to by my 
other children”.505 The Court held that no trust was created by these words. Viewed in relation to 
categorisation, this means that the words being interpreted did not designate the legal category of a 
trust. The reason given was the rule of interpretation that precatory words are not binding 
commands when directed to devisees rather than the executor.506  
 
The primary relevant legal consideration in this case was the intention of the testator.507 The aim of 
the rule of interpretation that the Court followed is to help judges give effect to this intention. 
Although it is possible that the testator did intend to create a trust, it is also arguable that she was 
merely providing a recommendation to the devisees. Therefore, the application of this rule of 
interpretation did not necessarily frustrate the testator’s intention, but may have helped give effect 
to this intention.508 This means that the decision that was reached was supported by the primary 
relevant legal consideration. For this reason, it cannot be said that this decision was fallacious.  
 
It may not seem that this act of interpretation involved categorisation. By deciding that no trust was 
                                               
503  It is possible for irrelevant considerations to be introduced for other reasons – for example, a bias or a mistake – but 
this thesis only discusses these two kinds of fallacious interpretation. 
504  At Chapter Four B.2.(a). 
505  See text accompanying n 279. 
506  See text accompanying n 281. 
507  See text accompanying n 280. 
508  Even if it seemed clear that the testator’s intentions would be frustrated by the application of this rule, a lower court 
may be bound to apply the rule. Such a decision would not be fallacious because the binding rule of interpretation is 
a relevant legal consideration. Such a decision, however, may not be justified. For a discussion of situations in 
which courts are forced to make unjustified decisions, see Chapter Four C.7. In other situation, however, courts have 
discretion to decide whether certain rules apply. For instance, the Court in Smith had the discretion to decide 
whether the rules of interpretation relating to lenity and to the intra-statutory consistency of meaning were 
applicable.  
177 
 
created, however, the Court held that the fact that the son was in the category designated by these 
words did not have the effect of making him a beneficiary of a trust. In other words, the Court 
accepted that the son was within the category created by these words, but decided that the legal 
effect of being within this category was not to make him a beneficiary of a trust. The focus of this 
decision, therefore, was not whether or not an item was within a certain legal category, but the 
nature of the category the item was within. Still, this act of interpretation involved categorisation in 
relation to the son. This can be seen by the fact that if the Court had held that a trust had been 
created, the son would have been a beneficiary under this trust. Therefore, it can be said that the 
effect of this instance of interpretation in relation to the son was that he was excluded from the legal 
category of being a beneficiary under a trust and was included in a legal category which did not 
have this consequence. Therefore, a decision regarding the legal status of a category has the same 
effect as assigning any items within this category to a category with that status.509 
 
6 Judicial fallacies and categorisation 
 
The analysis of these judicial fallacies has shown that it is helpful to view some instances of judicial 
interpretation as involving categorisation. Under this view, the situation before the court is viewed 
as an item that needs to be assigned to a legal category and the word being interpreted is viewed as 
the name of a legal category. The cases considered in the fallacy section show the kinds of items 
that can be assigned to legal categories. These items include actions (trading a gun for drugs), 
events (two deaths coinciding), and objects (a charitable society).  
 
Chapter Three discussed ordinary interpretation in terms of assigning items to categories. This 
section will analyse legal categorisation on the basis of that analysis. This will show in a clearer 
way the sorts of situations in which the fallacies that have been identified in this chapter can be 
committed and the essential problem with these fallacies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
509  Therefore, this decision can still be viewed as involving a decision regarding whether or not to assign an item to a 
certain legal category. See the earlier discussion of interpretation and categorisation in the paragraph accompanying 
n 260. 
178 
 
Diagram 4.9, below, which is based on Diagram 3.9 (Two Possibilities with Categorisation), shows 
two possibilities with legal categorisation. 
 
 
 
In Diagram 4.9 the items correspond to the matters before the court, and the legal categories 
correspond to the categories designated by the word being interpreted. The task of legal interpreters 
is to assign items to the correct legal category. If the items are included within the legal categories, 
they correspond to the referents of the words, not the meaning. When ordinary interpretation was 
viewed in relation to categorisation, the items being categorised corresponded to the meanings of 
words and the categories corresponded to the words being interpreted. The way legal interpretation 
is viewed in relation to categorisation is different from the way ordinary interpretation was viewed 
in relation to categorisation because the focus of legal interpretation is different from the focus of 
ordinary interpretation.  
 
The left-hand side of Diagram 4.9 depicts the possibility of either an item that belongs in a certain 
legal category or an item that does not belong in the legal category being assigned to this legal 
category. Whether or not an item belongs in a legal category is determined by the relevant legal 
considerations. An item that does not belong in a legal category can be assigned to the legal 
category due to the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy. This occurs when an item that should not be in 
the legal category can be assigned to the same verbal category as the verbal category by which the 
legal category is designated.  
 
The right-hand side of Diagram 4.9 depicts the possibility of an item that belongs in a legal category 
being either included within this legal category or being excluded from it. An item can be wrongly 
excluded from a legal category due to the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy. This occurs when an 
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item that should be in the legal category can be put in a different verbal category from the verbal 
category by which the legal category is designated.  
 
Diagram 4.9 depicts essentially the same two categorisation possibilities as Diagram 3.9. In 
Diagram 3.9 the left-hand side depicted two items being put in the same category. This could occur 
when the speaker and the interpreter put different items in the same category. This could be the 
result of the ‘same word’ fallacy, and would mean the interpreter had assigned a different item to 
the category from the speaker. In Diagram 3.9 the right-hand side depicted one item being put in 
two categories. This could occur when the speaker and the interpreter assigned the same item to 
different categories. This could be the result of the ‘different word’ fallacy, and would mean that the 
interpreter had not assigned the same item to the category as the speaker. 
 
In ordinary interpretation, the assignment of items to categories should be governed by relevant 
considerations. These considerations relate to the specific meaning that is being expressed by the 
speaker. In legal interpretation, the assignment of items to categories should be governed by 
relevant legal considerations. The relevant legal considerations do not all relate to the legal 
speaker’s meaning, but may relate to other matters, for instance, the law generally or the specific 
situation before the court. Having noted this difference, because both ordinary interpretation and 
legal interpretation involve categorisation, the same two possibilities with categorisation apply to 
them.  
 
Diagram 4.10, below, which is based on Diagram 3.10 (Possible Categorisations in the Abstract), 
can be used to show the possible legal categorisations in the abstract. 
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Diagram 4.10 shows the possible associations of items with categories in the abstract. On the one 
hand, two possible items can be put in the legal category: either an item that belongs in the legal 
category or an item that does not belong in the legal category. On the other hand, an item can be 
categorised in two possible ways: either within the legal category or outside of it. 
 
One danger is that an item that does not belong in the legal category may be assigned to it. For 
example, the defendant’s actions were wrongly categorised within the legal category ‘use’ in Smith. 
Another danger is that an item that does belong within the legal category may be excluded from it. 
For example, the Scottish society was wrongly excluded from the legal category ‘the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’ in National Society.  
 
Both fallacies can be caused by the assumption that the legal category to which an item should be 
assigned can be determined by the verbal category to which it can be assigned. In Smith the item 
was assigned to the legal category because it could be assigned to the same verbal category. In 
National Society the item was excluded from the legal category because it could be assigned to a 
different verbal category. Thus, the primary irrelevant consideration in these two decisions was the 
verbal category to which the item at issue could be assigned.  
 
The fallacies that can be committed with judicial interpretation are depicted in Diagram 4.11, below, 
which is based on Diagram 3.11 (Same Category and Different Category Fallacies). 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.11 depicts the two fallacies discussed in this chapter. Diagram 3.11 depicted the 
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interpreter either assigning an item to a different category from the category to which the speaker 
had assigned it or not assigning an item to the same category as the category to which the speaker 
had assigned it. Diagram 4.11 depicts the legal interpreter either assigning an item that does not 
belong to a legal category to this legal category, or excluding an item that belongs to a legal 
category from this legal category. It is helpful to discuss this diagram in relation to Smith and 
National Society.  
 
The left-hand side of this diagram can be used to depict the act of categorisation in Smith. In Smith 
the issue was whether the item before the Court should be assigned to the legal category ‘use’. The 
Court looked at what they considered to be the ordinary meaning of the word ‘use’ and saw that it 
captured the item. In other words, the item could be assigned to the verbal category ‘use’. The 
relevant legal considerations, however, showed clearly that the item did not belong within this legal 
category. Nevertheless, the defendant’s actions were held to be within the legal category because 
they could be put within the same verbal category as the one used to designate the legal category. 
The ‘same verbal category’ fallacy, therefore, results in the wrong inclusion of items within a legal 
category.  
 
The right-hand side of this diagram can be used to depict the act of categorisation in National 
Society. In National Society the issue was which of the items before the Court should be assigned to 
the legal category ‘the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’. These words 
labelled the legal category and the issue was which society fell within this category. The Law Lords 
did not associate the Scottish society with this verbal category. Rather, they associated the Scottish 
society with a different verbal category: ‘the Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children’. Thus, the Scottish society could be put within a different verbal category from the one 
used to designate the legal category. The relevant legal considerations showed clearly that the 
Scottish society belonged to this legal category. Nevertheless, this society was held to be outside the 
legal category because it could be put within a different verbal category from the one used to 
designate the legal category. The ‘different verbal category’ fallacy, therefore, results in the wrong 
exclusion of items from a category.  
 
National Society can also be analysed as an instance of the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy. Under 
this analysis, the legal category is still the category described by the language in the will. The item 
before the Court can be viewed as the London society. The Law Lords wrongly included the 
London society in the legal category because it could be put within the verbal category used to 
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describe the legal category. This involves the fallacious assumption ‘same verbal category, 
therefore, within legal category’. Therefore, in National Society the item before the Court can either 
be viewed as the London society or the Scottish society. If the item is viewed as the London society, 
the interpretive decision is an instance of the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy; if the item is viewed as 
the Scottish society, the interpretive decision is an instance of the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy. 
This shows that these two fallacies are very closely related. They are both based on the assumption 
that the verbal category to which an item can be assigned determines the legal category to which it 
should be assigned. 
 
The corresponding diagram in Chapter Three, Diagram 3.11, depicted the interpreter assigning an 
item to a different category from the category to which the speaker had assigned it. When ordinary 
interpretation is viewed in relation to categorisation, the speaker has assigned an item to a category 
and the goal of the interpreter is to discover this item. Therefore, in ordinary interpretation, the 
interpreter’s goal is to discover the item which a speaker has assigned to a category. The interpreter 
focuses on the category, and needs to discover an item that fits within it. In legal interpretation that 
involves categorisation, the goal is to assign the item before the court to the correct legal category. 
Ordinary interpretation is focused on the category, and what item should be assigned to it. Legal 
interpretation is focused on the item, and whether it should be assigned to the legal category.  
 
The fallacies that have been identified in this chapter involve the courts focusing on the word being 
interpreted and the meanings it could be given. This is a focus on the category and items that can be 
assigned to it. If legal interpretation had been viewed as categorisation, and the focus had been on 
whether the item before the court should be assigned to the legal category at issue, it is unlikely that 
these fallacies would have been committed. Thus, the focus of the act of categorisation was not 
appropriate for legal interpretation, even though such a focus is appropriate for ordinary 
interpretation. 
 
Having noted this difference in focus between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation, the 
diagrams in this section show that an essential similarity between legal interpretation and ordinary 
interpretation can be seen when both are viewed in relation to categorisation. Moreover, certain 
fallacies that can be committed in ordinary interpretation and legal interpretation are essentially the 
same when viewed in relation to categorisation.  
 
 
183 
 
The basic ideas in this section are summarised in Chart 4.2, below. 
 
Chart 4.2      ‘Same Verbal Category’ Fallacy and ‘Different Verbal Category’ Fallacy 
Same Verbal Category, therefore, Within 
Legal Category 
Different Verbal Category, therefore, 
Outside Legal Category 
Interpreter needs to decide whether to assign a 
certain item to a certain legal category. 
Interpreter needs to decide whether to assign a 
certain item to a certain legal category. 
Interpreter finds that the item can be assigned 
to a certain verbal category. 
Interpreter finds that the item can be assigned 
to a certain verbal category. 
This verbal category is used to designate the 
legal category at issue. 
This verbal category is not used to designate 
the legal category at issue. 
The interpreter takes into account the irrelevant 
consideration that the item can be assigned to 
the verbal category designated by the words 
being interpreted. 
The interpreter takes into account the irrelevant 
consideration that the item can be assigned to a 
different the verbal category from the one 
designated by the words being interpreted. 
This usually causes the interpreter to omit the 
relevant legal considerations. 
This usually causes the interpreter to omit the 
relevant legal considerations.  
The item is wrongly included in the legal 
category. 
The item is wrongly excluded from the legal 
category. 
 
7 Application of this analysis 
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a way to critique instances of judicial interpretation and detect 
fallacies. This section will discuss some practical considerations related to determining whether an 
instance of judicial interpretation is fallacious. This section will mention five practical 
considerations related to the application of the analysis in this chapter. 
 
First, the analysis in this chapter only applies to instances of interpretation that involve a decision 
whether to classify the item before the court within the category designated by the language being 
interpreted. This, however, covers an important group of instances of judicial interpretation that are 
legally significant.  
 
Second, it is not always legally unjustifiable for a judge to introduce ostensibly irrelevant 
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considerations or omit ostensibly relevant considerations when engaged in interpretation. There 
may be situations where a judge is restricted from introducing certain ostensibly relevant 
considerations or forced to introduce certain ostensibly irrelevant considerations. A number of 
examples of this can be given. First, a court may be restricted by binding precedent from 
introducing a certain consideration or may be forced by binding precedent to introduce a certain 
consideration.510 Second, a court may be procedurally restricted from introducing certain matters.511 
Third, a court may be limited by its jurisdiction from introducing certain considerations.512  
 
In such situations, a decision may be reached which may seem to be fallacious, but is actually non-
fallacious because the judge is restricted from introducing certain ostensibly relevant considerations 
or is forced to introduce certain ostensibly irrelevant considerations. The relevance of a 
consideration is determined by how the consideration relates to the act of categorisation at issue. 
Considerations that the court is required to take into account in relation to a specific act of 
categorisation are therefore relevant by definition. Similarly, if the court is restricted from 
introducing a certain consideration it is irrelevant by definition. Therefore, an interpretive decision 
that appears to be fallacious may not be fallacious because the court was forced to introduce certain 
considerations that seem irrelevant or was prohibited from introducing certain considerations which 
seem relevant. This thesis is not making the claim that judges should go beyond their existing 
power to make any decision that takes into account what appear to be relevant considerations or that 
judges should omit any considerations which they are obliged to introduce because they appear to 
be irrelevant considerations. Rather, it is claiming that within their power judges should make 
decisions that take into account relevant considerations and omit irrelevant considerations. 
 
Third, in some situations, the relevant legal considerations may be unclear. For instance, there may 
be a number of conflicting purposes relating to a certain statutory provision. This means that in 
some situations it may be difficult, or impossible, to determine that an interpretive decision is 
fallacious.  
 
                                               
510  For instance, in some jurisdictions, under the parol evidence rule, evidence of the parties’ prior negotiations is 
inadmissible when interpreting a contract. Evidence of such negotiations may be relevant, but a court may be 
prohibited from introducing it. For a discussion of this rule, see DW McLauchlan “Interpretation and Rectification: 
Lord Hoffmann’s Last Stand” [2009] NZ Law Review 431. 
511  For instance, in a civil trial there may be restrictions on the judge introducing considerations that were not raised by 
counsel: J A Jolowicz On Civil Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) at 254.  
512  For instance, in statutory interpretation there may be a jurisdictional restriction on courts correcting mistakes or 
filling gaps, even if the purpose of the provision is clear and it is clear that there is a mistake or a gap. For a 
discussion of this, see Sullivan, above n 321, at ch 7. 
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Fourth, in some situations, courts may introduce certain irrelevant considerations, but it may be 
unclear whether a different decision would have been made if these considerations had not been 
introduced. In such a situation, these considerations can be identified as irrelevant and it can be said 
that the decision is unjustified to the extent that it relies on such considerations. It cannot be said, 
however, that such a decision is fallacious.  
 
For instance, it is clear that Justice O’Connor’s decision in Smith introduced an irrelevant 
consideration related to word meaning (how a word can be used).513 It is also arguable, however, 
that Justice Scalia’s consideration regarding word meaning (how a word ordinarily is used),514 
though not as irrelevant, was still not the most relevant consideration. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia 
reached the right result. A different result would not have been reached if the relevant consideration 
regarding word meaning (how the word was used) had been introduced. Thus, Justice Scalia’s 
interpretive decision was not fallacious.  
 
Fifth, there may be important legal considerations related to a decision involving interpretation, 
which do not relate to this act of interpretation. Although judicial interpretation has been defined as 
legal categorisation, it is not necessarily all that is involved in such categorisation. Professor Arthur 
Corbin draws an important distinction between interpretation and construction515 in relation to 
contract interpretation. He remarks that:516 
 
By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that language induces in other persons. By 
‘construction of the contract,’ … we determine its legal operation – its effect upon the action of courts 
and administrative officials. If we make this distinction, then the construction of a contract starts with 
the interpretation of its language but does not end with it; while the process of interpretation stops 
wholly short of a determination of the legal relations of the parties.  
 
This is the distinction between the meaning of the language in a legal instrument and the legal effect 
of this instrument.517 This is a useful distinction. Interpretation involves assigning an item to the 
                                               
513  See n 408. 
514  See text accompanying n 411. 
515  This distinction is useful, but the use of the words ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ may be misleading because 
‘construction’ is often used as a synonym for ‘interpretation’. See n 347. 
516  Corbin, above n 284, at 9. 
517  A distinction between construction and interpretation has also been drawn by other writers. Francis Lieber drew this 
distinction in a different way: see Francis Lieber Legal and Political Hermeneutics (Charles C Little and James 
Brown, Boston, 1839) at 23 and 56. For an article comparing the way this distinction was drawn by Corbin and 
Lieber, see Lawrence A Cunningham “Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An Essay on Lieber and Corbin” 
(1995) 16 Cardozo L Rev 2225. Peter Tiersma also drew this distinction in a different way: see n 327. 
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category designated by the word being interpreted, but this may not be all that is involved in a legal 
decision that involves interpretation. There may also need to be a determination of the legal effect 
of the document being interpreted, whether, for instance, there is a binding contract. Such a 
determination should not be considered as part of the act of interpretation. Still, this kind of 
determination may affect the interpretation. Corbin notes:518  
 
Just as construction must begin with interpretation, we shall find that our interpretation will vary with 
the construction that must follow. Finding that one interpretation of the words will be followed by the 
enforcement of certain legal effects, we may back hastily away from that interpretation and substitute 
another that will lead to a more desirable result. 
 
Thus, there may be situations where considerations related to the legal effect of a decision may be 
introduced as relevant considerations related to a specific instance of interpretation, but this is not 
always the case.  
 
In this light, it is useful to consider the case Riggs v Palmer519 where the Court decided that a 
grandson who killed his grandfather in order to inherit under his will was not entitled to inherit 
under this will. The basic reason for this decision was the common law maxim that, “No one shall 
be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong”.520 This maxim can 
be considered to be a legal consideration, but it would be misleading to view it as a consideration 
that related to the interpretation of the will. This was not a situation where the Court interpreted the 
will at all, but a situation where the Court did not give effect to a provision in the will for a general 
legal reason. Such a legal reason can be considered a relevant legal consideration related to the legal 
decision that was reached, but it would be misleading to view it as a relevant legal consideration 
related to the interpretation of the will. 
 
8 Detecting fallacies and providing alternative, non-fallacious interpretations 
 
This chapter has identified two fallacies that can be committed in judicial interpretation. It is useful 
now to explicitly set out a practical way to detect such fallacies in relation to a specific instance of 
judicial interpretation and to arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations. The process of 
detecting these fallacies and providing alternative interpretations can be set out in five steps. 
                                               
518  Corbin, above n 284, at 12. 
519  Riggs v Palmer (1889) 115 NY 506 (CA). 
520  Ibid, at 511 
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This thesis has focused on instances of judicial interpretation that involve the categorisation of 
specific matters within the legal category designated by the word being interpreted. To detect 
fallacies, such interpretive decisions should be viewed as acts of categorisation. Such acts of 
categorisation involve judges making the decision whether to assign an item to a legal category. 
Therefore, the first step is to identify both the legal category and the item. The legal category is the 
category designated by the word that has been interpreted. This act of interpretation is an act of 
categorisation and has either resulted in the inclusion of a matter within this legal category or the 
exclusion of a matter from this category. This matter that has either been included within or 
excluded from this category by this act of categorisation is the item. 
 
The second step is to identify the relevant considerations that relate to this act of categorisation. 
These include considerations related to the word being interpreted, the legal category designated by 
this word, items relevant to this act of categorisation, and general legal considerations. Chart 4.1 
lists the kinds of considerations that are potentially relevant to an act of categorisation. 
 
The third step is to identify the reasons that have been given for the act of categorisation that has 
occurred. It then needs to be determined whether these reasons are relevant, that is, whether they 
can be related to this act of categorisation. In relation to the specific fallacies identified in this 
chapter, it needs to be determined whether the act of categorisation has been made on the basis of an 
irrelevant consideration regarding the verbal category to which the item can be assigned. 
 
The fourth step is to determine whether it is most likely that a different result would have been 
reached if any irrelevant considerations that were introduced (including the primary irrelevant 
consideration of the verbal category to which the item can be assigned and any other irrelevant 
considerations) had been omitted and if the relevant legal considerations had been introduced. Once 
this is done, it can be seen whether the two specific fallacies identified in this chapter have been 
committed.  
 
This automatically leads to the fifth step, which is to provide the alternative, non-fallacious 
interpretation by omitting any irrelevant considerations and introducing the relevant considerations.  
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These five steps are set out in Chart 4.3, below. 
 
 
 
Chart 4.3 sets out the steps that can be used to detect fallacies and provide alternative, non-
fallacious interpretations. This chart shows how to detect any fallacy that is caused by the 
introduction of irrelevant considerations and the omission of relevant considerations. The specific 
fallacies identified in this paper are identified by these same steps, but the primary irrelevant 
consideration relates to the verbal category to which the item at issue can be assigned. Judges can 
avoid fallacies by viewing interpretation as categorisation and following the first two steps in Chart 
4.3 and then categorising the item at issue by taking into account the relevant considerations.  
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It is now useful to analyse another case to illustrate this process of detecting fallacies. The House of 
Lords’ decision Mannai Investment v Eagle Star Life Assurance521 involved the interpretation of a 
lease. The lease was for a term of 10 years from 13 January 1992.522 Clause 7(13) of the lease 
provided: 
 
The tenant may by serving not less than six months’ notice in writing on the landlord or its solicitor such 
notice to expire on the third anniversary of the term commencement date determine this lease and upon 
expiry of such notice this lease shall cease and determine and have no further effect. 
 
The tenant attempted to bring the lease to an end by serving a notice523 on the landlord. The tenant’s 
notice stated: “Pursuant to clause 7(13) of the lease we as tenant hereby give notice to you to 
determine the lease on 12 January 1995”.524  
 
The third anniversary of the “term commencement date”, however, was 13 January 1995, not 12 
January 1995. Therefore, the tenant made a mistake in the date that was given in the notice. The 
landlord claimed that the notice was ineffective due to the tenant’s mistake, even though the notice 
was served on the landlord more than six months before 13 January 1995.525 
 
The issue was whether the notice was an effective notice under clause 7(13). In a dissenting speech, 
Lord Goff stated:526  
 
At first sight it seems unreasonable that the notice should not have been effective. It was obvious that the 
tenant was trying to give an effective notice under the clause, and that it had mistakenly assumed that the 
anniversary of the term commencement date was not 13 January but 12 January 1995. … It is tempting 
therefore to assist the tenant who has made a mistake of this kind, when it must have been obvious to the 
landlord that the tenant intended to give an effective notice under the clause. 
 
Lord Goff, however, stated “a notice under such a clause will only be effective if it conforms to the 
specification in the clause.”527 His Lordship further noted:528 
                                               
521  Mannai Investment v Eagle Star Life Assurance [1997] AC 749 (HL) [Mannai Investment]. 
522  Ibid, at 752. 
523  There were two leases with identical break clauses and two identical notices were served by the tenant (ibid, at 752), 
but for simplicity this analysis will refer to ‘the lease’ and ‘the notice’. 
524  Ibid. 
525  Ibid, at 766. 
526  Ibid, at 753. 
527  Ibid, at 755. 
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The question … is: does the notice which was given, properly construed, comply with the agreed 
specification? If it does, it is effective for its purpose. If it does not, it is not so effective; and the mere fact 
that the person serving the notice plainly intended, and was trying, to give an effective notice under the 
clause, and that the recipient of the notice realised that he was doing so, makes no difference. … The key 
does not fit the lock, and so the door will not open. 
 
His Lordship noted that counsel for the tenant had submitted that:529 
 
a more relaxed approach be adopted to the construction of notices of this kind, so that, if it is clear that the 
giver of the notice intended to comply with the provision of the clause, he should be held to have done so, 
despite an erroneous choice of the date on which the notice is to take effect. 
 
However, he rejected this submission, noting that:530 
 
It seems to me that the adoption of such a test in truth requires that a new meaning should be given to 
clauses of this kind, so that they are read as requiring no more than that the giver of the notice should 
express a clear intention to exercise his rights under the clause …. 
 
For these reasons, his Lordship decided that the notice was not effective. 
 
Lord Steyn disagreed with Lord Goff’s decision and stated:531 
 
The question is not whether 12 January can mean 13 January: it self-evidently cannot. The real question is 
a different one: does the notice construed against its contextual setting unambiguously inform a 
reasonable recipient how and when the notice is to operate under the right reserved?  
 
Lord Steyn, therefore, stated that “it would have been obvious to a reasonable recipient that the 
notices contained a minor misdescription and that the notices conveyed that the tenant sought to 
determine the leases” and held that the notice was effective.532 
 
Lord Hoffmann also held that the notice was effective.533 His Lordship stated:534 
                                                                                                                                                            
528  Ibid, at 755-756. 
529  Ibid, at 760-761. 
530  Ibid, at 761. 
531  Ibid, at 772 (italics in original). 
532  Ibid, at 773. 
533  Ibid, at 780. 
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It is of course true that the law is not concerned with the speaker’s subjective intentions. But the notion 
that the law’s concern is therefore with the ‘meaning of his words’ conceals an important ambiguity. The 
ambiguity lies in a failure to distinguish between the meaning of words and the question of what would be 
understood as the meaning of a person who uses words. 
 
His Lordship held that “[t]he notice should be construed against the background of the terms of the 
lease. Interpreted in this way, the notice in the present case was valid”.535 Lord Clyde also decided 
that the notice was effective.536 Therefore, the majority of the Law Lords held that the notice was 
effective. 
 
The process of detecting fallacies can be applied to Lord Goff’s decision in this case. First, the legal 
category and the item under consideration need to be identified. The legal category is the category 
designated by the words “the third anniversary of the term commencement date” in clause 7(13) of 
the lease, which are the words being interpreted. The item under considerations is the notice given 
by the tenant, specifically, the phrase “12 January 1995”. The question is whether these words in the 
tenant’s notice fit the description in clause 7(13) of the lease. Viewed in relation to categorisation, 
the issue is whether this item can fit within this legal category.  
 
Second, the relevant legal considerations related to this legal category need to be identified. As Lord 
Steyn and Lord Hoffmann pointed out, the primary relevant consideration that relates to this act of 
categorisation is the intention of the tenant and whether this intention was communicated to the 
landlord.537 The tenant’s notice interpreted against the factual background clearly expressed the 
requisite intention and this was also clearly communicated to the landlord. The legal category 
designated by clause 7(13) was created so the tenant could indicate its intention to break the 
lease.538 The requirements to break the lease, therefore, should be that the tenant gives notice that 
indicates an intention in accordance with clause 7(13).  
 
A further relevant consideration is the consequence of refusing to assign the item to the category 
and of assigning the item to this category.539 The consequence of Lord Goff’s refusal to assign the 
                                                                                                                                                            
534  Ibid, at 775. 
535  Ibid, at 780. 
536  Ibid, at 783. 
537  This corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
538  This also corresponds to consideration 2.1 in Chart 4.1. 
539  This corresponds to consideration 2.2 in Chart 4.1. 
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item to this category is that the landlord could take advantage of the tenant’s mistake. The 
consequence of assigning this item to this category, however, is to give effect to the intention of the 
tenant and to deny the landlord the opportunity of taking advantage of the tenant’s mistake.  
 
Third, the reason for the act of categorisation in Lord Goff’s decision needs to be identified. Lord 
Goff decided that this item was not within this category (in his Lordship’s words, “the key does not 
fit the lock”540). The reason his Lordship gave was that the notice did not “comply with the agreed 
specification”.541 Therefore, because the notice did not say ‘13 January 1995’, it was not effective. 
The notice was not effective because the date that the tenant used was different from the one 
required on a literal reading of clause 7(13). 
 
It is necessary to determine whether this consideration concerning the literal meaning of clause 
7(13) is relevant to this act of categorisation. The reason for this legal category was to provide an 
opportunity for the tenant to break the lease. This was done by the tenant giving notice indicating 
this intention. Lord Goff held that because a different date was mistakenly given, the notice was not 
effective. The fact that the wrong date was given, however, is an irrelevant consideration, when 
considered in the light of the reason for this legal category. The fact that the tenant expressed its 
intention using the wrong date should not mean that this notice was not effective if the intention 
was clearly expressed.  
 
It was not merely that the landlord would have known that the tenant had mistakenly written the 
wrong date, but the landlord would have known the specific reason for the mistake. Lord Goff noted 
that Hobhouse LJ in the Court of Appeal pointed out that “the tenant had mistakenly read the clause 
as if it said ‘to expire at the end of the third year of the term’”.542 Moreover, the notice that the 
tenant gave even referred to clause 7(13) in the lease.543 Lastly, the notice was given more than six 
months before 13 January 1995. Thus, the fact that the wrong date was given did not have any 
practical effect on the landlord. The date was just an arbitrary date chosen so that the tenant could 
indicate an intention to break the lease. Given these considerations, it is even clearer that the fact 
that the wrong date had mistakenly been given could not mislead the landlord and is therefore not a 
                                               
540  See text accompanying n 528. 
541  See text accompanying n 527. 
542  Mannai Investment, above n 521, at 753. 
543  Interestingly, Lord Goff stated “the trap which the tenant fell into in the present case is easily avoided by adopting 
the familiar stratagem of invoking, as an alternative to the specific date, a date identifiable by reference to the terms 
of the clause itself” (ibid, at 761). Nevertheless, his Lordship did not think that the fact that the tenant had used the 
words “pursuant to clause 7(13)” in the notice was sufficient to counteract the mistake that had been made. 
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relevant consideration in relation to this act of categorisation.  
 
Although, strictly speaking, it may be said that this instance of interpretation did not involve the 
interpretation of words, but of a number, it can still be seen as precisely analogous to the fallacy 
‘different verbal category, therefore, outside legal category’. The item (the tenant’s notice, and 
specifically, the phrase ‘12 January 1995’) could be put in a different verbal category from the 
verbal category designating the legal category: ‘the third anniversary of the term commencement 
date’. Lord Goff pointed out this different verbal category: “the end of the third year of the term”.544 
The fact that the item could be put in this different verbal category, or even that it would normally 
be put in this different verbal category, however, does not necessarily mean it should be outside the 
legal category. The fact that the item could be put in this different verbal category was irrelevant to 
this act of legal categorisation because the reason for this legal category was to give the tenant an 
opportunity to indicate its intention to break the lease, and this item (the notice) indicated this 
intention clearly. The difference in date had no practical effect on the landlord, did not mean that the 
tenant’s intention was not communicated, and did not even mean that the intention was any less 
clear than if the correct date had been given because the notice referred to clause 7(13) in the lease. 
It was therefore an irrelevant consideration,545 because it was not a valid reason to exclude the item 
from this legal category.  
 
Fourth, there needs to be a determination of whether it is most likely that Lord Goff’s act of 
categorisation would have been decided differently if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted 
and the relevant legal considerations had been introduced. Lord Goff’s decision was based on an 
irrelevant consideration in relation to this act of categorisation. Furthermore, it neglected the 
relevant consideration of the reason for the legal category. Lord Goff’s decision would most likely 
have been made differently if the irrelevant consideration had been omitted and the relevant 
consideration had been introduced.546 This is seen by the result in the decisions which introduced 
this relevant consideration. For these reasons, Lord Goff’s decision was fallacious.  
 
                                               
544  See text accompanying n 542. 
545  In many situations, a mistake in the date in a notice would be a relevant consideration. The point being made here is 
that it was an irrelevant consideration for this instance of interpretation. An analogous irrelevant consideration 
would be if the tenant made a minor spelling mistake that did not affect intelligibility. 
546  The fact that it may be possible to find relevant considerations that could support the result reached by Lord Goff 
(for instance, a policy argument based on a conjecture regarding the economic efficiency of literal interpretation) 
does not mean that such a decision is not fallacious. These sort of relevant considerations need to be weighed up 
against the relevant consideration of giving effect to the tenant’s intention which is the reason for the existence of 
the legal category, and is therefore a much more relevant consideration. 
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Fifth, the alternative, non-fallacious interpretation would be the decision reached by the majority of 
the Law Lords which took the relevant legal consideration into account and omitted the irrelevant 
consideration of the verbal category to which the item could be assigned.  
 
The reason this fallacy was committed was that Lord Goff focused on the legal category (clause 
7(13)) and the item that he expected to be assigned to it, rather than the item before the Court and 
whether it should be assigned to this legal category given the reason for this act of categorisation.  
 
It is helpful to make a few more points about Mannai Investment. First, to say the consideration that 
Lord Goff introduced (the mistaken date) was an irrelevant consideration is to say it is not relevant 
to the exclusion of the item from this legal category. A relevant consideration is a reason for an act 
of categorisation. The Court needed to consider the fact that the wrong date had been given, but 
then the decision needed to be made whether this fact was a valid reason for excluding the item 
from the legal category. Therefore, to say that this is an irrelevant consideration does not mean that 
it should not be taken into account by the Court at all. It means that it is not a reason that supports 
the exclusion of this item from this category.547  
 
Second, this analysis should not be taken to suggest that tenants can express their intention in any 
form whatsoever. The notice given needed to comply with clause 7(13). For instance, the notice 
needed to be in writing. If the tenant merely orally informed the landlord of an intention to break 
the lease, this would not be sufficient. The crucial point is that the notice that was given did comply 
with clause 7(13). Given the reason for clause 7(13), the minor mistake in the date should not be 
sufficient to mean that the notice did not comply. Therefore, the claim is not being made that every 
time a party to a contract makes a mistake but succeeds in communicating an intention, this 
intention should be recognised and given effect to by the courts. Rather, in the context of this 
specific act of categorisation, it was correct to give effect to the clear, communicated intention of 
the tenant.  
 
It is therefore not the case that a decision that the tenant’s notice was effective would have the result 
mentioned by Lord Goff that clauses of this kind “are read as requiring no more than that the giver 
                                               
547  Similarly, in Smith the Court may have needed to consult dictionaries, but if it is clear that the meanings given in the 
dictionaries are not relevant to the meaning that is being expressed in the provision, this meaning is an irrelevant 
consideration in relation to the act of categorisation before the Court. 
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of the notice should express a clear intention to exercise his rights under the clause”.548 The notice 
does need to comply with the clause. Rather, deciding that the tenant’s notice was effective had the 
result that clauses of this kind are interpreted with reference to the reasons they exist.  
 
Third, if a majority of the Law Lords had concurred with Lord Goff’s decision, a decision in a 
lower court that had reached a similar result would not be fallacious, because that court would be 
constrained to decide this way due to this binding precedent. Therefore, fallacious decisions at the 
level of the superior courts have the effect of forcing other courts to make similar decisions.  
 
Fourth, it is useful to briefly consider the views about meaning expressed in this judgement. It can 
be said that this case involved the interpretation of the meaning of a number. Numbers are signs like 
words, and thus are arbitrary, yet conventional symbols. Although the conventions in relation to 
numbers are far more settled than those in relation to words, they are still conventions. Therefore, 
Lord Steyn’s statement that 12 January cannot mean 13 January549 may not be as self-evident as it 
seems. It is true that the tenant did not mean 13 January in this instance. Rather, the tenant thought 
that the clause required notice to be given on 12 January. Still, it may be possible for 12 January to 
mean 13 January. Meaning is inextricably related to intention. Lord Hoffmann pointed out there is a 
need to “distinguish between the meaning of words and the question of what would be understood 
as the meaning of a person who uses words.”550 This distinction is helpful, but it may be clearer to 
say that the meaning of words is what a speaker uses them to mean. It is possible that a person 
could refer to ‘12 January’ and mean ‘13 January’, and if this intention was communicated, it 
should be recognised by the courts. Therefore, the claim that 12 January cannot mean 13 January 
seems to be based on an erroneous view about meaning. Lord Goff’s statement that the “key does 
not fit the lock, and so the door will not open”551 also seems to be based on an erroneous view of 
meaning: that there should be a fixed relationship between a certain verbal formula and a certain 
legal result. The whole purpose of language is to convey intention. The analogy of a key and a lock 
suggests that there is the need of a specific form of language to achieve a certain legal result, and 
this view of language can lead to the view that the verbal category to which an item can be assigned 
should determine the legal category to which it should be assigned. 
 
                                               
548  See text accompanying n 530. 
549  See text accompanying n 531. 
550  See text accompanying n 534. 
551  See text accompanying n 528. 
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D Conclusion 
 
This section concludes this chapter by addressing the questions regarding judicial interpretation 
raised at the end of Chapter Two. These answers summarise the main ideas in this chapter. They 
also show how the central contention of this thesis has been proven. Since this chapter has focused 
on judicial interpretation which involves categorisation, the answers to these questions focus on this 
kind of judicial interpretation and the statements made in these answers do not apply to all instances 
of judicial interpretation. Specifically, they do not apply to instances of judicial interpretation which 
do not involve the categorisation of a specific item within the legal category designated by the word 
being interpreted. 
 
1. What are the differences between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation? 
 
Various minor differences can be noted between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation. 
These include that judges are the authoritative interpreters and that legal interpretation takes place 
in the context of an official legal decision, that intention may need to be presumed where it is not 
discoverable or did not exist, that the act of interpretation is often delayed and is in the context of a 
different factual situation from the act of speaking, and that there are various evidentiary restrictions 
on legal interpretation. Importantly, such differences do not mean that the process of legal 
interpretation is significantly different from the process of ordinary interpretation. 
 
It is misleading to claim that legal interpretation is concerned with objectively ascertaining meaning 
whereas ordinary interpretation is concerned with the subjective intentions of speakers. Both kinds 
of interpretation are necessarily objective. Moreover, in many situations legal interpretation does 
involve ascertaining the actual intention of speakers.  
 
There are two important differences between legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation. First, 
the considerations that are relevant to legal interpretation may be different from the ones that are 
relevant to ordinary interpretation. Because legal interpretation relates to a legal decision regarding 
the application of the law, considerations related to the law are relevant, for instance, considerations 
related to the law generally, consideration related to the specific area of law at issue, and legal 
policy considerations. 
 
Second, legal interpretation is often focused on deciding whether a specific item should fit within a 
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legal category whereas ordinary interpretation is focused on discovering a meaning of a word. This 
means that judges may have to attribute a meaning to a word, rather than discover a meaning. More 
importantly, this means that the meaning given to the word being interpreted is related to a decision 
regarding the legal status of the matter before the court, and is not an end in itself.  
 
Having noted these two differences, both legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation involve 
essentially the same process, and this can be seen clearly when both are viewed in relation to 
categorisation. Both kinds of interpretation can involve the assignment of an item to a category 
based on relevant considerations. 
 
2. Should legal interpretation be approached differently from ordinary interpretation? If so, in 
what way?  
 
The basic processes involved in legal interpretation and ordinary interpretation are similar, but the 
considerations that need to be taken into account and the focuses of the acts of interpretation are 
different. A helpful way to approach ordinary interpretation is to view it as the discovery of the 
meaning a speaker has given the word being interpreted. Therefore, ordinary interpretation is based 
on considerations indicating the specific meaning being expressed by the speaker and is focused on 
the discovery of the speaker’s meaning. A helpful way to approach legal interpretation can be to 
view it as an act of categorisation which is based on various relevant legal considerations. 
Furthermore, the focus of this act of categorisation is on whether the specific item before the court 
should be included within the legal category designated by the word being interpreted.  
 
3. Are fallacies committed in the interpretation of language ordinarily relevant to legal 
interpretation?  
 
Fallacies that are committed in ordinary interpretation may be relevant to legal interpretation. For 
instance, the two fallacies identified in Chapter Three of this thesis (the ‘same word’ fallacy and the 
‘different word’ fallacy) are relevant to legal interpretation because corresponding fallacies can be 
committed by judges. Because of the difference in focus between ordinary interpretation and legal 
interpretation, however, these fallacies should be viewed in relation to the categorisation of a 
specific item within a certain legal category. Thus, the ordinary language fallacy that involves the 
assumption ‘same word, therefore, same meaning’ corresponds to the judicial fallacy that involves 
the assumption ‘same verbal category, therefore, within legal category’, and the ordinary language 
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fallacy that involves the assumption ‘different word, therefore, different meaning’ corresponds to 
the judicial fallacy that involves the assumption ‘different verbal category, therefore, outside legal 
category’.  
 
4. What is the goal of judicial interpretation? 
 
Viewed in relation to categorisation, the goal of judicial interpretation is to correctly categorise the 
item before the court. The judge needs to determine whether to assign this item to the legal category 
designated by the word being interpreted. The decision regarding whether to assign a certain item to 
a legal category should be governed by the legal considerations relevant to this act of categorisation. 
These include considerations related to the word being interpreted, the legal category designated by 
this word, items relevant to this act of categorisation, and general legal considerations.552 In this 
chapter, these considerations have been called ‘relevant legal considerations’. When an item is 
assigned to a legal category this has the effect of implementing the law in relation to that category, 
applying the law to that item, and giving that item a legal status with an attendant legal 
consequence. 
 
5. What makes an instance of judicial interpretation fallacious? 
 
Judicial interpretation should be based on relevant legal considerations. A consideration is irrelevant 
when it is not related to the specific act of categorisation before the court. An instance of judicial 
interpretation is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant consideration and it is most 
likely that a different result would have been reached if that consideration had been omitted, or 
when it omits a relevant legal consideration and it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if that consideration had been taken into account. 
 
6. What kinds of fallacies are committed in judicial interpretation? 
 
Two specific judicial fallacies have been identified in this chapter. First, the ‘same verbal category’ 
fallacy. This occurs when a judge assumes that because an item can be assigned to the verbal 
category by which the legal category has been designated, it should be assigned to this legal 
category. Second, the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy. This occurs when a judge assumes that 
because an item can be assigned to a different verbal category from the verbal category by which 
                                               
552  Chart 4.1 sets out these four groups of relevant legal considerations. 
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the legal category has been designated, it should not be assigned to this legal category.  
 
When these assumptions regarding the verbal category to which an item can be assigned result in 
the introduction of irrelevant considerations, and it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if these irrelevant considerations had not been introduced and the relevant legal 
considerations had been taken into account, the interpretation is fallacious. 
 
7. Why are these fallacies committed in judicial interpretation? 
 
Fallacies are committed in situations where a judge associates the item under consideration with a 
certain verbal category and does not look beyond this association to the relevant legal 
considerations. This can occur because of a focus on the discovery of the meaning of the word 
being interpreted rather than a focus on the correct categorisation of the item before the court. 
 
First, when a judge focuses on the discovery of the meaning of the word being interpreted, this can 
lead to the introduction of the irrelevant consideration of a meaning the word being interpreted can 
have and the neglect of the relevant legal considerations. Second, when a judges focuses the word 
being interpreted rather than the item before the court and whether it should be assigned to the legal 
category designated by this word, this can cause relevant legal considerations to be misapplied and 
can introduce irrelevant considerations.  
 
8. What is the consequence of these fallacies? 
 
The consequence of these fallacies is that an item is either wrongly included in or wrongly excluded 
from the legal category designated by the word being interpreted.  
 
9. How should an instance of interpretation be analysed to see whether it is fallacious? 
 
There are four steps to detect the fallacies identified in this chapter. First, the item to be categorised 
and the legal category need to be identified. Second, the relevant legal considerations that relate to 
this act of categorisation need to be elicited. Third, it needs to be determined whether the act of 
categorisation that has occurred has been made on the basis of an irrelevant consideration regarding 
the verbal category to which the item can be assigned. Fourth, it needs to be determined whether it 
is most likely that a different result would have been reached if any irrelevant considerations had 
200 
 
been omitted and the relevant legal consideration had been introduced. 
 
10. How can judges avoid fallacies?  
 
To avoid fallacies, judges need to pay attention to the relevant legal considerations and avoid 
irrelevant considerations. They also need to be willing to look beyond the verbal category to which 
an item can be assigned and determine whether it should be assigned to the legal category at issue. 
This can be done when judges view judicial interpretation as categorisation based on relevant legal 
considerations and focus on the correct categorisation of the item before the court. 
 
11. What is the way to arrive at alternative, non-fallacious interpretations when judicial fallacies 
have been committed? 
 
An alternative, non-fallacious interpretation is reached by making an interpretive decision on the 
basis of the relevant legal considerations and omitting any irrelevant considerations. Since the 
fallacies identified in this chapter involve either the wrong inclusion of an item in a legal category 
or the wrong exclusion of an item from a legal category, the alternative interpretations are clear. For 
the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy, the alternative interpretation is that the wrongly included item 
should be excluded from the legal category. For the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy, the 
alternative interpretation is that the wrongly excluded item should be included within the legal 
category.  
 
This chapter has analysed language in the law and judicial fallacies. It has provided a general 
definition of fallacious interpretation and has identified two specific fallacies that judges can 
commit. It has provided a way to detect these fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-fallacious 
interpretations when they occur. It has also given examples of such fallacies being committed by 
judges. Furthermore, it has briefly discussed how judges can avoid these fallacies.  
 
The examples of fallacies being committed have been from different jurisdictions, have related to 
different areas of the law, and have involved the interpretation of different kinds of legal documents. 
The analysis in this chapter can apply so broadly because it is viewing judicial interpretation as 
categorisation. Judicial interpretation is governed by different rules in different jurisdictions, but in 
all jurisdictions it can involve categorisation. Judicial interpretation in different areas of the law is 
based on different considerations, but in all areas of the law it can involve categorisation. The 
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judicial interpretation of different kinds of legal documents is focused on different matters, but the 
interpretation of all legal documents can involve categorisation. When viewed in relation to 
categorisation, even judicial interpretation and ordinary interpretation are fundamentally similar. 
Therefore, viewing judicial interpretation in relation to categorisation provides a helpful way to 
understand the basic process of judicial interpretation and this understanding can be applied very 
broadly.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LAW, LANGUAGE, AND CATEGORISATION 
 
A Introduction 
 
This chapter will address the general questions about law and language raised at the end of Chapter 
Two in light of the analysis in both Chapter Three and Chapter Four. Some of these questions may 
be dismissed as meaningless, but it is still helpful to address them.  
 
B Law and Categorisation 
 
This thesis has shown that judicial interpretation often involves categorisation. Although some 
definitions of the word ‘law’ were briefly mentioned in Chapter Two,553 it has not been necessary to 
provide a definition of the word ‘law’ for the purpose of this thesis. It has been seen, however, that 
judicial interpretation often involves the assignment of items to legal categories. The result of such 
an assignment is that the law is applied to these items in the sense that they are given a legal status. 
Furthermore, such assignment means that the law is implemented in the sense that the legal reason 
for the categories to which the items have been assigned is fulfilled. This implementation of the law 
can include the implementation of specific laws embodied in statutes, the recognition of legal 
relationships enshrined in contracts, and the carrying out of legal arrangements set out in wills or 
other legal documents.  
 
Thus, the law can be viewed as involving a system of legal categories to which items can be 
assigned by judicial interpretation. Such assignment gives these items a legal status. Although this 
may not be a comprehensive definition of the word ‘law’, it is a useful description of an important 
aspect of the law.  
 
                                               
553  See the paragraph accompanying n 26. 
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C Law, Language and Categorisation 
 
In light of this description of the law, the general questions raised at the end of Chapter Two can be 
addressed. 
 
1. What is a useful way to describe the nature of the relationship between law and language? 
 
In Chapter Two, various parallels between law and language were noted.554 A parallel that was not 
noted is that both a language and a legal system can be viewed as classificatory systems. Just as a 
specific language is a classificatory system, it can be said that the law governing a specific 
jurisdiction is a classificatory system. This is a more basic parallel between law and language than 
the others which were noted. It shows that there are not merely outward incidental similarities 
between law and language, but that law and language have a fundamental structural similarity.555  
 
The claim that law is language,556 therefore, may have some truth to it. The law in a specific 
jurisdiction is a classificatory system that is used to give items a legal status, just as a language is a 
classificatory system that is used to give items names. If the claim that law is language means that 
law functions as a classificatory system similar to language, such a claim is correct. 
 
It can also be said that law uses language as a classificatory system. In a sense, this use of language 
in the law is similar to other professions such as medicine which have their own vocabulary. Still, 
there is an important distinction. H L A Hart stated: 557  
 
The first efforts to define words like ‘corporation’, ‘right’ or ‘duty’ reveal that these do not have the 
straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of fact which most ordinary words have and 
to which we appeal in our definition of ordinary words. There is nothing which simply ‘corresponds’ to 
these legal words …. 
 
Such a statement is a little misleading. It is arguable that there is something that corresponds to each 
of these words. This statement, however, reveals an important distinction between the use of 
language in the law and the use of language in other professions. The use of language as a 
                                               
554  See the paragraph accompanying n 19. 
555  Compare the statement by Rotman quoted in n 21. 
556  See the quotations in n 24. 
557 HLA Hart “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” (1954) 70 LQR 37 at 38.  
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classificatory system in the law is different from the use of a technical vocabulary in other 
professions because the very existence of legal categories is dependent on the legal system of which 
those categories are a part. The use of language in the law creates a classificatory system with 
certain categories which would not exist at all if there were not a legal system to support them. A 
certain disease would still exist whether or not it was medically recognised, but a crime does not 
exist if it is not legally recognised. The action that would constitute the crime would still exist, but it 
would not be a crime. In this sense it can be said that legal categories do not have “counterparts in 
the world of fact” in the same way that categories created by other professions often do.558 
 
2.  Why is language important to the law?  
 
Having noted that law is a classificatory system, it is important to point out that law is not merely a 
classificatory system in addition to language, but is a classificatory system which employs 
language. Language is important to the law because it provides the law with a medium which makes 
it possible to categorise items, that is, it provides the law with a system within which legal 
categories can be expressed. The law uses language as a classificatory system. Language, therefore, 
makes it possible for items to be legally classified. 
 
3. To what extent does the nature of language determine the nature of the law? 
 
Because law employs language as a classificatory system, the nature of language determines the 
nature of law in a number of ways. Law inherits various traits of language. For instance, the 
categorisation errors that are possible in ordinary language interpretation are also possible in legal 
interpretation. Moreover, these categorisation errors can occur when the categorisation of items in 
ordinary language is confused with their categorisation in the law.559 This is because law uses 
language to create a system of categorisation, but this system is within the existing system of 
                                               
558  John Searle has drawn a distinction between ‘brute facts’ and ‘institutional facts’. Brute facts include the fact that 
“Mount Everest has snow and ice near the summit or that hydrogen atoms have one electron, which facts are totally 
independent of any human opinions. … Institutional facts are so called because they require human institutions for 
their existence. In order that a piece of paper should be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human 
institution of money. Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence.” John R Searle The Construction 
of Social Reality (The Free Press, New York, 1995) at 2. Therefore, it can be said that the law creates institutional 
facts, whereas other professions often classify brute facts. Institutional facts, however, can also be created in other 
areas of society, for instance, in sports (at 1). For instance, whether or not a certain event should be classified as a 
goal in a certain game depends on the rules of the game being played. These rules are a human institution and thus 
create institutional facts such as the fact that a certain event constitutes a goal. 
559  That is, a judge can think that because an item can be assigned to a certain verbal category it should be assigned to a 
certain legal category. 
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categorisation that ordinary language provides and employs the same words.560 
 
4. Is the law merely contained in language, or is this language itself the law?  
 
The plain legal language proponent Robert Benson makes the claim that “a law revision 
commission routinely tells a legislature, ‘We have simplified the code you asked us to look at, and 
changed only the words, not the law’”.561 Jeffrey Barnes, however, has argued that “in its attempts 
to change the impact of the law, the plain language project can be usefully analysed as a ‘law 
reform’ project.”562 The claim that the simplification of legal language changes only the words and 
not the law relies on an implicit definition of the law as something which is contained in language. 
The claim that clarifying legal language involves reforming the law may rely on an implicit 
definition of the law as certain language. To avoid confusion, such implicit definitions need to be 
made clear. They can be made clear when the law is viewed in relation to categorisation. 
 
In relation to categorisation, the law can either be seen as a system of legal categories that is 
embodied in specific language or as specific language that embodies a system of legal categories. 
These two ways of viewing the law are actually saying the same thing in two different ways. 
Whether the law is defined as the language itself that embodies the legal categories or as legal 
categories that are embodied in language, it still involves the use of language to embody categories. 
On the one hand, the categories could not be expressed without the language. On the other hand, the 
language would be of no effect if it did not express the categories.  
 
Likewise, there is no real difference between the claim that the law is language and the claim that 
the law is contained in language. On the one hand, the law could not be expressed without the 
language, so it can be argued that the language itself is the law. On the other hand, the language is 
of no effect without the law it expresses, so it can be argued that the language contains the law. On 
either view, however, the law needs to be expressed in language. Therefore, no answer to the 
                                               
560  In Chapter Three D it was pointed out that the categorisation that language imposes on thought can either be viewed 
as restricting thought or as enabling thought, that is, it can either be viewed negatively or positively. Similarly, the 
categorisation that law imposes on items can be viewed as restrictive or enabling, that is, negatively or positively. In 
Lon Fuller’s words, law can be viewed “as an instrument of constraint to keep people from evil or damaging 
behaviour … [or] a framework within which [people] can organize their relations with one another in such a manner 
as to make possible a peaceful and profitable coexistence” Lon L Fuller “Law as an Instrument of Social Control 
and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction” (1975) 1975 BYU L Rev 89 at 89.  
561  Robert W Benson “The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over” (1984-1985) 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 519 at 
563. 
562  Jeffrey Barnes “The Continuing Debate About ‘Plain Language’ Legislation: A Law Reform Conundrum” (2006) 27 
Statute L Rev 83 at 85.  
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question of whether the law is merely contained in language or whether this language itself is the 
law can provide any real insight into the nature of law or its relationship to language. It is thus a 
meaningless question. A better question to ask would be: ‘What effect does language have on the 
law?’  
 
Diagram 2.1 depicted the relationship between law and language in relation to drafting and judicial 
interpretation in a preliminary way. This relationship was given more accurately and in more detail 
in Diagram 4.6 in relation to legal speaking and legal interpretation. Still, the basic question of the 
relationship between law and language was not addressed clearly by these diagrams. Diagram 5.1, 
below, revisits the question of the relationship between law and language by viewing this 
relationship in terms of legal categorisation.  
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Diagram 5.1563 shows that when the law is viewed in relation to categorisation it can be seen that 
the claims that the law is language or that the law is contained in language are really saying the 
same thing. Such claims, therefore, provide no insight into the nature of the law or its relationship to 
language. They just illustrate two ways of looking at the relationship between law and language.  
 
To a certain extent, arguments about the law may rely on question-begging definitions. For instance, 
the claim that simplifying legal language changes only the words and not the law depends on an 
implicit definition of ‘law’ as something contained in language. On this definition, the law can be 
                                               
563  This diagram depicts the relationship between the law and language, whereas Diagram 2.1 depicted the relationship 
between law and language. The term ‘the law’ is more specific than the term ‘law’. ‘The law’ relates to a specific 
legal system, or a specific system of legal categories, whereas ‘law’ may be thought of as an abstraction that is not 
related to any particular system of categories. 
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distinguished from the language in which it is contained. This, however, is only one way to view the 
relationship between law and language. Furthermore, the claim that simplifying legal language will 
change the law may rely on an implicit definition of the law as language. On this definition, the law 
cannot be distinguished from the language in which it is contained. This again is only one way to 
view the relationship between law and language. It may be possible to sustain either claim, but to do 
this is it necessary to see the nature of the relationship between law and language clearly. A good 
way to see this relationship clearly is to view it in terms of categorisation.  
 
5. If a distinction is drawn between the words of the law and the law, what is the law as 
opposed to the words of the law?  
 
This question concerns the nature of the ‘abstract law’ in Diagram 2.1. In Chapter Two it was 
mentioned that the concept of ‘abstract law’ is questionable and may create confusion.564 There is a 
certain sense, however, in which the law can be said to exist apart from the words of the law. This 
can be seen clearly when the law is viewed in relation to categorisation. The law can be viewed as a 
system of legal categories to which items can be assigned. There are a variety of relevant legal 
considerations which determine whether an item should be assigned to a legal category. In the sense 
that these considerations are legally relevant considerations which determine the legal result, and 
therefore determine what the law is, they can be viewed as the law in relation to this category. These 
considerations, however, should not be viewed as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky”,565 but 
rather should just be viewed as a group of considerations which determine whether an item should 
be assigned to a legal category. Therefore, these relevant legal considerations can be viewed as the 
abstract law in Diagram 2.1.566 
 
Chapter Two mentioned that some theorists have viewed judicial interpretation as the law.567 A 
problem with this view was pointed out by Brian Bix. In his introduction to Jerome Frank’s Law 
and the Modern Mind, Bix notes:568  
 
One problem with a theory of law that focuses on actual official actions (especially actual judicial 
                                               
564  See text accompanying n 45. 
565  See n 45. 
566  The relevant legal considerations govern interpretation. Therefore, they may relate to more matters than the abstract 
law in Diagram 2.1 which governs legal drafting. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that only the relevant legal 
considerations that relate to the drafting of a legal document should be viewed as the abstract law in Diagram 2.1 
567  See n 35. 
568  Brian Bix in Jerome Frank Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (NJ), 2009) at xiii. 
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decisions) is that it does not have the resources to explain the idea of ‘legal mistake’ … Equating law 
this closely with actual decisions, and leaving no conceptual room for ‘the law’ diverging from those 
[mistaken] decisions, is a more radical conclusion than most judges, lawyers, and legal scholars are 
willing to swallow.  
 
This is an important point. The law cannot merely be equated with judicial decisions, because 
judicial decisions may misapply the law. If the claim that judicial interpretation is the law is merely 
highlighting that judges have a large amount of power,569 it may be acceptable, but it is misleading 
if it is taken as a complete description of the law. 
 
Furthermore, this description of the law does not take into account what judicial decisions are based 
on. There has to be something prior to judicial decisions on which they are based. Judicial decisions 
are based on relevant legal considerations. Therefore, these considerations can be viewed as 
‘abstract law’. It is usually unnecessary, however, to posit the existence of abstract law. 
 
6. Does changing the words of statutes or other legal documents change the law?  
 
The answer to the question depends on how ‘the law’ is defined. An answer can be given based on a 
definition of the law as a system of legal categories to which items are assigned on the basis of 
relevant consideration. To the extent that changing the words of a legal document changes the legal 
considerations relevant to the legal categories embodied in that document, changing these words 
may change the law. The meaning of the word being interpreted is an important consideration, often 
the most important consideration, in legal interpretation. If the word is changed, this meaning can 
be changed, and thus the relevant legal considerations are changed, and the law may be changed. 
The law is changed if changing the word results in items being assigned to different legal 
categories. 
 
This, however, is clearly not the intention of the plain legal language proponents. Therefore, any 
simplification of the language of the law has to ensure that the meaning of the words remains 
unchanged. This can be done by providing definitions. Having said this, even if definitions are 
given, a simplification of the language in which the law is expressed can make the law uncertain 
and may result in the law being changed when judges interpret these words. 
                                               
569  See, for instance, Beth Packert’s description of Fred Rodell’s view that “[b]ecause the words of the Constitution 
could be twisted to mean nearly anything, those in charge of interpretation had tremendous power.” G Beth Packert 
“The Relentless Realist: Fred Rodell’s Life and Writings” (1984) 1984 U Ill L Rev 823 at 829. 
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D Judicial Interpretation and Categorisation 
 
7. When judges determine the meaning of language, do they create the law or do they merely 
interpret the meaning of the law?  
 
Chapter Two mentioned two basic views in relation to the role of judicial interpretation: that judicial 
interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of the law, and that judicial interpretation involves 
creating the law. Much has been written about this topic,570 and the details of this debate are beyond 
the scope of this discussion. To a certain extent, however, some of the arguments on either side of 
this debate may depend on the definition given to ‘the law’. This again is clarified when judicial 
interpretation is viewed as categorisation. 
 
Diagram 5.2, below, clarifies the nature of these two views of the role of judicial interpretation by 
viewing judicial interpretation571 as categorisation.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
570  For material written by judges extra-judicially on this topic, see James Reid “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972) 12 
JSPTL 22; Ruth McColl “The Art of Judging” (2008) 12 Southern Cross University L Rev 43; Michael Kirby 
“Judicial activism? A riposte to the counter-reformation” (2004) 24 Aust Bar Rev 219; and Aharon Barak Purposive 
Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005). 
571  This diagram covers the judicial interpretation of language. It does not relate to judicial decisions regarding the 
common law, which are sometimes referred to as ‘interpreting’ the law. See quotation in n 37. 
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This diagram shows that the two basic views regarding judicial interpretation may involve only an 
apparent distinction because they rely on a merely verbal difference in the definition given to ‘the 
law’. Often this definition is not stated explicitly but is implicitly assumed.  
 
Even in situations where there is a genuine question at issue – for instance, the issue of how much 
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discretion judges should have in interpretation – this issue may be obscured by the way the role of 
judicial interpretation in the law is described. The issue may be begged by the claim that judges 
either create the law or merely ascertain the meaning of the law. Arguments can be given in relation 
to the scope of discretion that should be given to judges. These arguments have not been discussed 
in this thesis. The point of this section is to show how this issue can be confused by an unreal 
distinction brought about by a mere verbal difference in the implicit definition given to ‘the law’. 
Merely saying that judges legislate or that judges ascertain the meaning of the law avoids 
addressing the real issue. 
 
Jerome Frank noted:572 
 
[I]t is impossible to anticipate with precision the multitude of particular circumstances which later arise, 
and which, although not within the literal words of the statute, can be argued to have been within its 
general scope. 
 
He also noted that “the legislature, not infrequently, uses words that are purposely vague, intending 
that the courts should work out the meaning as specific cases arise.”573 When a situation occurs that 
is possibly within the general scope of a provision, or when the legislature deliberately uses vague 
words, it is difficult to sustain the claim that judges merely ascertain the meaning of the law. To a 
certain extent, their task involves the creation of the law.574 On the other hand, even in such a 
situation, the claim that judges merely create the law can be misleading, since they are still engaged 
in interpretation and should be influenced by legal considerations relevant to this act of 
interpretation.  
 
E Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that the answer to some of the general questions raised in 
Chapter Two may depend on the definition given to the word ‘law’. This chapter has also shown 
how confusion can arise concerning the relationship between language and the law and the role of 
                                               
572  Frank, above n 20, at 293-294. 
573  Ibid, at 294. 
574  TRS Allan notes: “The notion of unqualified parliamentary sovereignty is ultimately grounded … in an implausible 
theory of statutory meaning or interpretation. It attributes legal authority to a formally enacted text on the 
assumption that the words can dictate a literal or ‘ordinary’ or intended meaning owing little or nothing to judicial 
construction or evaluation.” TRS Allan “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning, 
and Authority” (2004) 63 Cambridge LJ 685 at 689. 
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judicial interpretation in the law. This confusion can be dispelled when both the law itself and 
judicial interpretation are viewed in relation to categorisation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has investigated fallacies in judicial interpretation. It has shown that judges commit 
certain fallacies and has provided a way to detect these fallacies and arrive at alternative, non-
fallacious interpretations when they occur. 
 
The focus of this thesis has been on judicial interpretation which involves categorisation. Such 
categorisation needs to be based on relevant legal considerations. A consideration is irrelevant when 
it is not related to the specific act of categorisation in which judges are engaged. Relevant 
considerations include considerations related to the word being interpreted, the legal category 
designated by that word, items relevant to this act of categorisation, and general legal 
considerations.  
 
In Chapter One a fallacy in judicial interpretation was defined as an instance of judicial 
interpretation that is not legally justified and reaches the wrong result. In Chapter Three a more 
detailed definition of a judicial fallacy was provided. This definition was that an instance of judicial 
interpretation is fallacious when it takes into account an irrelevant consideration and it is most 
likely that a different result would have been reached if that consideration had been omitted, or 
when it omits a relevant legal consideration and it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if that relevant consideration had been taken into account. Such a fallacy is not legally 
justified because it is not justified by legally relevant considerations. Furthermore, such a fallacy 
reaches the wrong result because it is most likely that a different result would have been reached if 
any legally relevant considerations had been introduced and any irrelevant considerations had been 
omitted.  
 
Based on this general definition of fallacious interpretation, two specific fallacies have been 
identified: the ‘same verbal category’ fallacy and the ‘different verbal category’ fallacy. These 
fallacies occur when judges make an interpretive decision on the basis of the verbal category to 
which an item can be assigned rather than on the basis of the relevant legal considerations which 
determine the legal category to which it should be assigned. These fallacies both involve the 
introduction of an irrelevant consideration and usually involve the omission of relevant legal 
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considerations. This then causes a result to be reached which it is most likely would not have been 
reached if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted and any relevant considerations had been 
taken into account.  
 
These two fallacies are detected by assessing whether an instance of interpretation is merely based 
on the verbal category to which an item can be assigned or whether it is justified by relevant legal 
considerations. To do this, there is the need to identify the legal category at issue, the item that the 
judge has either included within this legal category or excluded from this category, and the relevant 
legal considerations which relate to this act of categorisation. It then needs to be determined 
whether the reasons that have been given for the act of categorisation that has occurred are relevant 
considerations. If the categorisation has been based on the irrelevant consideration of the verbal 
category to which the item can be assigned, and if it is most likely that a different result would have 
been reached if this irrelevant consideration had been omitted and the relevant legal considerations 
had been introduced, the decision is fallacious.575 Examples have been given of these two fallacies 
being committed by judges.  
 
Alternative, non-fallacious interpretations are reached by introducing relevant considerations and 
omitting irrelevant considerations. When this is done, a different result will be reached, that is, the 
item at issue will be categorised differently. Alternative, non-fallacious interpretations have been 
provided for the examples that have been given of the fallacies being committed by judges.  
 
Although this thesis is primarily focused on how to critique judicial decisions and detect fallacies, it 
has also provided a way for judges to avoid fallacies. When engaged in interpretation, judges can 
avoid fallacies by viewing the act of interpretation as categorisation and focusing on whether the 
item at issue should be assigned to the legal category designated by the word being interpreted. 
Whether the item should be assigned to this legal category can be determined by the legal 
considerations that are relevant to this specific act of categorisation.576 Viewing judicial 
interpretation in relation to categorisation, therefore, provides a helpful way to detect fallacies and a 
helpful way for judges to avoid fallacies. As shown in Chapter Five, viewing both the law generally 
and legal interpretation specifically in relation to categorisation also provides a useful way to clarify 
the relationship between law and language and the role of judicial interpretation in the law.  
                                               
575  Chart 4.3 sets out the process of detecting fallacies. 
576  Chart 4.1 sets out the relevant legal considerations which judges need to take into account when engaged in 
interpretation. 
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This thesis opened with the epigraph: “The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the 
sabbath.”577 Similarly, the law exist to serve society; society does not exist to serve the law. In 
relation to judicial interpretation which involves categorisation, judges should not primarily focus 
on ascertaining the meaning of words. Rather, they should focus on whether the item before the 
court should be assigned to the legal category at issue. That is, they should not start with the legal 
category, and inflexibly assign items to it based on the apparent meaning of the words designating 
this category. This is to approach the task from the wrong direction. Rather, they should start with 
the factual situation before the court and determine how it should be legally classified. To do this, it 
is helpful to view such instances of judicial interpretation as categorisation based on relevant legal 
consideration, rather than merely as the discovery of the meaning of the words being interpreted. 
                                               
577  See text accompanying n 1. 
217 
 
APPENDIX ONE GLOSSARY 
 
This glossary collects some important words defined in Chapters Three and Four. The words 
defined in Chapters Three and Four are grouped separately and are listed alphabetically within each 
group.  
 
Chapter Three 
 
Arbitrary: a connection between a word and a thought that it is not natural, intrinsic or necessary. 
 
Convention: an agreed association between a word and a thought.  
 
Fallacy: an unreasonable interpretation where an interpreter arrives at a meaning that is not justified 
given the relevant considerations indicating the meaning being expressed by the speaker. A fallacy 
can be committed when speakers either introduce irrelevant considerations or omit relevant 
considerations. 
 
Ineffable: a thought is ineffable for a speaker when the speaker does not know which word to use 
to encapsulate that thought; a thing is ineffable for a speaker when a speaker does not know which 
word to use to describe that thing. 
 
Interpretation: the interpreter objectively ascertaining a speaker’s meaning.  
 
Meaning: the thought associated with a word. It is necessary to distinguish between the speaker’s 
meaning, the interpreter’s meaning and the general conventional meaning of a word. 
 
Meaningless: a word is meaningless to an interpreter when it does not generate any thought in the 
interpreter’s mind.  
 
Referent: the thing to which a thought generated by a word refers and, therefore, the thing for 
which a word stands.  
 
218 
 
Speaking: the encapsulation of a speaker’s thought in language. ‘Speaking’ includes any 
encapsulation of a thought in language, including writing. 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Because Chapter Four has given stipulative definitions to the words and phrases listed below, the 
definitions given here are more detailed than the definitions for Chapter Three. 
 
Item: the specific matter before the court which has prompted the instance of interpretation and 
which needs to be categorised. The court has to decide whether to include this item within the legal 
category designated by the word being interpreted or to exclude this item from that category. When 
an item is included within a legal category, this item can be viewed as the referent of the word 
designating the legal category.  
 
Judicial fallacy: an instance of interpretation that is not legally justified and reaches the wrong 
result. This means that the interpretation is made based on irrelevant considerations which do not 
relate to the specific act of categorisation in which the court is engaged rather than relevant legal 
considerations which do relate to this act of categorisation, and this affects the result reached. 
 
Legal category: a legal category is the category designated by the word being judicially 
interpreted. For instance, if the word ‘vehicle’ is used in a certain statutory provision and this word 
is being interpreted, the legal category is the category designated by this word. The court needs to 
determine whether to assign the item at issue to this legal category. 
 
Legal ineffability: a thought is legally ineffable for a legal speaker when the speaker does not 
know which words to use to correctly encapsulate this thought. This means that the legal speaker 
does not know which words to use to create a legal category with a certain consequence. 
 
Legal interpretation / Judicial interpretation: the process by which judges assign a meaning to a 
word. The interpretation covered in this thesis involves judges deciding whether to assign the item 
before the court to the legal category designated by the word being interpreted. Such an assignment 
needs to be based on relevant legal considerations. 
 
Legal meaninglessness: a word is legally meaningless to a judge when the reason for the existence 
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of the legal category which it designates and the kind of items that should be included within this 
category are unclear to this judge. 
 
Legal speaking: The process by which the language being interpreted by the judiciary comes into 
being and is given meaning by legal speakers. This involves the creation of legal categories to 
which items can be assigned by judicial interpretation.  
 
Legal word: the word being judicially interpreted. 
 
Relevant legal consideration: a consideration that is relevant to the assignment of an item to a 
legal category. A consideration is relevant when it is related to the specific act of categorisation in 
which the court is engaged. Relevant considerations include considerations related to the word 
being interpreted, the legal category designated by that word, items relevant to this act of 
categorisation, and general legal considerations. 
 
Verbal category: the word or words by which a legal category is designated. For instance, the word 
‘vehicle’ may be used in a certain statutory provision to designate a legal category of items to which 
that provision applies. An item may fit within the verbal category ‘vehicle’ according to common 
usage, but may not be an item that should be assigned to this legal category.  
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APPENDIX TWO DIAGRAMS 
This appendix collects the diagrams from Chapters Three and Four together. 
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